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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

THE ROLE OF SEXUAL DIFFERENCE IN PLATO’S TIMAEUS
My dissertation is a reading of Plato’s Timaeus that centers sexual difference and in
particular femininity. I analyze the role of sexual difference in the framing of the dialogue
as well as its accounts of body in the first and second discourse and its account of health in
the third discourse. I argue that sexual difference, and, in particular, sexual reproduction,
serves as a guiding paradigm of Timaeus’ entire project. I argue in each part of my
dissertation that various aspects of the Timaeus depend on a certain notion of sexual
difference—even aspects which are seemingly causally prior to the issue of sexual
difference (e.g., the nature of cause itself, structure). The dissertation consists of three parts.
In the first part of my dissertation, I give a new reading of the myth of the origin of women
at the end of the Timaeus and bring it into conversation with the dialogue’s opening in
order to give an interpretation of the dialogue’s framing. I analyze the concept of sexual
difference presented in this myth and argue that its philosophical richness has been
overlooked, with many considering it to be either a joke or a sexist account. Focusing on
Timaeus’s account of the woman’s relationship with her womb, I argue that womanhood
in this myth is constituted by features that are elsewhere characterized as essentially
philosophical (e.g., collaboration, making room, recognizing the complex structure of
things, and nurture). In the second part of my dissertation, I introduce the two paradigms
for the origin and composition of the cosmos in the Timaeus: the first discourse’s craft
paradigm that construes the cosmos as a crafted artifact, and the second discourse’s genetic
paradigm that construes the cosmos as a birthed organism. I am especially concerned with
each discourse’s account of body. Here, I argue that the second discourse’s genetic
paradigm is a significant revision of the first discourse’s craft paradigm. While some
scholars have found that Timaeus’s insights in the second discourse are a further
development of the groundwork he lays in the first discourse, I argue that the genetic
paradigm’s focus on femininity and the mutual collaboration of masculine and feminine
capacities is incompatible with the craft paradigm’s androcentrism. Finally, in the third
part of my dissertation, I analyze the way that the Timaeus centers women’s bodies in its
account of health in body and soul. Here, I argue that the Timaeus characterizes health by
drawing on ideas about women’s bodies that are framed as symptoms of feminine disease

in the Hippocratic texts (e.g., disequilibrium, flux, and porosity). Taken together, the three
articles of my dissertation constitute a reading of the role of sexual difference in each part
of the Timaeus.
KEYWORDS: Plato, Timaeus, Ancient Greek Philosophy, Ancient Greek Medicine,
Hippocrates, Sexual Difference
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CHAPTER 1. SEXUAL DIFFERENCE AND THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE
BEGINNING AND END OF PLATO’S TIMAEUS
1.1

Timaeus’ Karmic Myth: Comedy, Sexism, or Serious?

From the outset, Timaeus warns us that his speech will have a unique standard of evidence
and not always agree with itself. In fact, as he is describing the peculiarity of his method,
he tells Socrates to expect a certain degree of disunity and disagreement within the speech:
So then, Socrates, if, in saying many things on many topics concerning gods and the
birth of the all, we prove to be incapable of rendering speeches that are always and
in all respects in agreement with themselves and drawn with precision, don’t be
surprised. 1
Timaeus goes to great lengths to assist the reader in this respect. He reminds us on multiple
occasions to consider and appreciate the strangeness of his way of explaining things. 2 The
strangeness of his speech takes place as a struggle or an ambition rather than a sure thing;
Timaeus says that it is difficult to make things clear and often opens topics by proclaiming
that he must try to make them clear. At various points throughout the speech, he describes
his method as ἄτοπος (out of place) and ἀήθης (unusual). 3 Throughout the speech, he gives
us every reason to expect strangeness in his explanations.

1

Timaeus 29c translated by Peter Kalkavage.
C.f., 48c2-e1, “…it’s difficult to make plain what seems to be the case according to our present mode of
exposition. So, for your part, don’t suppose that I must speak of it … But by safeguarding what we declared
at the beginning—the power of likely accounts—I’ll attempt to give an account not less likely but more so,”
53c1-3, “So now I must try to make plain to you, by means of an unusual account…,” and 72d4-8 “Only if
god gave his consent, only then, could we insist that the truth has been spoken; but we must utterly risk the
claim that what we’ve said is at the very least likely, both now and even more so as we continue to investigate
further.”
3 Timaeus, 48d, 53c. Timaeus characterization of the strangeness of his speech seems to be limited to a certain
aspect. He does not describe his as strange in the sense that it is novel (e.g., καίνος or νέος), foreign (e.g.,
ἀλλότριος, ἀλλόφυλος, ὀθνεῖος), or astonishing (e.g., δεινός, θαυμαστός). It is strange in the sense that it is
odd; the speech is contrary to that to which we are accustomed (i.e., ἀήθης, ἄτοπος).
2

As strange as the dialogue is, the ending of the Timaeus is perplexing even
according to the Timaeus’ exceptional standard of perplexity. Timaeus ends his final
speech with a karmic myth explaining how sexual difference and non-human animals came
to be. The beginning of the myth (90e-91d) deals with sexual difference, giving special
attention to “the origin of women and the entire female sex” (91d). According to this myth,
women are the reincarnations of cowardly and unjust men. 4 It is difficult to know what to
make of this account of the origin of women, especially given the way that the beginning
of the dialogue foregrounds the elevated status of women in the ideal city. 5 This seems to
be a significant inconsistency of the Timaeus. Many choose to dismiss the seriousness of
the karmic myth, thinking of it as a comedy or a farce. 6 More charitable interpreters see
the myth as a test for the reader, while those less charitable read it as expressly misogynistic
thinking. In particular, the account of the wandering womb (91c) is frequently cited as a
locus classicus of misogyny and notions of the hysterical woman. 7
Must we understand the dialogue’s closing myth as misogynistic or absurd to the
degree that it is no longer philosophical? My project here is to read this myth with a straight
face. I see my analysis of the karmic myth as a reading that adheres to Timaeus’ instructions

4 See 90e-91a. As Timaeus notes, he is taking this cue from something he mentioned in the first discourse at
42b: “he who had failed to live well would, in his second birth, take on woman’s nature.”
5 The equal civic status of women and making childrearing a task of the city rather than a task for women is
the main topic of Socrates’ political preface to the dialogue at 17a-19b.
6 Taylor says, “we can be sure that Plato is not in earnest with [the origin of sex],” (p. 635). Miller (2003)
says: “there is a provocative humor in Timaeus’ karmic myth, all the more so because it is double edged. …
Can we help but smile at the vivid image of the phallus as an ‘unruly animal with a mind of its own’ that
‘tries to overpower all else with its frantic desires’? But does this image not give the lie to the story it is part
of, the story of how the gods fashioned the female form? As the reincarnation befitting men unable to master
their passions?” (p. 50).
7 See Bianchi’s “The Errant Feminine in Plato’s Timaeus: “This is this same errancy, straying, or wandering,
(planomenon) that Plato attributes to the womb at the very end of the dialogue, in a passage that (alongside
Hippocrates) is a locus classicus for the malady of hysteria,” (p. 89).

2

for engaging with his speech. Namely, I take the myth seriously in its strangeness and
investigate the philosophical insights that such strangeness provides an occasion for.
In my analysis, I will make three arguments. First, I argue that, taken seriously, the
karmic myth presents a sophisticated account of sexual difference. This account is more
complicated than—and in fact, totally rejects—the seeming notion that men are good and
establish a norm while women are bad and stray from that norm. Here, I observe the ways
that Timaeus complicates the issue of sexual difference by avoiding locating sexual
difference in either the body or soul. The karmic myth instead characterizes sexual
difference in terms of each sex’s relationship to its respective set of reproductive
equipment. 8 On this model, men are characterized by their effort to master their autocratic
genitals, while women are physiologically compelled to cooperate with the desires of their
wombs.
Second, after establishing the account of sexual difference in the karmic myth, I
argue that womanhood on this model is characterized by features that are elsewhere
characterized as essentially philosophical (e.g., collaboration, making room, recognizing
the complex structure of things, nurture, etc.). I make my argument by analyzing the
woman’s relationship with her womb, reproductive partner, and offspring in the karmic
myth. Again, to establish the familiarity of this kind of an account of womanhood in Plato’s
writing, I consider instances in which Plato uses feminine capacities such as pregnancy and
midwifery to characterize crucially philosophical projects elsewhere in his writing,
especially his Symposium and Theaetetus.

8 I.e.,

humans’ god-given ζῷα that Timaeus introduces at 91a.

3

Finally, I address the seeming inconsistency between the karmic myth’s assessment
of women and the dialogue’s opening suggestion that women should share equal status
with men in the city. I argue that my reading of the karmic myth resolves any perceived
tension between the dialogue’s beginning (i.e., Socrates’ preface) and end. I analyze the
way that Socrates’ preface, which foregrounds issues of sexual difference and childbearing,
presents a scheme in which men and women share equality by making childbearing a
matter of the city rather than the family. Politically, men in the ideal city enjoy the same
obligation to childbearing that women possess biologically, and, in turn, women’s
physiological dependencies find new expression as civic duty.

1.2

Sexual Difference in the Karmic Myth (90e-91d)

The Timaeus ends with an account of how different kinds of humans (i.e., sexed humans)
and the rest of the animals are born, told as a karmic myth. 9 My purpose in this section is
to analyze the account of sexual difference at the heart of the final myth in Timaeus. Once
I have developed the myth’s notion of sexual difference and of womanhood, I will compare
the myth’s commitments with the political ideas about sexual difference from the
beginning of the dialogue.
Once Timaeus finishes his account of human health and disease in the third discourse,
he turns to the assignment Critias gave him for his speech 10:
Now, at this point, what we were commanded to do at the beginning, to go through
an account of the all down to human birth, seems to have nearly reached its end. For
9 Of course, he also presents the origin of non-human animals (91d-92c), but that’s beyond the scope of what

we’re looking at in this paper.
“It seemed good to us that since Timaeus here is the most astronomical of us and has made it his special
task to know about the nature of the all, he should speak first, beginning from the birth of the cosmos and
ending in the nature of humans,” 27a.
10

4

how the rest of the animals were born must be recalled only briefly: there’s no
necessity to speak of this at length. In this way, we would seem to preserve more of
a measure with ourselves in our accounts of these things. So let what we say be as
follows. 11
Timaeus introduces the following myth by suggesting that he will be giving a zoogony.
However, his account down to human birth is nearly (σχεδόν) finished, but not entirely.
That account reaches its end with the following anthropogony at 90e-91d, which precedes
the story of the origin of animals and sets down the origin of sexual difference in humans
and other animals. 12
The first page of Timaeus’ karmic myth is an anthropogony in multiple senses. On
the one hand, it is an account of how male and female humans came to be as sexually
distinct beings. On the other hand, it is an account of human birth itself and the role
reproduction plays in the lives of men and women. Sexual difference is a crucial concept
in each case. However, as integral as sexual difference may be to Timaeus’ final task, it is
a surprisingly difficult notion to pin down in the myth. Although the myth is ostensibly
accounting for the difference between men and women and how they came to be, Timaeus
does not clearly locate the site of sexual difference in the soul or body. Timaeus gestures
toward the soul and the body in the myth but ultimately denies both as explanations of
sexual difference. I will argue that, instead, he explains sexual difference as a matter of
each sex’s relationship to the god-given ensouled ζῷα with whom they share a body—their
reproductive equipment.

11 Timaeus
12 “That’s

90e.
how women and the entire female sex were born,” 91d.

5

1.2.1

Soul

In the beginning of the karmic myth, it appears as if Timaeus will account for sexual
difference as in terms of moral psychology. He introduces the issue of sexual difference
with a karmic framework:
Among those who were born men (ἀνδρῶν), all that were cowardly and lived an
unjust life were, according to the likely account (κατὰ λόγον τὸν εἰκότα), 13
transplanted in their second birth as women. 14
This initial characterization seems to make sexual difference a matter of moral psychology:
men are formerly virtuous people and women are formerly vicious people. The conditions
of the woman’s embodiment are caused by the fact that, in her past life she strayed from
the moral norm by living in a way that was cowardly and unjust. The moral quality of her
past life determines her status as woman, and in this way moral psychology is deeply
connected to the matter of her womanhood. 15

13 Timaeus begins his karmic myth with an appeal to a claim about gender and moral psychology from much

earlier in his speech. Here, he appears to be referencing his claim at 42b-c: “but he who had failed to live
well would, in his second birth, take on a woman’s nature.”
14 90e-91a. While Timaeus tells us about the kinds of lives women lived in their previous life—namely, lives
that were male, cowardly, and unjust—he does not reveal the kind of life that human men lived in their
previous lives. Perhaps Timaeus is positing human men as the primary forms of mortal living beings. On the
contrary, Strauss takes it that the karmic myth suggests sexual difference arrives on the scene simultaneously,
making the original humans sexless, or “sexless males” (The City and the Man, p. 111, note 42). If this is
the case, the quality of a human male’s previous life remains a mystery.
15 This has some interesting implications for the nature of the relationship between spheres that seem
categorically distinct, especially the relationship between metaphysical and ethical categories. The conditions
of a woman’s embodiment—the way her body is structured and arranged as a female body, as opposed to a
male body—blurs metaphysical and ethical lines. Is womanhood a category of a kind of being metaphysically
or ethically? If woman really is a different kind of being than man structurally or categorically, then
womanhood seems to be a metaphysical category. Her body, a massively constraining feature of her being,
the thing that makes moving around and engaging and acting in the world possible, is determined by the
unrestrained moral conduct of another, to whom her connection is meaningful only really in name; the
identity of the soul may be the same, but none of its experience seems to be. However, as we have seen,
Timaeus presents sexual difference as a distinction with ethical causes and effects. Womanhood is caused by
a kind of ethical straying—the poor moral conduct of the past life of the woman—and her womanhood has
an ethical fallout. As a woman, a person’s social entanglements are, by necessity, more complicated and
deeply committed than a man’s in that her health and well-being is at stake in her social commitments to her

6

Although there is an undeniable connection between moral psychology and sexual
difference, further analysis reveals that sexual difference is not defined by moral
psychology. Deviant moral conduct establishes the origin of sexual difference but does not
account for any difference between actual men and women. Sex is determined by one’s
past life, a life which is not one’s own. That a woman is a woman is determined by her past
moral conduct, but this, so far, says nothing about the woman’s life as a woman or what it
means to be a woman. Women can be just and men can be unjust on this scheme. While
moral psychology can be called the cause of sexual difference on the myth’s account, it
does not account for the differences between individual men and women. The introduction
of sexual categories hints at the soul as the defining feature of sexual difference, but instead
makes moral psychology distinct from sexual difference.
Timaeus gives us other reasons not to think of the soul as being inherently sexed,
and, therefore, not to think of sexual difference as being a matter of the soul. There is a
relationship between one’s soul and her sex insofar as her sex is determined by past moral
conduct, but Timaeus does not say anything to suggest that men and women could be
distinguished by anything about their souls. Over the course of various lives, the souls of
mortal beings (at least the immortal soul that survives the death of the body) are
“transplanted” (μετεφύοντο, 90e8) between different kinds of bodies, from sexually
distinct bodies to bodies of different animal species. As the karmic myth goes on to explain,
the soul of a human man or woman may at some point in the future occupy the body of a
bird, a beast of the land, or a fish. 16 The soul in itself is not limited to a certain sex category
reproductive partner and offspring. The woman’s offspring and sexual partner are not subject to the same
high stakes toward the woman as wife or mother.
16 See

91d, 91e, and 92a, respectively.

7

on this scheme any more than it is limited to a certain species category. Further, Timaeus
gives no indication that his earlier description of immortal human soul applies to only one
sex, or that there would be a separate account for female souls.
1.2.2

Body

The next part of the myth gestures to the body as the possible site of sexual difference. As
Timaeus continues, he distinguishes the sexes based on a person’s reproductive equipment,
which he sets apart from the human as an ensouled animal in its own right:
And it was at that very time and at that reason that gods built (ἐτεκτήναντο) the love
of sexual intercourse by constructing one sort of ensouled animal (ζῷον…ἐμψυχον)
in us and other sort in women, in either case having some manner as this. 17
This elaboration gets us closer the heart of the myth’s concept of sexual difference,
but Timaeus’ language still leaves ambiguity. The different types of ensouled animals
correspond with sexual difference, but, as distinct entities, they do not constitute a precise
bodily difference between men and women. Although a person’s reproductive equipment
is incorporated into her body, it is not a part of her in the same way the other parts of her
body belong to her. The animals that the gods place in human bodies have their own souls,
bodies, and desires that are distinct from—and often come into conflict with—those of the
men and women they inhabit. While a woman’s liver or the heart undoubtedly make up
and belong to the woman’s body, the womb is more of a roommate with the woman.
Timaeus gives us other reasons not to see sexual difference as a properly somatic
distinction. Based on this passage, one’s reproductive role is a consequence of one’s sex
rather than the defining feature of it. Timaeus has one’s reproductive role correspond with

17 Timaeus

91a.
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one’s sex, but precisely speaking, he presents male and female as categories that precede
sexual reproduction. Timaeus says that the gods built the ensouled animals according to
the categories of sexual difference—one in men and another in women (ἐν ταῖς γυναιξίν).
We are also encouraged not to see sexual difference as a somatic issue when we consider
that Timaeus’ anatomical and physiological account, like his psychological account,
applies to both sexes. 18 This is a marked departure from, for instance, some of the
Hippocratic texts, which represent a contemporaneous framework for understanding sexual
difference. The Hippocratics describe “male” and “female” as broad-reaching categories.
They explain female bodies as entirely physiologically distinct from men’s bodies (e.g., in
terms of humors, composition, and standards of health). In other words, in the medical
tradition, male and female are not distinguished purely according to reproductive roles;
their entire physical composition is supposed to be different—the flesh in women’s bodies
is porous, imbalanced, and full of winding passageways, while men’s bodies are compact
and balanced. 19 No such anatomical disparities are represented in any part of the Timaeus.
Instead, Timaeus seems to reject that bodily account of sexual difference by giving a basic
account of human anatomy and physiology that is common to both sexes.
Timaeus takes careful steps to avoid characterizing sexual difference as a matter of
the soul or the body. In fact, it’s difficult to describe any ways that men and women differ

18

Cornford says: “In the machinery of the myth, the creation of the sexual parts and of the desire for
intercourse is postponed until the whole account of the human body is complete and the moment comes for
the less satisfactory men to be reincarnated as women (91e). … We are left to conjecture the reasons for this
curious plan. It is not enough to say that differences of sex are postponed because the whole account of the
human soul and body applies equally to men and women, though this may be true” (291-2).
19 C.f. Diseases of Women I 1.12-14: “A woman is more porous and softer than a man; this being so, a woman
draws what is being exhaled from her cavity more quickly and in a greater amount than does a man’s,” and,
“a woman has hotter blood, and for this reason she herself is hotter than a man … A man, having solider
flesh than a woman, will never overfill with so much blood that … he feels pain” (translated by Potter).
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in soul or body in what we have looked at so far. The psychological differences between
men and women do not strictly speaking belong to them as men or women, they belong
instead to their past lives which were not necessarily embodied according to the same
gender or even the same species. We find the same difficulty with somatic differences.
Differences in the bodies of men and women do not strictly speaking belong to them as
men and women, they belong to other “animals” with whom they coinhabit a body. Further,
these animals appear to be a consequence of sexual difference rather than the explanation
of it.
1.2.3

“Ensouled Animals”

The remainder of Timaeus’ comments on human birth deal with men’s and
women’s ensouled animals, the animals’ desires, and how those desires guide—or, in the
woman’s case, force—humans to behave in certain ways. Timaeus goes to great lengths to
distance a person from her womb. However, while distinct from men and women, the
ensouled animals are the key players in Timaeus’s account of sexual difference. This is not
to say that sexual difference amounts only to the difference between male and female
reproductive equipment, though; it would be a mistake to reduce a man to his genitals or a
woman to her womb. In fact, men and women are, as Timaeus shows us with this myth,
often in conflict with their animals. For instance, as I will explore further below, Timaeus
says that the womb desires childbearing, and that if a woman does not become pregnant in
the appropriate season of life, 20 the womb suffocates the woman until she conceives a child.
These conflicts are at the heart of sexual difference in the karmic myth. Men and women
cannot be distinguished by psychological or somatic differences alone. The difference

20 Reading
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between men and women depends on the way that each sex copes with the desires of their
reproductive equipment. Sexual difference in the karmic myth is, I find, a matter of
constraints for one’s ability to navigate conflicts and allegiances.
Men’s and women’s experiences with reproduction in the myth differ in the degree
to which they are forced to confront their ensouled animal. Men are able to get in control
of their sexual desire with the right education and practice. They need not be controlled by
that desire, and Timaeus—as well as custom—treats it as both a moral vice and a physical
disease when men are controlled by their sexual desire. 21 Men as beings who are male are
characterized and evaluated by their ability to cope with this desire, with the healthiest,
most virtuous, and most nearly immortal man being the one who is fully in control of his
desire. 22 In contrast, women have no hope of controlling the will of their ensouled animal
through any degree of education, practice, or physical exercise. The womb is simply too
powerful for a woman to master because of its ability to wander through her body and,
consequently, hold her life hostage. Due to the womb’s power in getting its way, women’s
virtue is not a matter of overcoming her womb’s desire for childbearing. A woman’s goal
cannot be to dominate or control the desires of her womb. Instead, she must find a way of
working together with it. Here precisely lies the nature of sexual difference in the karmic
myth: men relate to their ensouled animal in a struggle for dominance, while women relate

21 C.f.

86c-e: “When the seed from a man’s marrow-area grows copious and free-flowing beyond measure,
he brings on himself again and again many intense pains and many pleasures amid his desires and their
offspring; and he comes to be raving mad for the greater part of his life through those greatest pleasures and
pains; and although he has a soul that’s diseased and thoughtless under the influence of the body, people hold
the opinion that he’s willingly bad. But the truth is that sexual incontinence has come about as a disease of
the soul.”
22 C.f. 90b: “So when someone has fallen in with desires or contentions and labors away at them intensely,
all his decrees grow utterly mortal…but when someone devotes himself to the love of learning and to true
prudence, and has exercised himself in these things above all others, then there’s every necessity, I suppose,
that … he doesn’t fall short of [immortality].”
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to theirs through necessary mutual collaboration. Even within the context of the myth,
Timaeus shows us that the feminine need for negotiation extends beyond its manifestation
in sexual reproduction. Women are forced to confront their vulnerability and obligations
to not only their wombs, but also to a male sexual partner, their offspring, and a past life
of which they have no experience.
The woman’s various reproductive obligations provide occasions to explore the
notion of womanhood as a state of being forced to negotiate conflict rather than dominate
it. In the next section, I will unpack these commitments and, consequently, the properties
and behaviors that the Timaeus frames as being inherently feminine. Specifically, I am
going to examine three ways in which women are compelled to negotiate conflict in the
karmic myth. First, I will look further at the way a woman is beholden to the desires of her
womb, and how she deals with the threat of suffocation when the womb’s desires are not
satisfied by conceiving a child. Next, as an extension of the woman’s relationship to her
womb, I will consider her reliance on a male sexual partner to conceive a child and satisfy
her womb’s desires. 23 Finally, I will examine the woman’s physiological commitment to
her offspring in pregnancy. I will argue that Timaeus’ explanation of womanhood through
these relationships represents an essentially philosophical way of being according to the
values expressed in the Timaeus and Plato’s other dialogues. 24

23

According to familial custom, this would be the woman’s husband. However, as I will explore further
below, Timaeus curiously avoids any familial language in the karmic myth—there is no mention of husbands,
marriage, or even children. A woman’s offspring is characterized as a ζῷον that grows inside her, and her
sexual partner in reproduction is not given any title or description. Of the man, Timaeus says only that “the
desire of the one and the love of the other bring the sexes together; and, as if plucking fruit from trees, they
sow in the womb…” (91d).
24 In fact, according to much of what Plato has to say about philosophical virtue, the way the woman is
beholden to others in negotiating conflict is more philosophically virtuous than the characteristically
masculine pursuit of domination in conflict.
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1.3

The Philosophical Virtue of Femininity

As I unpack Timaeus’ characterization of sexual difference and womanhood in particular
in the karmic myth, I will be arguing that the traits that constitute femininity (e.g. the
capacity to nurture, make room for others, and collaborate rather than dominate) are
familiar to us as traits that exemplify philosophical virtue in Plato’s other dialogues. Before
I continue my analysis of the karmic myth, I will explain what I mean when I call something
a “philosophical virtue.” I do not intend to discuss a system of ethics in a rigorous sense.
Rather, when I refer to philosophical virtue, I mean to designate behaviors, habits,
techniques, or dispositions that are essentially philosophical. I consider philosophical
virtues to be behaviors that are virtuous insofar as someone is a philosopher, or, in other
words, the behaviors that constitute philosophical conduct. These behaviors distinguish the
aspiring philosopher from the non-philosopher.
In the dialogues, Plato’s characters often discuss proper and improper ways of doing
philosophy. They show us that philosophical method is something that can be both used
and abused. In the Republic, for instance, Socrates warns of the dangers of introducing
people to argumentation when they are too young. He says that “when young people get
their first taste of arguments, they misuse it by treating it as a kind of game of
contradiction.” 25 However, it is not only the young who use argumentation
unphilosophically. Plato often uses characters in his dialogue to demonstrate philosophical
and unphilosophical conduct. Characters like Meno, Thrasymachus, Euthydemus and
Dionysodorus and, to a lesser extent, Euthyphro and Theodorus serve as examples of

25

539b, trans. Grube and Reeve.
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people who use discourse and inquiry in an unphilosophical way. 26 These characters and
their misuse of argumentation can be distinguished by the ends and means of their
discourse. Generally speaking, eristic argumentation appears similar to philosophy but is
set apart by its goal (i.e., winning the argument rather than getting at the truth) and the way
it goes about achieving that goal (i.e., the use of rhetoric to support the speaker’s hypothesis
rather than test it).
This unphilosophical misuse of discourse stands in contrast with the philosophical
project. While eristic discourse seeks to win arguments by means of rhetoric and
persuasion, philosophy aims to test the truth of ideas. This is the way Socrates describes
his project in the Theaetetus, comparing his philosophical art to midwifery:
The most important thing about my art is the ability to apply all possible tests to the
offspring, to determine whether the young mind is being delivered of a phantom, that
is, an error, or a fertile truth. 27
Prioritizing the truth over one’s own hypothesis is characteristic of philosophy. Rather than
an attachment to any one hypothesis or claim, a philosophical attitude entails an openness
to resistance. Consider, for instance, Timaeus’ exhortation in the second discourse as he
explores which triangle is the most beautiful and makes up bodies:
If, then, someone could tell of one that’s more beautiful that he’s selected for the
construction of these bodies, then he wins the mastery not as enemy but as friend. 28
Philosophy seeks to recognize what is true rather than dominate an opponent through
persuasion and rhetoric. In recognizing what is true, the philosopher makes room for
dissent and decenters herself in the discourse. In some dialogues, this aim is carried out in

26

And, to a lesser extent, Euthyphro and Theodorus. This list is not meant to be comprehensive.
150c. It is noteworthy that Socrates compares the philosophical project of testing the truth of
ideas with the midwife’s art assisting in childbirth. I will return to this analogy later in my project.
28 Timaeus 54a.
27 Theaetetus.
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dialectic—a method of division that seeks to identify what is and separate like from like.
Discourse with these aims is philosophically virtuous.
I find that Timaeus’ characterization of womanhood is informed by these same ideals.
I will argue that this is demonstrated in the myth’s account of the woman’s obligations to
her womb, sexual partner, and offspring.
1.3.1

The Womb and Sexual Intercourse

In the karmic myth, the most evident way that women are constrained in their ability to
navigate conflict has to do with the womb. The woman is physically compelled to answer
to the desire of her womb:
Whenever [the womb] comes to be fruitless long beyond its due season, it grows
difficult and irritable; and wandering everywhere throughout the body it blocks up
the breathing passages, and by not allowing breathing throws one into the most
extreme frustrations (ἀπορίας τὰς ἐσχάτας) and brings on all sorts of other diseases,
until the desire of the one and the love of the other bring the sexes together. 29
In this myth, a woman’s health and relationship to childbearing consists of two distinct
physical dependencies. These dependencies compel the woman to accommodate the
desires of her womb and collaborate with a male sexual partner. First, because the woman’s
life can be jeopardized by the womb blocking her breathing passages, her health depends
on the position and behavior of her womb. By not allowing breathing, the womb throws a
woman into the most extreme bodily aporia. While this description is unpleasant, the
woman’s vulnerability to intensely painful aporia is not a weakness. In addition to her
dependency on her womb, the woman depends on a male sexual partner in order to
conceive a child and satisfy her womb’s desires.

29 Timaeus

91c-d.

15

1.3.1.1 Dependency and Collaboration
To understand the woman’s dependency on her womb, we should first return to the man’s
relationship with his ensouled animal. Timaeus᾽myth begins with a description of the male
genitals:
From the passageway by which drink goes out, where it receives the liquid that comes
through the lungs down into the kidneys and on into the bladder and ejects it with
marrow that extends from the head down along the neck and through the spine; and
since this marrow was ensouled and had found a vent, it instilled in that very part
where it found a vent a lively desire through emission and thus produced a love of
begetting. This is why the nature of the genitals is autocratic, like an animal that
won’t listen to reason, and attempts to master all things through its stinging desires. 30
After outlining the ensouled animal in men, Timaeus introduces the womb:
Again, for the same reason, 31 there’s the matrix or so-called womb in women, which
is an indwelling animal desirous of childbearing. 32
The ensouled animal in women differs from the one in men in the content of its desire and
the way it goes about achieving that desire. The man’s ensouled animal desires emission;
the marrow simply wants out. 33 This desire is constant, unrelenting, and insensitive to
circumstance. Timaeus says that the ensouled animal in the man “always attempts to master
all things.” The womb’s desire—childbearing—is more complex. Unlike the unrelenting
desire of the male animal, the womb is sensitive to circumstance. While the male animal is
always trying to control the man, the womb takes action to control the woman and achieve

30

Timaeus 91a-b.

31 The “same reason” seems to be the coming-to-be of the two sexes, referring back to 90e-91a. I.e., “Among

those who were born men, all that were cowardly and unjust were, according to the likely account,
transplanted in their second birth as women; and it was at that very time and for that reason that the gods
built the love of sexual intercourse by constructing one sort of ensouled animal in us and another sort in
women,” (90e-91a).
32 Timaeus 91b.
33 The animal’s desire in turn produces a love of begetting. It is ambiguous whether the man or the genitals
possess this love, I am inclined to think that the man possesses the love of begetting while the animal
possesses the desire to emit. These do not seem like animals complex enough to have both desire and love. I
think 91d1 reinforces this interpretation.
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its desires only when the season of childbearing is unfulfilled. Further, the womb is not
only sensitive to circumstance, it has some care for measure. The womb does not simply
try to master the woman for the sake of mastery. Rather, Timaeus says that it becomes
unruly only when it is fruitless long beyond its due season. 34
The woman’s reliance on her womb is mirrored by her reliance on her sexual
partner. The woman depends on her sexual partner because he provides something that she
could not in any circumstances procure for herself; a woman requires a man to conceive a
child. This alone does not make her dependent on him, though. A crucial aspect of her
dependency is that her health and well-being depends on what she can receive only from a
male sexual partner. On the model of the karmic myth, foregoing childbearing and leaving
the female body to its own devices results in blocked breathing passages and, consequently,
“all manner of diseases” (νόσους πανταδαπάς, 91c). The woman needs sexual intercourse
not only to propitiate her womb, but to be healthy in general. The Timaeus tells a relatively
happy ending to the woman’s troubles with her womb (the woman’s diseases last only until
they are relieved sexually) but gives no indication of how long the woman can endure these
pains, or what would happen if she refused to find a sexual partner. 35 The woman depends
on her sexual partner to live a tolerable life—without bearing children, she is vulnerable to
attack from within her own body.

34

ὅταν ἄκαρπον παρὰ τὴν ὥραν χρόνον πολὺν γίγνηται, 91c.
ancient sources—to whatever degree they describe a similar phenomenon, which it seems that they
do—demonstrate the life-or-death stakes of this disease for the woman. The Hippocratic tradition describes
a virgin’s disease in which the womb terrorizes a girl in a similar way if she does not start having sex with
men at the time of menarche. For more on the virgin’s disease, see On Girls, and Diseases of Women I 2.1417, Generation 4, and Nature of Women 3.316.
35 Other
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Women categorically rely on men for their lives and well-being on this account. In
addition to being secondary to men in the logic of the anthropogony (i.e., some men take
their second birth as women), women’s lives depend on sexual reproduction with men.
However, I do not find that women’s dependency on men is an inherently misogynistic
characterization. As various interlocutors from other dialogues show us, dominance and
independence are not necessarily philosophically virtuous qualities. Philosophical
discourse puts us in a position of depending on a certain kind of engagement with others,
and women in this account are disposed to this way of being even in their physiology. The
woman, acting as womankind, does justice to men, her womb, and her body by conceiving
a child. Men do not on this account have the same universal relationship to reproduction.
The man does not do justice to anyone—least of all himself—by simply “emitting.” Rather,
virtue for the man involves overpowering the desire of his ensouled animal.
This difference in men’s and women’s relationships with their reproductive
equipment reflects a difference between eristic and philosophy. Timaeus characterizes the
male genitals in a way that reflects dishonest and willful people with whom Socrates speaks
in other dialogues (e.g., Euthyphro, Meno, Thrasymachus, Euthydemus and
Dionysodorus). This similarity lies in both the desire and the means of achieving that
desire. The male desire for emission does not require the presence or the consent of the
woman. Like male desire, these speakers’ desire to be correct does not have any need for
an interlocutor or partner in their correctness. Not only does dominance in discourse not
require cooperation from a conversational partner, but it also does not have the capacity
for such collaboration. For one’s position to be victorious in a debate, the enemy position
has to be vanquished. We see this in the disregard the dialogues’ vicious interlocutors show
18

for their conversation partners. They can achieve this desire without coming together with
others in philosophical dialogue. These vicious interlocutors can—and do—achieve the
feeling of victory or correctness that they desire through other, unphilosophical means.
Euthydemus and Dionysodorus run circles around others with rhetorical games, barely
acknowledging other perspectives. Euthyphro maintains his sense of rightness by not
testing his views.
The womb, on the other hand, represents a more philosophically virtuous way of
being. It operates in a way that resembles Socrates, or other interlocutors who care in
earnest for carrying out philosophical discourse with others. The womb is not incessant in
its attempts to get what it wants. Instead, it is sensitive to the circumstance of the other it
is trying to persuade, it is aware that there is an appropriate season or circumstance for
acting. This care for circumstance evokes instances in which Socrates relents from
questioning a frustrated interlocutor (e.g., When Socrates turns away from Meno and to the
slave in Meno). Additionally, the womb’s desire is for collaboration. According to
Timaeus—and this point differs from many of the Hippocratic accounts—the womb does
not desire moistness or to be moistened, it desires childbearing. Where the male desire for
emission—and the corresponding vicious desire for dominance or victory in discourse—
does not require collaboration from the other, childbearing is an inherently collaborative
effort.
Like the womb’s desire, philosophical discourse seeks collaboration rather than
domination. This should be unsurprising to us, given the frequency with which Plato uses
feminine capacities—especially feminine reproductive capacities—as analogies for
philosophical virtue elsewhere in his work. Looking back to the Theaetetus, Socrates
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characterizes his philosophical midwifery as an art that inherently requires collaboration
with another:
One thing which I have in common with the ordinary midwives is that I myself am
barren of wisdom. The common reproach against me is that I am always asking
questions of other people but never express my own views about anything, because
there is no wisdom in me; and that is true enough. And the reason of it is this, that
God compels me to attend the travail of others, but has forbidden me to procreate. …
But it is I, with God’s help, who deliver them of this offspring. 36
Socrates’ analogy is not an exact match to the description of womanhood in the karmic
myth, but his portrait of the midwife shares an important element with Timaeus’ woman:
both the midwife and Timaeus’ woman rely on another to bring about the birth of the
offspring.
1.3.1.2 Aporia
As Timaeus goes on, he illustrates another element of the womb’s approach to achieving
its desires that demonstrates another kind of philosophical virtue represented in female
embodiment:
Whenever this comes to be fruitless long beyond its due season, it grows difficult
and irritable; and wandering everywhere throughout the body it blocks up the
breathing-passages, and by not allowing breathing throws one into the most extreme
frustrations and brings on all sorts of other diseases, until the desire of the one and
the love of the other 37 bring the sexes together. 38
While the male genitals are constantly trying to overtake the man through stinging desires,
the womb has a more strategic and intense approach. The womb achieves its desire by
36

Theaet. 150c-d, translated by Levett and Burnyeat.
On the basis of the masculine gender of ‘ἔρος’ and the feminine gender of ‘ἐπιθυμία’, this line has been
interpreted as a misogynistic slight. The idea is that Timaeus is implying that men love, a higher emotion,
while women only desire, a baser emotion. Other interpreters take the nouns together, seeing Timaeus as
saying something like the love and desire of the woman causes her to come together with the man. It seems
to me that another possible interpretation of this passage is that the love of the one means the love of the
woman, while the “other” that has desire could be the womb. She is, after all, definitively feminine (if we
think the gender of the words is important, which it need not be), and a distinct entity apart from the woman
with her own desires and aims.
38 Timaeus 91c-d.
37
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producing aporia in the woman. Aporia, the state of impasse or frustration, is familiar to
readers of Plato as an intellectual or emotional state of some of Socrates’ interlocutors at
the end of a dialogue. The Timaeus, however, presents a physiological and inescapable
aporia. When not anchored by a growing fetus, wombs wander around the body and cause
trouble. Here, Timaeus emphasizes suffocation as the trouble caused for the woman,
singling it out among the other “many diseases” caused for the woman. The woman is
thrown into aporia by her suffocation. The womb is physically blocking the woman’s
airways, bringing on an aporia with a life-or-death urgency. The womb forces the woman
to confront it and act.
The phenomenon of the womb-induced aporia is not unique to the Timaeus. The
Hippocratic texts describe the same issue for women. Looking to the Hippocratic tradition,
and in particular to the text On Girls, illustrates the connection between the bodily aporia
women experience here and the kind of aporia Socrates induces in his interlocutors. In the
treatise On Girls, the author describes what happens when a girl does not begin having
intercourse with men in due season. According to that text, intercourse is required to allow
menstrual blood to flow freely from the womb:
When young girls who are at the age to be married remain husbandless, they suffer
even more often from this, especially during their monthly “descent,” an excessive
evil which did not trouble them when they were younger. But when they reach this
age, blood flows into the uterus as if it should then flow out from it. But when the
mouth at its end is not opened up (ἀπορρευσόμενον), even more blood flows in from
food and the body’s growth. Then, having no means of flowing out, the blood springs
up in its multitude, into the heart and the midriff. When these fill up, the heart
becomes heavy and dull, then from heavy to numb (νάρκη), and from the numbness
madness (παράνοια) seizes her. 39

39

Hippocrates, On Girls 1.466, my translation.

21

The accumulation of menstrual blood causes a pain and eventually a deep dumbness that
leads to madness. Socrates’ interlocutors report similar symptoms of their philosophical
state of aporia. Meno, for instance, describes the numbness brought on by conversation
with Socrates:
Socrates, before I even met you I used to hear that you are always in a state of
perplexity (ἀπορεῖς) and that you bring others into the same state, and now I think
you are bewitching me and beguiling me, simply putting me under a spell, so that I
am quite perplexed (ἀπορίας). Indeed, if a joke is in order, you seem, in appearance
and in every other way, like the broad torpedo fish, for it too makes anyone who
comes close and touches it feel numb (ναρκᾶν), and you now seem to have had that
kind of effect on me, for both my mind and my tongue are numb, and I have no
answer to give you. 40
Here we see Socrates producing in Meno a similar experience to the girl experiencing the
virgin’s disease in On Girls—aporia gives way to numbness. In On Girls and the Timaeus,
the aporia eventually produces insufferable frustration. In the Theaetetus, Socrates
describes the tendency his art has to bring on pain in his subject:
There is another point also in which those who associate with me are like women in
childbirth. They suffer the pains of labor, and are filled day and night with distress;
indeed they suffer far more than women. And this pain my art is able to bring on, and
also to allay. 41
Like the womb, Socrates is able to induce pain in a person to move them toward a kind of
birth.
In the Timaeus, the womb’s ability to produce aporia in the woman relies on its position
within the woman and its ability to move around within her body. This stands in contrast
with the male genitals’ fixed position on the outside of the man’s body. The womb does
not have a natural or fixed position in the woman’s body; it only occupies positions that

40
41

Meno, 79e-80b, translated by Grube.
Theaetetus, 151a.
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are more or less compatible with the woman’s well-being and ability to bear a child. 42
Meno accuses Socrates of having an aporetic effect for the same reason. He says that it is
because of Socrates’ own perplexity that he is able to produce the same effect in others.
Socrates recounts this kind of accusation against him in the Theaetetus in his discussion of
midwifery:
The common reproach against me is that I am always asking questions of other
people but never express my own views about anything, because there is no wisdom
in me, and that is true enough. And the reason of it is this, that God compels me to
attend the travail of others, but has forbidden me to procreate. 43
Unlike Socrates’ interlocutors, Timaeus’ woman cannot ignore her aporia. When Meno,
Euthyphro, and the others become frustrated by the aporetic effect Socrates has on them,
they can—and most often do—walk away from the situation out of frustration rather than
confront it. They can deny or dwell in the aporia that is brought on in part by their
unphilosophical way of being, choosing not to cooperate with Socrates any longer. The
woman in Timaeus’ myth is forced to reckon with the aporia and to give in to the desires
of her womb. Her aporia compels her to work together with her womb.
1.3.2

Pregnancy and Birth

The power and desire of the womb forces the woman to cope with it and act in collaboration
with others in several ways. So far, we have considered some ways the woman is forced to
reckon with the desires of her womb in collaborative action. Additionally, the process of
satisfying the womb’s desire (i.e., childbearing) is an inherently collaborative effort. In this
42 In addition to its unfixedness, the womb, in the Timaeus and throughout Greek medical writings, is
characterized as being generally indistinct and indeterminate. The woman’s animal, the womb, is indistinct
in name and number. Timaeus’ words that we would translate as ‘matrix’ and ‘womb’ are plural: μῆτραί and
ὑστέραι (91c). This is not optional, there are not singular versions of these words that Timaeus could have
chosen to use instead. This is the standard usage. On the Greek understanding, the womb has a natural sense
of plurality.
43 Theaet. 150c.
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section, I will focus on the other aspects of womanhood that Timaeus explores in the karmic
myth: pregnancy and childbearing.
Timaeus’ account of these activities demonstrates the sense in which the woman, as a
fact of her womanhood, is essentially committed to her offspring. Because satisfying the
womb’s desires requires gestation, childbearing, and childrearing, 44 the woman’s initial
obligation to her womb entails another set of obligations in motherhood.
After Timaeus goes through the trouble that the womb causes for the woman and the
means by which the woman can relieve that trouble, he finishes the part of the myth dealing
with the origin of women by narrating the fallout of disease-curing sexual intercourse:
…by not allowing breathing [the womb] throws one into the most extreme
frustrations and brings on all sorts of other diseases, until the desire of the one and
the love of the other bring the sexes together; and, as if plucking the fruit from trees,
they sow in the womb, as though in a field, animals (ζῷα) invisible for their smallness
and not yet formed; and these animals they again make distinct in their parts; and
they nourish them to great size within the womb and afterwards, by bringing them
into the light of day, complete their birth as animals. That’s how women and the
entire female sex were born. 45
In the process of satisfying her womb’s desire for childbearing, the woman runs into more
collaborators with whom she becomes inextricably tied. It is not just the intercourse that is
collaborative; Timaeus frames pregnancy as a collaborative project as well. In this passage,
Timaeus consistently uses 3rd person plural verbs to describe the act of gestation. For
instance, at 91d, is not just that she, the woman, nourishes the child, it is the case that they
are—the woman and whom?—nourishing the offspring. The other party in addition to the
woman who constitutes the “they” responsible for the gestation of the offspring throughout

44

Possibly also a general care for the household and estate (i.e., finances and property), but this is more
according to custom and not outlined so clearly in the karmic myth of the Timaeus.
45 Timaeus 91c-d.
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91d (i.e., κατασπείραντες, they sow; διακρίναντες, they distinguish; ἐκθρέψωνται, they
nourish or bring to birth) could be her male sexual partner, but this seems unlikely. Surely
the man has a role in sowing the seed of the offspring, but what part does he play in
distinguishing the parts of the offspring or nourishing it in the womb? It seems likely to me
that the “they” acting together here is the woman and her womb. 46 In any case, Timaeus
depicts the woman as acting in collaboration even in the nourishing of the offspring in
pregnancy.
Of course, the child itself is party to this project, too. There has to be a child for the
womb’s desire for childbearing to be satisfied. The woman’s commitment to her child is a
project of giving definition and nourishing the child. In what follows in this section, I will
unpack the woman’s commitments to her offspring as further dimensions of womanhood
and femininity that Timaeus shows us in the karmic myth.
It is odd here that, although the woman’s sexual partner and offspring constitute the
woman’s familial commitments, Timaeus avoids using any familial language. The man
with whom the woman generates an offspring is not called her husband. In fact, he is not
given any kind of name or term; Timaeus says only that they come together,
“συναγαγόντες.” Ιn any case, Timaeus does not give an explicit name to the male involved
in sexual reproduction. In his vagueness, Timaeus gives no indication that the man in any
way belongs to the woman, or the woman to the man. They are not identified as husband
46 This reading is reinforced by understanding the ἑκατέρων in “μέχριπερ ἂν ἑκατέρων ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ ἐρως

συναγαγόντες” as the woman and her womb rather than the woman and the man. Sexual intercourse being
brought about by the desire of the womb and the love of the woman is an attractive reading of this line
because it mirrors Timaeus’ earlier comments about men and their genitals. Back at 91b, Timaeus says that
marrow “instilled in that very part where it found a vent a lively desire (ἐπιθυμίαν) for emission and thus
produced a love (ἔρωτα) of begetting.” If it is the desire and love of the woman and her womb that cause the
sexes to come together in sexual intercourse, it makes sense to interpret the “they” as the woman and her
womb.
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and wife. This, however, does not take away from the sense in which the woman depends
on her sexual partner. Regardless of the marital status of their relationship, the woman
experiences a profound dependency on her sexual partner insofar as he provides something
that she cannot under any circumstances procure for herself on her own.
The same family-evading language extends to the woman’s offspring. Timaeus
chooses language that obscures the relationship between mother and child to the greatest
degree. The offspring are not called children, sons, daughters, or even heirs. Timaeus calls
them “ζῷα,” living things, a remarkably unspecific term for what is growing in the
woman’s womb. In a myth that describes the transmutation of species through birth, can
we be confident that these living things are even human? Presumably they are humans, but
the language is nevertheless cloudy. Timaeus does not describe a mother nourishing a child,
but simply a living thing. Although I am analyzing this part of the myth and this aspect of
femininity as motherhood and the woman’s commitment to her offspring, we have to keep
in mind that Timaeus is not describing the mother-child relationship of typical Athenian
custom. We should understand the woman’s would-be familial commitments in the
Timaeus itself as designating a more basic social-biological relationship. The woman’s
sexual partner and offspring are relevant to Timaeus’ conception of womanhood and
therefore to the myth insofar as they are necessary for her womb to get its way.
Timaeus characterizes pregnancy and the gestation of the ζῷα as a project of the
mother (or the parents together, or the mother and womb together) executing certain
commitments to her offspring. Timaeus highlights three ways in which the woman is
committed to her offspring. The mother’s first obligation to her offspring is to make it
distinct in its parts. The second is nourishing the child within the womb. I’m going to
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address each of these features one at a time. Finally, the woman is committed to bringing
or leading her offspring into light (ἀγαγόντες εἰς φῶς, 91d). These three features—giving
structural distinction, providing nourishment, and bringing the offspring into light—
constitute what is necessary to complete the birth of the offspring (ζῴων ἀποτελέσωσι
γένεσιν, 91d). The woman’s relationship to her womb and sexual partner revealed the
feminine quality of dependency and mutual collaboration. Her relationship to her offspring
reveals more aspects of femininity: in addition to being essentially dependent on the actions
of others, the woman is what acknowledges, develops, and makes room for structure
beyond herself, and gives it its own place in the world.
1.3.1.1 Giving Distinctness and Making Room
When the offspring is initially sown in the womb, it is invisible (ἀόρατα) due to its
smallness (σμικρότητος) and the its unformed state (ἀδιάπλαστα). To bring the offspring
to birth is to solve this problem of its invisibility—in multiple senses, as Timaeus writes
the mother brings the child into light (εἰς φῶς ἀγαγόντες). Timaeus tells us that this is
accomplished by transforming the offspring’s smallness and unformedness. The first of
these that Timaeus addresses is the unformedness. To give birth to her offspring, the mother
must give definition to the offspring’s body:
They sow in the womb, as though in a field, animals invisible for their smallness and
not yet formed; and these animals they again make distinct in their parts. 47
When the mother makes her offspring distinct in its parts, she does so in two senses. Each
sense reflects its own kind of philosophical virtue. On the one hand, the mother makes her
offspring’s body distinct from itself—the previously unformed body develops limbs, a

47 Timaeus

91d.
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face, and everything that constitutes a body. On the other hand, she is making the offspring
distinct by separating it from herself and providing it with self-differentiation and selfdefinition.
The mother makes her offspring visible in part by making its body distinct in its
parts. Making and giving distinctions is shown throughout the dialogues to be a core
concern of doing philosophy. The practice of making divisions—especially dividing like
from like—is the project of dialectic. 48 In the Phaedrus, Socrates even characterizes the
method of division as a kind of cutting of the body at its natural joints. 49 While Socrates
here is making butchering and the death of the animal the analogy, a similar kind of division
occurs as the mother forms the body of her offspring preparing to give birth to it.
The art of division is philosophical because it is a search for truth. In making
dialectical divisions, one recognizes what is apart from the other things that are like it and
on its own terms. This is to say, dialectic aims to acknowledge categories on their own
terms rather than in terms of custom. In the Statesman, the Stranger remarks multiple times
on the importance of excluding cultural judgements from the method of division in order
to make the truest cuts.
It's as if someone tried to divide the human race into two and made the cut in the way
that most people here carve things up, taking the Greek race away as one, separate
from all the rest, and to all the other races together, which are unlimited in number,
which don’t mix with one another, and don’t share the same language—calling this
collection by the single appellation ‘barbarian’. Because of this single appellation,
they expect it to be a single family or class too. … But I imagine the division would
be done better, more by real classes and more into two, if one cut … the human race
in its turn by means of male and female, and only split off Lydians or Phrygians or
anyone else and ranged them against all the rest when one was at a loss as to how to
48

And practicing dialectic is, of course, according to many accounts in the dialogues the ultimate goal of
philosophy (c.f. Republic 532a-d).
49 Phaedrus, 265c.
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split in such a way that each of the halves split off was simultaneously a real class
and a part. 50
When appealing to customary classifications—like Greek and barbarian—one is more
likely to miss the real ways in which categories (i.e., a class or part; γένος or μέρος). Later,
the Stranger remarks again on the way the dialectical method of division stands at odds
with customary classifications and judgements:
Such a method of argument as ours is not more concerned with what is more dignified
than with what is not, and neither does it at all despise the smaller more than the
greater, but always reaches the truest conclusion by itself. 51
True divisions divide according to the properties of the things being divided themselves,
rather than human judgements about those things. Timaeus’ description of the mother
giving distinction to the body of her offspring emphasizes the sense in which she gives it
distinction on its own terms. This sheds light on Timaeus’ use of impersonal and nonfamilial language for the offspring. He is describing the woman’s pregnancy as the process
of bringing forth of a ζῷον, a living being in its own right. This characterization stands in
contrast with the customary and traditional mother-child relationship. Timaeus is not
describing a mother shaping her offspring as a child or member of the family. The mother
here is not forming the way the child honors or participates in family custom, she is merely
forming it as a living thing.
This brings us to the second sense in which the mother distinguishes her offspring
in the womb: she distinguishes her offspring from herself. By means of her own womb and
body, she gives her offspring body and structure apart from her own. In other words, she
makes room for her offspring to be self-differentiated and self-defined. This practice, once
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Statesman, 262c-263a, translated by Rowe.
262d, translated by Rowe.

51 Statesman,
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again, stands in contrast with familial custom, which seeks to assimilate a child into the
family by eliding difference in the name of familial bonds and obligations. The mother’s
obligation to her child in pregnancy involves creating a difference between mother and
child at the same time as she is immanently connected with and encompasses the child
growing within her. Unlike the Demiurge of Timaeus’s first discourse, who creates things
to be as much like him as possible, the mother creates in a way that not only acknowledges
but emphasizes the difference between herself and her offspring. 52
In this respect, the role of the mother in the karmic myth resembles the role of the χώρα
in the generation of the cosmos in Timaeus’ second discourse, a resemblance Timaeus
himself establishes multiple times:
Let us speak of the mother and receptacle of that which has been born visible and in
all ways sensed as neither earth nor air nor fire nor water, nor as any of these things
that have been born composites or constituents of these. But if we say that she is
some invisible and shapeless form—all-receptive, but partaking somehow of the
intelligible in a most perplexing way and most hard-to-capture—then we won’t be
lying. 53
Like the χώρα, the mother in the karmic myth is wholly distinct from her offspring yet
creates the occasion for the existence of the offspring in her natural capacity to make room
for and give herself to what is other than herself.
1.3.2.1 Nurture
In the previous section, we looked at Timaeus’s characterization of pregnancy and
gestation as a process of making the offspring visible. In order to bring a child to birth and
make it visible, the mother must make the offspring both well-formed and large enough.

52 C.f. Timaeus 29e: [The Demiurge] was good, and … willed that all things should come to resemble himself

as much as possible.
51a-b.

53 Timaeus
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So far, we have seen how the mother gives her offspring form and structure. Next, Timaeus
addresses the issue of the offspring’s size. When it is sown in the womb, the offspring is
invisible due in part to smallness (σμικρότητος). 54 The mother’s nurturing allows her
offspring to grow to a visible size over the course of her pregnancy:
They nurture (ἐκθρέψωνται) [their offspring] to great size within the womb. 55
Nurture is another key feature of the woman’s commitment to her offspring. To unpack
both what is essentially feminine and what is philosophically virtuous about nurturing, we
need to distinguish it from similar capacities. What the mother does for her offspring in
pregnancy—nurturing, ἐκτρέφω—is distinct from but closely related to feeding (τρέφω)
and care (ἐπιμέλεια). Although the word for feeding, τρέφω, is the root of ἐκτρέφω, the
words have different senses. 56 What the mother does is more than just feeding. Feeding the
offspring and helping it to grow to a larger size is one aspect of the mother’s nurture, but
her nurture extends beyond that. In addition to providing nourishment for her offspring,
the mother—or, more exactly, the womb—provides the offspring with a safe place in which
it can grow undisturbed. At the same time, it would be going too far to call her nurture care

54 The issue of a thing’s invisibility due to is smallness and, in turn, its visibility in aggregation, appears a
few times in the Timaeus. It occurs for the first time in the discussion of the fabrication of human bodies in
the first discourse. Here Timaeus here says that the rivets binding human bodies together are “invisible in
their smallness,” σμικρότητα ἀοράτοις (43a). Later, Timaeus repeats the idea in the second discourse in his
discussion of the pyramids that make up fire: “one must think of all these as being so small that none of them,
taken singly each in its own individual kind, is seen by us because of their smallness; but when many have
been gathered together, then do we see the masses of them,” (53b-c). The idea occurs once more in the third
discourse, as Timaeus discusses the bubble-structures that arise from acid phlegm: “taken one at a time they
are invisible because of their smallness (ἀοράτων διὰ σμικρότητα), but taken together yield a visible mass,”
(83d).
55 Timaeus 91d4.
56 For the basic sense of this difference, we can look to the different translations according to Liddell & Scott.
They translate τρέφω “to make grow or increase,” (p. 713) while ἐκτρέφω is “to bring up from childhood,
rear up,” (p. 212). However, while τρέφω typically designates feeding in this simple sense, the word seems
to take on a broader meaning in other parts of the Timaeus. In the dialogue’s opening, Socrates describes the
education of the guardians as a kind of τροφή: “And what about their nurture (τροφήν)? Weren’t we saying
that they would be nourished (τεθράφθαι) on lessons in both gymnastics and music?” (18a).

31

(i.e., ἐπιμέλεια). 57 While the notion of care entails a special attention that is paid to the
object of the care, the mother’s nurture for the offspring in the womb is involuntary and
operative at all times regardless of her attention. This is the case at least while the offspring
is still in the womb (i.e., pre-born), which is the explicit scope of Timaeus’ analysis in the
myth. His discussion of women ends abruptly with the birth of the offspring. 58 The
mother’s nurture, then, is a capacity in between feeding and caring. It is a nurture that
provides sustenance and protection, allowing for the offspring to grow and develop.
Once again, the way the mother nurtures her offspring mirrors the role of the χώρα in
Timaeus’s second discourse. Timaeus describes the χώρα as a wet nurse (τιθήνην) of
becoming. 59 Like the womb, the χώρα is that in which things come to be. 60 The mother is
like the χώρα both in the sense that she provides the occasion for things to come into being
by giving them body and also in the sense that she wholly encompasses what comes to be
within her. 61
1.3.2.2

Bringing Offspring into the Light

57 While

care and education are not the senses in which the mother nurtures her offspring in the womb, the
care for and education of youth is expressed as a concern in its own right for the philosopher in multiple
dialogues. Significant care is given to the issue of childrearing in the Republic, the Laws, and even earlier in
the Timaeus (18d).
58 C.f., “After which they bring them forth into the light and thus complete the birth of the living thing. In
this way, then, women and the whole female sex have come to be. And the tribe of birds…” (91d).
59 Timaeus 49a.
60 Timaeus characterizes the χώρα as that in which things come to be multiple times; see 49e, 50d.
61 The mother’s nurture also evokes Timaeus’s description of the Earth in the first discourse: “And Earth [the
Demiurge] contrived to be both our nurturer (τροφόν) and, because she’s huddled round the pole that’s
stretched through the all, the guardian and craftsman of Night and Day—first and eldest of the gods that have
come to be within heaven (40b-c).” Timaeus’s characterization of the Earth as nurturer here is unlike the
nurture of the χώρα. While the χώρα is all-encompassing, the Earth is placed in the center of the cosmos,
fully encompassed by the cosmos around her, and nurtures from there.
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The mother’s relationship to her offspring in gestation culminates with birth. Once the
mother has nurtured her offspring and distinguished its body from her own from within the
womb, the woman is able to give birth and make her offspring visible:
Leading them into the light, they complete the birth of the animals. 62
Giving birth also constitutes an end of the woman’s compulsion to her womb. What started
with the womb’s desire for childbearing is brought to completion when the woman finally
gives birth. The womb first expresses its desire by producing extreme pains for the woman
in a physical aporia that compels her to engage in sexual intercourse. However, this was
only ever a means to an end. The point of the womb’s desire is the birthing of the child,
not insemination. This is underscored by the way Timaeus initially characterizes pregnancy
with an agricultural metaphor: “then, culling as it were the fruit from trees, they sow upon
the womb as if it were ploughed soil animals…” 63 The sowing of seed in the womb, as in
the earth, is significant and worthwhile because of the harvest that follows.
Pregnancy and birth are often used as images for doing philosophy and
philosophical virtue in the dialogues. As when Theaetetus has trouble giving Socrates an
answer, Socrates tells him that this is because he is pregnant and experiencing
philosophical labor pangs. 64 Likewise, as we have already discussed, Socrates describes
his art as a kind of midwifery. However, instead of testing pregnancies and delivering
babies, Socrates tests ideas and delivers true ones:
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Timaeus 91d4-5. Even when it is born and visible in the world, the offspring is still merely a living thing,
a ζῷον, rather than a child or even a human.
63 Timaeus 91c-d.
64 Theaetetus, 148e.
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The most important thing about my art is the ability to apply all possible tests to the
offspring, to determine whether the young mind is being delivered of a phantom, that
is, an error, or a fertile truth. 65
In the Theaetetus, giving birth is synonymous with philosophical success (i.e., arriving at
a tested true conclusion). The mother’s project of giving birth is highlighted as an
exceptional image for the philosophical project throughout the dialogues.
Bringing the offspring into light is the ultimate way in which the mother recognizes
the otherness of her offspring or recognizes it on its own terms apart from its origin in her.
When the offspring is born, it is separated fully from the mother’s body and begins its life
outside the darkness of the womb and in the light. The mother’s project of bringing her
child into the light through birth represents another way that the mother is like the χώρα.
To begin with, the χώρα is like the mother in that she is responsible for the visibility of all
things insofar as visibility is a principle of body. Further, it is impossible for things that
come to be to escape the χώρα—everything relies on her for body. At the same time, while
all things rely on and cannot be fully separate from the χώρα, they do not receive any of
their qualities from the χώρα. Timaeus describes her like the odorless base of a perfume or
a molding material. 66 The χώρα creates the occasion and provides the basis for things
coming to be but does not herself give attributes to what comes to be in her. Instead, she
allows for the expression of the things that come to be in her on their own terms.
The journey from the darkness into light is the basic trajectory of philosophical
inquiry. Seeking out the truth, we aim to give clarity and plainness to the nature of things.
The philosophical journey is characterized as a journey from darkness into light in
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Theaetetus 150b-c.
50e, 50a-b.

66 Timaeus,
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Republic’s allegory of the cave in book seven. 67 In this same book, Socrates describes
education as leading someone into the light. 68 The woman’s ability to bring something to
light and make it visible is characteristic of the capacities at play in the philosophical
project. The woman is not fabricating an offspring, she is simultaneously growing it,
discovering it, and bringing it to light, just as people do as they develop hypotheses and
test philosophical ideas.
Timaeus frames his own project as an attempt to bring things to light or make them
visible throughout the dialogue. Often when he mentions his use of the εἰκὼς μῦθος, he
says that he uses it in order to make the topics of the speech clear. For instance, at 48c:
It’s difficult to make plain (δηλῶσαι) what seems to be the case according to our present
mode of exposition.
And 53c:
So now I must try to make plain (δηλοῦν) to you, by means of an unusual account…
Timaeus’s project in the entire Timaeus is a kind of giving birth insofar as it is the explicit
project of making matters clear, plain, or evident in their truth.
1.3.3

Review of Feminine Virtues

Timaeus frames the origin and nature of women in the karmic myth by giving an account
of their reproductive role. Men and women are characterized by their ability to cope with
the desires of their reproductive equipment. While men seek to overcome the stinging
desire of their genitals, women are forced to give in to the womb’s desire for childbearing.
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Republic 514a-516b.

68 Republic 518c: The power to learn is present in everyone’s soul and the instrument with which each learns

is like an eye that cannot be turned around from darkness to light without turning the whole body. This
instrument cannot be turned around from that which is coming into being without turning the whole soul until
it is able to study that which is and the brightest thing that is, namely the one we call the good” (translated
by Grube).
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The woman’s project of satisfying the womb’s desire—i.e., the project of childbearing—
entails various commitments, dependencies, and bodily capacities which, I have argued,
constitute what is essentially womanly.
To begin with, womanhood entails a vulnerability to the womb. Because of the
womb’s ability to wander throughout the woman’s body and suffocate her, it physically
compels her to reproduce. While the man is able to overcome the desire of his genitals, the
woman must give in to hers. In addition to her womb, the woman relies on a male sexual
partner to maintain her well-being. Both of these dependencies constitute the first basic
philosophical virtue of the woman: collaboration. Because of her dependency on the womb
and her reproductive partner, the woman is compelled to collaborate with parties other than
herself with whom she might otherwise be conflict. Collaboration, working together, and
mutual respect for the purpose of seeking out the truth is emphasized as philosophical
virtues throughout the dialogues. The collaborative approach stands in contrast with
autocracy or domination. The domineering approach, or the project of victory over the
opponent rather than care for what is truest or best, is characteristic of the unphilosophical
approach to discourse. Eristic, rhetoric, and persuasion stand in contrast with philosophy.
The use of aporia to urge a collaborator one way or another, as Socrates does in many of
the dialogues, is another way that the woman and her womb share a collaborative (if
unpleasant) relationship.
In addition to dependency on her womb and reproductive partner, womanhood is
expressed by the processes of pregnancy and birth. Timaeus expresses pregnancy as the
project of a mother giving visibility to an initially invisible and concealed offspring by
giving it form and nurturing it within the womb until she is able to bring it into the light.
36

The aspects of femininity and philosophical virtue that emerge in Timaeus’s description of
pregnancy have to do with the philosophical project of division (i.e., dialectic). The first
thing that Timaeus says the mother does for her offspring is distinguish its body in its parts.
Like a dialectician, she does so by distinguishing the body in its own right and distinguishes
its body from her own. Further, Timaeus emphasizes the otherness of the offspring by
refraining from the use of any kind of familial language for the offspring; it is merely a
ζῷον. The mother gives structure and body to the offspring as a living thing, not as her son
or daughter. Like the method of division in the Statesman, the mother’s nurture of the
offspring in the womb has no use for familial or customary traditions, opinions, or
judgements. Additionally, in Timaeus’s description of pregnancy we see ways in which the
woman is to the offspring what the χώρα is to everything that comes to be in her. Like the
χώρα, the mother gives body and substance in such a way that makes room for and allows
the full expression of what comes to be in her.
In this analysis, I hope to have shown that Timaeus’s karmic myth is neither simple
nor misogynistic. His expression of sexual difference is irreducible to a somatic or
psychological difference in the sexes. Rather, it is construed as a difference in the way that
each kind relates to its role in reproduction. While Timaeus does say that women come to
be as the result of men who were cowardly or unjust, nothing he says suggests that women
are in any way inferior to men in their virtue or intelligence. On the contrary, Timaeus’s
expression of womanhood through her reproductive role emphasizes traits which are
essentially philosophical both in the Timaeus and Plato’s other dialogues. Crucial features
of female embodiment, like making room and acknowledging and collaborating with
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others, reflect traits necessary for practicing philosophy both informally and rigorously
(i.e., dialectically).

1.4

Timaeus 17a-19b: Childbearing and Childrearing as a Civic vs. Familial Duty and
the Status of Women in the Preface

Now that I have gone through the whole account of the origin of women, I would like to
go back to the beginning of the Timaeus and address the objection that the characterization
of women in the karmic myth is incompatible with the claims Socrates makes in his preface
about the equality of women in the city. I find that there is no such incompatibility. Rather,
I will argue, the two passages aid in one’s understanding of the other. I will begin with
some considerations regarding the project of bringing these two parts of the dialogue into
conversation with one another. Next, I will give an overview of the points Socrates
addresses in his summary, and, following that overview, I will give my analysis of its
significance with respect to the karmic myth.
1.3.4

Method and Delivery in the Preface and the Karmic Myth

The Timaeus opens and closes with discussions that highlight the status of women. These
discussions are quite different in method and scope. In his summary of the ideal city at the
beginning of the dialogue, Socrates foregrounds the civic status of women and suggests
that men and women should share equal responsibilities in the city. 69 This opening
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From 17b-19b, Socrates is summarizing the previous day’s conversation, which many take to be a
connection to the Republic, especially book V. If Socrates is meant to be summarizing the Republic, his
foregrounding of women is even more salient. Socrates omits many—if not most—of the defining features
of the aristocratic city from Republic in his summary. Some have tried to justify this by arguing that Socrates
is referring back to an early version of Republic (the so-called “proto-Republic”) that does not include the
features we are familiar with. Nails notes the “inadequate summary,” as evidence that the Timaeus must be
the sequel to some earlier version of Republic on p. 326. Others, however, argue that Socrates has in mind
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discussion is practical in at least two senses. First, it’s a sketched summary of a previous
conversation, so it is instrumental in tone. Second, it is practical in the sense that Socrates
is listing the policies that will sustain the ideal city. The practicality and suggestion of
gender equality in the dialogue’s opening contrasts with the mythic and seemingly
misogynistic quality of the end of the dialogue.
There are other differences to note between Socrates’ preface and Timaeus’ karmic
myth in terms of the method and delivery of each section. To begin with, these sections are
the words of two different speakers. Socrates delivers the political summary in the
beginning, while Timaeus tells the ending myth. In addition to having a different speaker,
the tone and content of the final pages of Timaeus are a far cry from the practical, political
summary at the beginning of the dialogue. For one, Timaeus is delivering a myth. In
contrast with Socrates’ low-stakes summary, Timaeus’ εἰκὼς μῦθος is not a practical or
everyday way of speaking. Rather, it is such a particular way of speaking that it Timaeus
gives it a special introduction in its own right. 70 Additionally, while Socrates is describing
practical features of the lives of individual people, Timaeus is thinking at a level prior to
the individual. His myth is dealing with categorical differences. He is describing how kinds
of beings came to be rather than individuals. By considering individuals in terms of their
souls and their fit for certain occupations rather than their status as man or woman, Socrates

the Republic as we know it, but chooses to draw from it selectively in his summary to suit the purposes of
the dialogue. Annas (2010), for instance, writes, “Plato wants to link the argument of the Republic with the
cosmological project of the Timaeus, and does so by means of selective reference to the Republic in a new
context, one in which he refers only to the ideal state in Book 5," (p. 52). While the supposed connection
between Republic and Timaeus provides interesting context for evaluating Socrates’ choice to focus on laws
that have to do with women and childbearing, nothing in my argument relies on a connection between the
dialogues. We must also consider the option that Socrates is referring to a conversation that we do not see in
any dialogue.
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is erasing the boundary marked by sexual difference in his thinking. In contrast, Timaeus
is comparing men and women precisely as sexually distinct beings by digging into what
marks sexual categories off from one another. In that sense, sexual difference is treated
more like a theoretical difference than a practical one in the karmic myth.
The delivery of the exchange between Socrates and Timaeus at 17b-19b stands in
contrast with the final myth. This part of the dialogue is practical in part because it is
instrumental. When I say it is instrumental, I mean that Socrates’ summary is serving the
purpose of reminding the speakers of the previous day’s conversation. Timaeus initiates
the recap with a casual request. He says, “if it’s not difficult for you, go through it again
briefly from the beginning, just to make it more secure for us.” 71 Socrates obliges, and what
follows is a low-stakes reminder of the past discussion. Timaeus confirms that the stakes
of the summary are low when he says that everyone present agrees with the principles of
the regime Socrates is (17c). Socrates is not out to argue or convince anyone of his points.
He and Timaeus pass through this summary quickly without giving much detail or body to
any of the points. In addition to being practical in the sense that it is instrumental, the
summary is practical in the sense that it is delivered as casual, everyday conversation. The
dialogue’s opening is also practical in its content. Socrates is, for the most part, talking
about policy.
At the same time, there are similarities to notice in the delivery of the beginning and
end of the speech. Although Socrates delivers the summary at 17a-19b, Timaeus is
participating in the conversation with Socrates, and expresses his enthusiastic agreement
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with Socrates’ ideas multiple times. 72 Another thing these two sections of the dialogue
have in common is a certain strangeness. Timaeus’ karmic myth is undeniably strange. He
talks about the human body in a strange way; we have ensouled animals living in us and
guiding our lives, and the stakes of our future animal embodiment depend on how just or
philosophical we are. Socrates’ suggestions about the status of women in the beginning of
the dialogue would be equally striking and strange to an ancient audience. Especially in
Athenian society, women had an extremely limited role in public life. 73
Additionally, like Socrates’ sketch-outline in the beginning, Timaeus deliberately sets
low stakes for the karmic myth. Before he tells it, he says:
For as regards the mode in which the rest of living creatures have been produced we
must make but a brief statement, seeing that there is no need to speak at length; for
by such brevity we will feel ourselves to be preserving a right proportion in our
handling of these subjects. 74
Timaeus deliberately changes his tone going into the final myth. For the entire third
discourse he has been analyzing the minutiae of the human anatomy, describing in great
detail the significance and purpose of the design of all aspects of the body, but here he
shifts gears and speaks more concisely and in broad strokes.
There are many differences in the method, scope, and content of the beginning and
end of the Timaeus. Although this is the case, they can still be brought into conversation
with one another. For all their differences, they share key features and goals: in each case,
Timaeus expresses or agrees to certain views about sexual difference and the relative status
of men and women. Further, dramatically speaking, the sections are highly relevant to one
72 In Socrates’ summary, Timaeus affirms his remarks frequently, at 17c9, 18a3, 18a8, 18a11, 18b8, 18c5,
18d6, 18e4, 19a6, and 19b1.
73 For the details of this limitation, see Harris (2006, pp. 333-346), and Just (1989, pp. 13-39).
74 Timaeus, 90e.
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another. Considering the opening and closing passages of the Timaeus together is important
to gain a sense of the dialogue’s framing both dramatically and philosophically. An
understanding of the Timaeus as a whole dialogue demands making sense of it with respect
to its beginning and end, and, further, demands sorting out the reason sexual difference
plays such an important role in the framing.
1.3.5

Survey of Timaeus 17b-19b

I’m first going to review each of the items in Socrates’ summary between 17b-19b.
Following this outline, I will synthesize some of the common goals of the policies the
speakers discuss. Socrates’ summary consists of the following eight points:
(1) In the city, there will be two classes of people: one that consists of farmers and the
other arts, another consisting of those who go to war on the city’s behalf (17c).
(2) In accordance with nature (17c), each person will receive an occupation that
corresponds to their nature, and those who make war on behalf of the city will be
her guardians (17c-18a).
(3) The souls of the guardians will have a spirited and philosophic nature and they will
be educated in gymnastics and music (and whatever is appropriate to them) (18a).
(4) The guardians will live with everything in common and will not hold private
property (18b).
(5) Men and women should both be given an occupation based on their nature rather
than sex (18c).
(6) Marriages and children will be held in common so that no one recognizes their
progeny (18c-d).
(7) There will be a secret lottery to ensure that the best women reproduce with the best
men (18d-e).
(8) The offspring of the good couples will be nurtured, while the offspring of the bad
couples will be dispersed throughout the city (19a).
The first four points of Socrates’s summary describe a dimension of who the guardians of
the city should be. The rest of the points in the summary conspicuously foreground sexual
difference and family in Socrates’ suggestions about marriage and childbearing. 75 If this is
75 This is even more conspicuous if one considers the discussion a summary of the conversation from
Republic. Many important features of the conversation from Republic are omitted from the summary—for
instance, the critique of poetry, the three classes, and the discussion of the various kinds of regimes, among
many other items of discussion from the Republic. Instead, if this conversation really is meant to point the

42

a comprehensive summary of the day’s discussion of the best regime—and, based on
Timaeus’ confirmation at 19b, it seems that it is—then, according to this account, the key
to the ideal regime is ensuring that customs surrounding family and women’s status do not
prevent people with guardian-souls from ruling. By getting rid of the norms associated with
sexual difference and the family, guardians are able to be identified according to the nature
of their souls alone, as much as possible. Getting these customs right is the main, if not
only, concern of the summarized conversation.
When we are deciding what to make of Socrates’ account of women and sexual
difference in the beginning of the Timaeus, we have to look closely at what he says at 18c.
Based on what Socrates says at 18c, there is room for interpreting whether there is a
difference between men and women in their souls. Socrates says:
Further, regarding women, we mentioned that their natures were to be tuned to the
men and so made similar to them, and that to all the women all occupations were to
be given in common, whether these have to do with war or with the other aspects of
life.
The result of Socrates’ suggestion here is clear: women should be given the same jobs as
men in all areas of life. Most importantly, women will rule alongside men. The importance
of this point is underscored when Socrates repeats it at 18d-e. 76 However, here at 18c when
Socrates says that that women’s natures must be brought alongside men’s natures, there
are a few possible implications this may have for an account of sexual difference. 77 The
reader back to the Republic, Plato chooses to open the Timaeus with elements of Republic that are focused
on the relationship between men and women, some of which were seemingly not very important parts of the
Republic itself.
76 “Don’t we remember how we said that the rulers, male and female, had to contrive…” (18d-e).
77 Here it is worth mentioning the role of conflict and in particular military combat that provides context for
this section and the Timaeus as a dialogue in general. Socrates here mentions that women’s natures must be
attuned with the men’s natures so that both may share in the tasks of the guardians, especially making war
on behalf of the city. Following his preface, Socrates initiates the “feast of speeches” by requesting to see his
ideal city in motion, which he explains as wanting to see it in active conflict with another city. Given the
emphasis here and throughout the dialogue and on conflict and the role of courage and spiritedness in the
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interpretive problem is with the word συναρμοστέον; one must fit together, bring alongside
one another, or bring into harmony. Do the natures of women need to be fit with the natures
of men because they are different and need to be adjusted to an androcentric standard? Or
do the natures of men and women not differ on the basis of sex, making the need for fitting
them together a corrective measure making up for the mistakes of custom? Based on the
rest of Socrates’ suggestions about the ideal regime, the latter seems more likely. It seems
that the natures of men and women do not differ insofar as they are men and women, but
rather based on the kind of lives or crafts they are best suited to. This interpretation is
supported by the fact that Socrates talks about the natures—plural—of men and women,
rather than a singular nature for each. In other words, there is no single “male” nature or
“female” nature. The most straightforward reading here seems to be that Socrates is talking
about the individual natures of men and individual natures of women, rather than a group
of natures belonging only to women that must be brought into harmony with a group of
natures belonging only to men. In any case, Socrates is clear that in the regime a person’s
civic role will not depend on their sex. 78
The elevation of the civic status of women in the ideal city is accompanied by
changing who is in charge of childrearing in the city. Women are relieved of their
traditional obligations to childrearing and caring for the household, and instead marriages
and children are held in common. 79 The commonness of marriages and children effectively
eliminates individual families as anchors or obligations for women. This is a move that is

human being, it is perhaps possible that Socrates means to suggest that women should be made more
courageous so as to match the spiritedness of men as they join them in military combat.
78 This reading aligns with Socrates’ remarks in book V of Republic (i.e., 454b-456b).
79 Socrates also suggests this in Republic (c.f. 457c-d).
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possibly just as significant as the suggestion that women should rule. The regime not only
gives women the new responsibility of ruling the city (among other occupations), but it
does also so at the same time as it takes the traditional occupations of women off the table
entirely.
In sum, Plato frames the Timaeus at the outset with a discussion of women and the
family. In this discussion, Socrates emphasizes the importance of removing the obstacles
that customs present to justice in the political sphere. In particular, he is concerned with
the ways that customs surrounding women and the family get in the way of justice in the
city. The main features I want to highlight from Socrates’ summary are (1) the message is
that women need to have equal status with men in the ideal regime, and that souls must be
evaluated on the basis of facts other than sex, and (2) that this message is delivered in
practical terms; The equality of men and women is treated/enforced practically, in terms of
the occupations they are given. Further, the equality of men and women is instrumental for
the city; we have to have female guardians if we’re going to have the best guardians in
general. Socrates does justice to women by recognizing them not according to custom but
according to their souls.
1.3.6

Analysis of Timaeus 17b-19b and 90e-91d: Reading the Timaeus as a Dialogue
Framed by Reflections on Sexual Difference

In this project, I have argued that the karmic myth does not present a misogynistic account.
Instead, I find that it presents a concept of womanhood that is philosophically virtuous. I
have argued that this characterization of womanhood should not be surprising to us given
the way Plato uses feminine capacities as images for philosophical virtue throughout the
dialogues. In particular, I have focused on the way Plato elevates feminine capacities in the
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Theaetetus, Symposium, and Republic, although he does so in other dialogues as well. The
woman in the karmic myth is characterized by her physiological compulsion to collaborate
with those with whom she may find herself in conflict rather than seek domination over
them. In particular, I have examined the ways that the woman is compelled to satisfy the
desires of her womb in childbearing, which in turn entails certain commitments to and
dependency on a reproductive partner and an offspring. This requirement for collaboration
stands in contrast with the male ideal of overcoming and controlling the desires of one’s
reproductive equipment. While women are physiologically coerced into the philosophical
virtue of mutual collaboration, men’s virtue depends on controlling and dominating their
genitals rather than working with them to achieve their desires.
This framework for womanhood appears oppressive or misogynistic only when we
consider the various ways the karmic myth portrays women as being dependent on and
committed to the project of childbearing according to the norms for the Athens in which
Plato lives—or even according to the norms of our own lives today. In a society for which
childbearing is the domain of the private family, the woman’s physiological obligation to
childbearing does indeed tie her to her body and its needs in a way that the man does not
suffer. 80 The woman suffers something that the man need not in two respects: first, her
need for childbearing compels her to marry and start a family, while for the man this is
optional. The man cannot be suffocated by his genitals if he does not reproduce, therefore
he is not compelled to marry in the same biological way that women are on this account.
Second, as the caretaker of offspring, the woman is constrained to life in the private
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This point is very similar to the thinking that guides Simone de Beauvoir’s analysis in The Second Sex,
especially her ideas in “History” (i.e., Vol. I Pt. 2, especially chapters 1-2).
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household, while the man is able to venture into public life as well as private life. In these
ways, the way the karmic myth requires childbearing appears oppressive to the woman.
We must, however, consider that this kind of society, the one in which children and
marriage belong to private life, is not the one to which Timaeus’ speech is expressly
responding. When we consider the karmic myth’s portrait of womanhood in light of the
commitments and guidelines of the regime proposed in the beginning of the dialogue, it
takes on a new look.
The regime Socrates proposes holds marriages and children in common; this is not
a society in which the private family has a place. The regime legislates childbearing in
order that no one knows to whom any child belongs. Men and women are assigned to mate
by a secret lottery in order that the best offspring will be produced. 81 According to the laws
of this city, participation in childbearing is established as a civic duty. This stands in
contrast to the society of the private family in which childbearing is not mandatory. The
change in the domain of childbearing has consequence primarily for men. According to the
model of womanhood in the karmic myth, as well as the contemporary Greek cultural and
medical understanding of womanhood and its requirements, childbearing is already
mandatory. When childbearing is legislated, nothing changes in practice for the woman;
either way, she is going to be bearing children. Men, on the other hand, are subject to an
obligation to childbearing in the ideal regime which they do not enjoy in Athenian culture.
While women are bound to childbearing in either case, the way that obligation is expressed
is radically different in Athenian society compared with the ideal regime. In Athenian
society, a woman’s obligation to childbearing is an obligation of custom and of the body

81 Timaeus

18d-e.
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and constitutes an inequality with and an inferiority to men. In the ideal regime, on the
other hand, the woman’s obligation to childbearing finds new expression as a civic duty.
Men’s and women’s relationship with childbearing is equal as a civic duty; biology and
custom are no longer relevant considerations in determining the relative status of men and
women with respect to childbearing. This is reinforced by the fact that Socrates has the
regime control the rearing and education of children; men and women cannot be compared
with respect to their familial roles in this context. All of these laws serve the general
purpose of clearing away customs which would keep those who are most fit to rule from
ruling. In making childbearing and rearing a civic duty, the groundwork is laid for men and
women to be considered each according to their nature as a human rather than their
obligations (or lack thereof) determined by customary or biological constraints. The city’s
laws with respect to marriage and children are crucial for its ability to select the best
leaders.
Viewing the karmic myth in the context of the ideal regime casts it in a different,
more benign light. Sexual difference need not constrain one’s life or pursuits; on the
contrary, the ideal regime allows one to set aside sexual difference as a constraint. With
these concerns out of the way, the significance of Timaeus framing of womanhood as
philosophically virtuous is underscored: if men and women are essentially equal in nature,
why are women seemingly better disposed to practicing virtue and doing philosophy?
Further, the broader interpretive question remains: why does Plato foreground sexual
difference and equality so intensely in the framing of the Timaeus? This framework
suggests that sexual difference and the relative status of the sexes is an important notion
for the rest of the dialogue. I find this a tenable understanding. In my next article, I will
48

argue that just collaboration of opposite kinds—expressed as sexual reproduction—is a
paradigm that guides Timaeus’ cosmology, especially as he expresses the cosmos as the
joint product of reason and necessity.
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CHAPTER 2. SEXUAL DIFFERENCE AND COSMOLOGICAL PARADIGMS IN
PLATO’S TIMAEUS
2.1

The Dialogic Structure of Plato’s Timaeus

Timaeus’ monologue consists of three interconnected speeches 82 that explain the origin
and order of the cosmos, from the whole down to the various animal bodies that occupy it.
In his second and third speeches, Timaeus tells his audience that he is starting over, making
a new beginning. 83 Timaeus takes up a different approach in each speech to explain
different aspects of the cosmos. At the same time, Timaeus talks about his three speeches
as if they constitute a unity like a living body, calling his third and final discourse as “a
head that’s joined to what has gone before.” 84 An understanding of Plato’s Timaeus as a
whole depends on the way one takes the relationship between these speeches. Do the three
speeches contribute to a continuous whole? Do they differ because Timaeus is building out
his previous ideas with new, more nuanced concepts? Or, on the other hand, do the
differences in the speeches render them incompatible explanations of things? Could
Timaeus be replacing certain ideas with others throughout the dialogue?
The relationship between Timaeus’s first and second discourse is especially
difficult to parse. Each takes on a different paradigm for conceiving of the origin and
structure of the cosmos. In his first speech, Timaeus discusses the cosmos as a crafted thing,
82 Following Cornford’s outline, I am reading the first discourse as 29d-47e, the second discourse as 47e69a, and the third discourse as 69a-92c. In addition to the three discourses, Timaeus also gives a “prelude”
(i.e., προοίμιον, 29d5) in which he introduces the parameters of his method with the notion of the εἰκὼς
μῦθος. Here, he also sets down the foundational principles for his explanation in the first discourse by making
the initial distinction between Being and Becoming (27d6-7) and introducing the δημιουργός (28a6).
83 C.f., 48e, “Now let this new beginning concerning the all have more divisions than the one we made
before,” and 69a, “let’s go back again briefly to the beginning” (translations of Timaeus are by Peter
Kalkavage here and throughout).
84 Timaeus 69b. Kalkavage (2016) suggests that the image of the “head” likens Timaeus’ speech to a statue,
rather than a living body (p. 64).

50

using a model that conceives of cause as ποιήσις, where all order and structure in the natural
world is the result of the workings of a divine craftsman. 85 Here, he explains the soul and
body of the cosmos using language of mathematical proportion. At the end of this speech,
Timaeus says that he has exhibited (ἐπιδείκνυμι) the things that have been crafted by
intellect (τὰ διὰ νοῦ δεδημιουργημένα, 47e4) without yet discussing what comes to be by
necessity (τὰ δι᾽ ἀνάγκης γιγνόμενα). The second discourse, in turn, gives voice to what is
left out of the first, explaining what comes to be by necessity. Here, Timaeus explains the
origin of the cosmos as a kind of birth which relies on both a male and female parent rather
than a single male δημιουργός. Timaeus’s language changes with reference to the cosmos’s
parentage (in particular its father). Rather than “demiurge,” Timaeus describes the father
of the cosmos as “intellect.” 86 Throughout the second discourse, Timaeus’s language
becomes more obscure and opaque, and he relies more heavily on images. Sorting out the
unity or disunity of the Timaeus as a whole depends in large part on what one makes of the
differences in Timaeus’s first and second discourse. How are we meant to take the second
discourse in relation to the first? Is the second discourse meant to pick up where the first
leaves off and provide supplementary information? Is it an augmentation of the paradigm
in first discourse, or does it present a new paradigm that is meant to revise the framework
laid down in the first discourse?
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I.e., the δημιουργός (28a6).
Intellect (νοῦς) is introduced at 48a2. Despite the different name, many have argued that intellect is the
intellect of the demiurge, or that these are two names for the same thing. For instance, Cornford associates
intellect with the Demiurge (Plato’s Cosmology, pp. 161-166), Menn (Plato on God as Nous, 1955) takes
intellect to be the crucial component for the conception of God in Plato’s Timaeus and other words, and
Petrucci’s (2021) philological analysis of 55d5 (i.e., reading θεός rather than Burnet’s θεόν) offers good
evidence to find that Timaeus does in fact identify the demiurge with intellect.
86
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My task in this project is to sort out these and other questions about the relationship
between the first and second discourse. Reading the relationship between the first and
second discourse with a special concern for the role of sexual difference in each, I will
make some suggestions about the significant ways in which the discourses differ. I will
argue that the second discourse’s genetic paradigm is a significant revision of the craft
paradigm of the first discourse rather than an addendum to it. At the same time, I take
seriously the notion that the discourses both contribute to a single whole, and I will consider
what it means for both of these discourses to be part of the εἰκὼς μῦθος and part of a single
philosophical account. I will argue that the crucial difference in the paradigms that guide
the first and second discourse is rooted in the way each construes the role of femininity in
its cosmological and cosmogonical account. To make my argument, I will analyze the
various and repeated ways that Timaeus uses sexual difference to shape his accounts. I will
focus in particular on each discourse’s account of body and embodiment to demonstrate
the crucial difference in the craft paradigm and the genetic paradigm. Looking to these
accounts of body, I will argue that the craft paradigm seeks to minimize principles that the
dialogue construes as feminine, while the genetic model makes the very same principles
essential features of body and the cosmos.
I will begin by characterizing the first discourse’s productive model and its
commitments. I will focus on the ways this model is built on a basic distinction between
Being (τὸ ὄν) and Becoming (τὸ γιγνόμενον) and conceives of the Demiurge’s craftwork
as a likeness of Being in the medium of Becoming. Here, I will analyze the role of sexual
difference in Timaeus’s characterization of the Demiurge, his characteristics, his craft, and,
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in particular, his status as “poet and father” of the cosmos. 87 Next, I will look at the accounts
of body according to the craft paradigm. 88 I will argue that the first discourse’s craft
paradigm, and especially the account of body on that model, is highly androcentric
according to the dialogue’s own conception of sexual difference. The first discourse seeks
to understate—if not totally erase—in the cosmos characteristics that are explicitly
associated with femininity in the rest of the dialogue.
Next, I will characterize the second discourse’s genetic paradigm for the origin and
structure of the cosmos. Here, I will look at Timaeus’s revisions of the fundamental
distinction between Being and Becoming with his introduction (and subsequent reintroductions) of the third kind. Once again, I focus on the role of sexual difference in these
distinctions. While in the first discourse there was only a father of the cosmos, Timaeus
introduces and explains a mother in the second discourse; Timaeus frames the first and
third kind as a father and mother of the cosmos, respectively. I will demonstrate the ways
Timaeus draws attention to femininity in the second discourse. On the genetic paradigm
that guides the second discourse, Timaeus frames the origin of the cosmos as a
collaboration between masculine and feminine principles, and he makes feminine
principles (e.g., disorder, decay) essential features of embodiment rather than errors which
require divine minimization. He uses overwhelmingly feminine images to characterize the
χώρα—using feminine pronouns for her and calling her a mother and wetnurse—and I will
argue this represents elevating femininity as a partner with masculinity in a way that was
not done in the first discourse. I argue that the difference in the different treatment of
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Ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα, 28c3.
the body of the cosmos, crafted by the demiurge (31b-34a), and the bodies of human beings, crafted
by the lesser gods (42a-43a).
88 I.e.,
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femininity constitutes an irreconcilable inconsistency in the craft paradigm and the genetic
paradigm, and that the genetic paradigm revises the craft paradigm in Timaeus’ speech. I
take the two discourse’s differing approaches to the father’s use of force or persuasion as
further evidence of the incompatibility of the two accounts. 89

2.2

The Craft Paradigm: Timaeus’ First discourse

Timaeus explains the order of the cosmos in the first discourse using the nature and aims
of craftwork as a paradigm. He frames his initial discussion of the origin and intelligible
order of the cosmos as an act of production by a divine craftsperson. Timaeus’s conception
of making depends on a categorical distinction between Becoming and Being, with the
demiurge’s producing a likeness of Being in the medium of Becoming. This likening takes
place as the demiurge produces order and beauty in what is disorderly by subordinating
aspects of Becoming to the norms of the eternal model. Because beauty and intelligibility
are not natural to Becoming, the all requires the demiurge’s craft to achieve intelligibility
in the cosmos, it cannot achieve this on its own. Thus, the first discourse’s account of the
demiurge’s craft is the story of the various ways in which he makes the components of the
all commensurate with each other and with the whole. He constructs a body, soul, and
intellect of the cosmos, producing a living thing by structuring its natural generativity.
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In a future version of the project, I would like to include some further reflections on the unity of the first
and second discourse. Despite the differences in the paradigms that guide the first and second discourse, I
find that we need to take seriously the fact that they belong to the same account. Here, I will offer some
remarks on considering the sense in which these accounts share unity as parts of Timaeus’s εἰκὼς μῦθος,
which he warns us will not always agree with itself: “If, in saying many things on many topics concerning
gods and the birth of the all, we prove to be incapable of rendering speeches that are always and in all respects
in agreement with themselves and drawn with precision, don’t be surprised” (29c).
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Over the course of his first speech, Timaeus deepens and expands the idea of the
natural world as a likeness of the eternal model by explaining the aims and consequences
of the demiurge’s craft. As a likeness of Being, the cosmos occupies a strange position,
seemingly at odds with itself in a basic ontological sense. On the one hand, it belongs to
the class of things that come into being, τὸ γιγνόμενον, and as a result is subject to constant
generation and, in its pre-ordered state, is grasped by opinion rather than intellect. On the
other hand, as a likeness of Being, it is made to be as much like the eternal model as
possible, with the demiurge approximating beauty, self-sameness, and intelligibility in his
ordering of the all. Once the all is ordered into the cosmos, it is grasped both through
opinion and intellect, with the intelligible aspects of the cosmos owing to the demiurge’s
craft.
In this section, I am going to analyze the commitments of the craft paradigm that
guides Timaeus’s first speech. First, I’ll go through the distinction between Being and
Becoming in prologue to the first speech (i.e., 27c-29d). I will review the way that the
craftworking paradigm is introduced out of the distinction between Being and Becoming
in the characterization of the cosmos as something that comes to be but is crafted in the
likeness of Being. Next, I will examine the figure of the divine craftsperson responsible for
ordering the all into the cosmos: the demiurge. I will review the demiurge’s aims in crafting
the cosmos, focusing on the way that he seeks to produce certain properties (e.g.,
intelligibility, unity, order) in the cosmos while working to minimize others (e.g.,
unintelligibility, multiplicity, disorder). In particular, I will look at the way the demiurge
does this as he crafts the body of the cosmos. Finally, I will examine the way Timaeus
expresses the demiurge as an overtly masculine figure, and associates masculinity with the
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properties that the demiurge seeks to impart in the cosmos. I will argue that, in addition to
framing the demiurge as a masculine figure, Timaeus expresses this initial cosmological
model as an androcentric model that names and emphasizes masculinity while occluding
and refusing to name femininity as a principle or cause of cosmic order.
2.2.1

Being and Becoming

All of Timaeus’ observations in his first discourse hinge the distinction between Being and
Becoming that he makes in the prologue to his speech. 90 Timaeus begins his speech by
setting Being (τὸ ὄν) to one side, and Becoming (τὸ γιγνόμενον) apart from it, listing the
traits and behaviors that belong to each kind. 91 Being is always in the same condition (ἀεὶ
κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὄν, 28a2) and never has generation (γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχων, 27e6), while
Becoming is always coming into being and never is (τί τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν ἀεί, ὄν δὲ
οὐδέποτε, 28a1), constantly being generated and destroyed (γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον,
28a3). Being is purely intelligible, grasped through intellect with reason (νοήσει μετὰ
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This occurs at 27d5-28a6. It is important to note the distinct sense in which Timaeus is construing
Becoming here. Elsewhere in Plato’s work, the physical world is often conceived as not-always-being in the
sense of both being and not being some quality. For instance, in the Phaedo, Simmias is said to be both tall
and not tall, insofar as he is taller than Socrates but shorter than Phaedo (102b-d). We find a similar
characterization in what Socrates calls “summoners” (τὰ παρακαλοῦντα, 523c1) in Republic VII, the things
that provoke intellect because they both are and are not at the same time. Socrates uses the example of a
finger, which can be both big and small insofar as it is bigger than one finger but smaller than another.
However, Timaeus does not characterize the sensible in terms of the compresence of opposites. Instead, he
frames Becoming as constant generation set in tandem with being destroyed (ἀπολλύμενον, 28a3). In “Why
The Cosmos Needs a Craftsman: Plato, ‘Timaeus’ 27d5-29b1,” Johansen observes that Becoming in the
Timaeus resembles Aristotle’s concept of generation as the birth of a new thing (p. 300). We might also
compare this characterization of Becoming with Heraclitean flux, i.e., an account of the physical as constantly
changing into something new. Timaeus construes Becoming as what changes from one state into another
over time.
91 This distinction calls to mind the Pythagorean table of opposites that Aristotle recounts in Metaphysics
A.5 986a22-b2, according to which the all is bifurcated into two categories of properties (i.e., order,
simplicity, and the masculine on the one hand, and disorder, multiplicity, and the feminine on the other). Like
the Pythagorean table of opposites, Timaeus will associate one category with the masculine (in this case,
Being) and the other with the feminine (i.e., Becoming).
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λόγου περιληπτόν, 28a1), while Becoming is sensible, opined with unreasoning senseperception (δόξῃ μετ᾽ αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου δοξαστόν, 28a2-3). Timaeus draws all his initial
commitments about the cosmos from the categories of Being and Becoming. From his
observation that the cosmos is visible, tangible, and has body (ὁρατὸς γὰρ ἁπτός τέ ἐστιν
καὶ σῶμα ἔχων, 28b7-8), Timaeus deduces that it must have come into being. Visibility
and tangibility are qualities that are perceived through the senses, and sense-perception
with opinion is how Becoming is apprehended (rather than Being), therefore the cosmos
has come to be.
In addition to the general distinction between Becoming and Being, Timaeus makes
a division within the class of Becoming with respect to cause. He observes that all
Becoming must come into being through some cause (πᾶν δὲ αὖ τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπ᾽ αἰτίου
τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαι, 28a4-5). 92 This split gives rise to the paradigm of craftworking
as the principle of the origin and structure of the cosmos. Timaeus associates cause with
craft, suggesting that the cause of a thing’s coming into being is a kind of craftsman (ὁ
δημιουργός, 28a6). 93 In light of this, Timaeus distinguishes two kinds of craftsmanship that
each yield their own kind of product. This distinction depends on the model to which the
craftsman looks as he works. On the one hand, there is the craftsman who models his
product after an eternal model (one that always is, belonging to the category of Being),

92

The craftsman’s role as cause of the cosmos marks a distinctive aspect of the first discourse’s productive
model. Timaeus shows us that cause (αἴτιον) is not identical with the category of Being. That is to say, the
eternal model is not itself the cause of the cosmos’ coming into being.
93 While Timaeus does not exclude the possibility of other kinds of causes of things coming into being besides
craftsmen, he does not discuss any other causes. Further, when it comes to things that come to be that are
beautiful, Timaeus is explicit that the cause must be a craftsman (28a8). For a more comprehensive analysis
of Timaeus’ arrival at this conclusion and his overall argument in the prologue, see Johansen’s “Why the
Cosmos Needs a Craftsman: Timaeus 27d5-29b1” (Phronesis, 2014). Johansen (pp. 313-16) argues that cause
can be thought of only as a craftsman.
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and, on the other hand, there is the craftsman who models his product after something else
that has come into being. This constitutes a cut in kinds of Becoming: on the one hand,
there is a kind of Becoming modeled after Being, on the other hand, a kind of Becoming
modeled after Becoming. 94 Whether the craftsman looks to the eternal or something
generated, he models in his work after a paradigm of some kind. Because of this,
craftsmanship is, broadly speaking, mimetic in that it seeks to produce something as a copy
of another. The craftsman of our cosmos, Timaeus tells us, looked to the eternal model. 95
2.2.2 The Demiurge and His Craft
Timaeus says that products in the likeness of the eternal model are beautiful (καλόν, 28a6),
while those in the likeness of a generated model are not beautiful (οὐ καλόν, 28b2). He
observes that the beauty of the cosmos is evidence of the goodness of its maker and the
model to which he looked. 96 Since, Timaeus says, the cosmos is the most beautiful of the
things that have come into being (ὁ κάλλιστος τῶν γεγονότων, 29a5), he infers that it was
crafted with reference to what is self-same and grasped through reason (29a6-b1), i.e.,

94 Similar

distinctions in kinds of making appear in the Sophist and Republic X. In the Sophist, the Stranger
distinguishes two kinds of making (ποιητικός) at 265b, one divine and one human. The divine kind of making
is identified as natural generation, broadly speaking. The stranger says that animals, plants, and all other
natural phenomena are the result of a god working as a craftsman (265c), and that this class of making is
distinct from human productivity (i.e., craftsmanship, carpentry, etc.). Natural generation is described here
as a kind of productive act, with the Stranger calling natural phenomena the products (γεννήματα, 266b4)
and finished works (αὐτὰ ἀπειργασμένα) of a god. In Republic, Socrates distinguishes making (ποίησις) from
imitation (μίμησις) on the basis of the model to which one looks (see 595c-601c). Making is producing
something in the image of the form, while imitation—the art that belongs to poets and painters, according to
Socrates—produces something in the image of appearance (i.e., a sensible thing from a particular angle at a
particular moment in time).
95 Timaeus, 29a.
96 As I will discuss further below, the work of the lesser gods provides an example of craftworking that looks
to a generated model and produces a correspondingly inferior product.
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Being. 97 Timaeus concludes that the cosmos is a likeness (εἰκόνα, 29b2) because it is
modeled after Being.
Timaeus describes the demiurge as “the best of causes,” good, and unbegrudging. 98
It is due to his unbegrudging nature that the demiurge makes the cosmos resemble himself
as much as possible. 99 Accordingly, on this model, the demiurge fashions the cosmos as a
likeness. He does not create ex nihilo; there is no crafting without a model (i.e., Being) or
pre-existing material (i.e., the all, τὸ πάν, of 30a). At the same time, fashioning a product
as a likeness requires a certain kind of creativity from the Demiurge. His special position
as the cause of Becoming requires that he perform a kind of mediation between Being and
Becoming. Becoming is not naturally orderly, intelligible, or beautiful, and it is therefore
up to the Demiurge to approximate those things in Becoming by looking to Being. 100 While
the paradigm to which he looks designates the intelligible qualities with which things must
be imbued if they are to be like the paradigm, the particular way those intelligible qualities
are visually represented cannot be dictated by the paradigm itself. This is because the most
essential properties of the eternal model that Timaeus lists—e.g., intelligibility, goodness,
beauty, self-sameness, and self-sufficiency—are not inherently visible properties. 101 For
example, it seems to be the case that a visible thing must be beautiful in order to be like the
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Johansen (pp. 305-6) invites us to consider this as a distinction between craftworking that is good, and
craftworking that is not, drawing a comparison to the distinction Socrates makes between making (ποίησις)
and imitation (μίμησις) in Book X of the Republic. In the Republic, Socrates contrasts a craftsperson who
uses knowledge to create a beautiful product in the likeness of a form against the one who uses opinion to
make an imitation of an object’s appearance.
98 Timaeus, 29a6, 29e1-2.
99 Timaeus, 30a. Timaeus stresses that wise men (ἀνδρῶν, 30a1) say that this is the most authoritative reason
for the cosmos coming into being.
100 See Timaeus 29e-30a: “[the demiurge] took over all that was visible, and, since it didn’t keep its peace
but moved unmusically and without order, he brought it into order from disorder.”
101 Timaeus mentions these attributes of the eternal model throughout 28a-31b.
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eternal model. However, visible things can be beautiful in different ways. The Demiurge
represents beauty in the visible, but he has choices about the way he goes about doing so. 102
As he discusses the crafting of the cosmos, Timaeus focuses on the ways that the
demiurge brings the cosmos as much as possible into a state of likeness with the eternal
model from a state of unlikeness. Since the properties of the eternal model are not natural
to Becoming, the demiurge must take special measures to make Becoming resemble the
model. To do this, he seeks to minimize and occlude certain aspects of Becoming that stand
at odds with the norms of the eternal model. I say ‘occlude’ rather than ‘exclude’ because,
as we will see, these features are not left out or removed from the cosmos. The demiurge
must inevitably confront the unruly aspects of the all as he orders it into a cosmos. He
covers over certain elements of the all like Ouranos does the Titans in Hesiod’s Theogony,
by shoving them out of view by force and hiding them as much as possible. Unlike visibility
and tangibility, which are preserved in the demiurge’s cosmos, disorder and multiplicity
are among some of the properties suppressed by the demiurge’s craft. the demiurge
occludes the aspects of the all that would prevent the cosmos from being as much like the
model as possible. For instance, the model demands intelligibility, therefore the demiurge
seeks to maximize intelligibility and minimize unintelligibility. The way the demiurge
works by emphasizing the properties of the eternal model while occluding the disorderly
aspects of Becoming is especially clear in Timaeus’s account of the demiurge’s
construction of the body of the cosmos.

102 I attribute this basic point to Johansen (2014), who writes, “there can be no certain or demonstrative proof

that these features are the ones that best liken the eternal paradigm in the medium of change, any more than
one might prove that La Traviata is the best musical rendition of the novel La Dame aux Camelias,” (p. 317).
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2.2.3

Body According to the Craft Paradigm

Next, I will consider the account of body and bodies according to the craft paradigm in the
first discourse. I will examine three senses of body that Timaeus presents in the first
discourse, in the order he introduces them. In the beginning of his speech, Timaeus
associates body with visibility and tangibility. Next, Timaeus emphasizes the
structuredness of body his discussion of the formation of the body of the cosmos—the first,
most comprehensive, and most perfect body that comes into being. Finally, in the case of
mortal bodies—bodies that can be dissolved by forces other than the demiurge’s will—
individual bodies are presented as being naturally reliant on others and subject to external
forces. In each conception of body, I will focus on the ways that the demiurge’s production
of various bodies depends on suppressing a certain set of characteristics while emphasizing
another.
2.2.3.1 Visibility and Tangibility
Both in the prologue and in the discussion of the formation of the body of the
cosmos, concepts of body (σῶμα) and the bodily (σωματοειδές) are interwoven with what
is visible (ὁρατός), tangible (ἁπτός), and firm (στερεός). 103 Body is formed when the
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At both 28b7-8 and 31b4-6, Timaeus lists tangibility and visibility alongside body, leaving open the
possibility that body means something other than, or is not reducible to, visibility and tangibility. As he
begins his discussion of the formation of the body of the cosmos, the Greek can be taken in different ways.
Timaeus says that for what comes to be, it is necessary to be bodily, visible, and tangible: σωματοειδὲς δὲ δὴ
καὶ ὁρατὸν ἁπτόν τε δεῖ τὸ γενόμενον εἶναι (31b4-6). On the one hand, Zeyl and Kalkavage translate this
passage as a list of three terms (e.g., it is necessary for Becoming to be bodily, visible, and tangible),
suggesting that the bodily is something separate from the visible and tangible. However, the emphatic δή
particle might suggest that the visible and tangible are constitutive of what it means to be bodily (e.g., it is
necessary for Becoming to be bodily, which really is visible and tangible). Consider Denniston’s assessment
of the particle: “the particle combines a temporal sense with that of obviousness, notoriousness, actuality,
certainty … Hence, δή denotes ‘that which lies, clear to see, before the speaker’s eyes at the moment … δή
denotes that a thing really and truly is so, or that it is very much so,” (pp. 203-204). What is at stake is two
different senses of body. Either body is the combination of the visible and the tangible, or something else,
distinct from the visible and tangible, and does not by nature contain the combination of those qualities.
Moving further into the account of the body of the cosmos will help address this issue. However, it is at least
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demiurge takes on the visible (30a3-4) and sets the two in proportion with one another in
the creation of the elements (31b). 104 Timaeus introduces the specific ways that the
demiurge orders the all in his discussion of the formation of the body of the cosmos—i.e.,
ordered visibility and tangibility. There is special emphasis on the way the demiurge’s
craftsmanship takes what is already there and orders it by subjecting it to terms of
orderliness. He describes the demiurge’s productive ordering as leading the all into order
from disorder (εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας, 30a5). When Timaeus introduces the
demiurge’s relationship to the visible (ὁρατόν, 30a3), he says that the demiurge takes it on
or inherits it (παραλαβών, 30a4). The language Timaeus uses to describe the demiurge’s
reception of the visible underscores the dynamic of power and hierarchy that is at play.
Vocabulary is important here. In contrast with λαμβάνω, which has a simple meaning of
reception or taking, παραλαμβάνω carries the sense of reception from someone else
according to some specific context, for instance, the receiving of orders (e.g., from some
higher authority), receiving a new familial commitment (e.g., a wife or a child), or
receiving an inheritance. 105 The demiurge has a hierarchized relationship to the bodily, he
has a power over or responsibility to it.

clear that body is strongly connected to visibility and tangibility, even if the specifics of that relationship are
not entirely defined. Further, as we will see, Timaeus describes the formation of the cosmic body as the
combination and ordering of visibility and tangibility in the form of fire and earth.
104 While visibility is most often mentioned in tandem with tangibility (c.f., 28b7-8, 31b4, 32b8), here
Timaeus names it without also naming tangibility. Timaeus also leaves out tangibility at the beginning of the
second discourse, in which the second kind—seemingly similar to the class of Becoming from the first
discourse—is said to have generation and to be visible (γένεσιν ἔχον καὶ ὀρατόν, 49a1). In my view, we
should not think of Timaeus as intentionally excluding tangibility from the bodily in these places. Rather, it
seems that Timaeus uses visibility as a synecdoche for the bodily in these places. Body is conceived as visible
and tangible, but the sense in which it is visible is privileged.
105 C.f. Liddell & Scott: “παρα-λαμβάνω: to receive from another; to succeed to an office or property; to take
possession of; to take to oneself as to wife,” (p. 524).
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At its core, this concept of body—i.e., ordered visibility and tangibility—is the
conception of the all as subordinate to the terms of the eternal model, or, in other words,
the all as a likeness. I am considering subordination to be when something is made subject
to the terms of another, but with its properties preserved in a meaningful sense. Visibility
and tangibility are preserved as the demiurge shapes them (i.e., in forming the body of the
cosmos, he does not seek to get rid of visibility or tangibility in any way). The body of the
cosmos is fully visible and tangible, and Timaeus affirms that this must be the case. 106 At
the same time, visibility and tangibility have been significantly altered. As we will see in
the next section, they are no longer present as visibility and tangibility as such, but rather
as fire and earth, mediated by air and water. That is to say, their presence and role in the
ordered cosmic body is constrained and mediated by their participation in structure. We
see the various ways that the visible and tangible are subordinated to the terms of structure
by looking to the formation of the body of the cosmos and the various ways it is made like
the eternal model.
2.2.3.2 The Body of the Cosmos
The cosmic body is the first, most ideal and most comprehensive body that the demiurge
crafts, constructed as a unique and beautifully combined structure. However, despite being
the most perfect kind of body, it turns out to be surprisingly un-bodily. Body is established
at the outset of Timaeus’s speech as one of the properties that is most closely tied to
Becoming, characterized throughout the first speech as something that is complex, visible,
and changing. However, as a likeness of Being, the cosmic body is, as much as possible,
the antithesis of these things; it is designed to be as simple and unchanging as it can be,

106 “What

has come to be must be bodily in form and both visible and tangible,” Timaeus, 31b4.
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subordinating the behaviors that are natural to Becoming—e.g., complexity, visibility, and
flux—to be like the eternal model.
Timaeus says that nothing becomes visible without fire or tangible without earth
(31b5-6). 107 Here, Timaeus appears to be presenting visibility and tangibility as secondary
to fire and earth, with the former relying on the latter. This is a strange characterization,
given the way he frames things in the prologue. If nothing can be visible without fire, then
why does Timaeus remark on the visibility rather than the fieriness of Becoming in the
prologue? The answer seems to be related to the issue of structure. Fire and earth differ
from visibility and tangibility in that the former pair are presented specifically as
components of a structure, part of a geometric ratio of elements, while the latter pair are
not by nature parts of a whole. In other words, visibility is presented as an essential property
of the unstructured all, while fire is presented as a component part of the structured body
of the cosmos. Timaeus says that the demiurge constructs the body of the all (τὸ τοῦ παντὸς
σῶμα, 31b7) from fire and earth, rather than visibility and tangibility themselves. This
passage reveals an important component of body on the productive model, namely, that
bodies have complex structure. In this respect, body is not reducible to visibility and
tangibility, which are not by nature structured.
The demiurge combines earth and fire by setting them in proportion with one
another using the most beautiful bond (δεσμῶν δὲ κάλλιστος, 31c2). This bond is a kind of
proportion or analogy (ἀναλογία, 31c3) between terms. To bind fire together with earth,
the demiurge sets water and air in the middle in a kind of geometric ratio. However, fire

107 To

be more precise, earth is not directly the source of tangibility. Earth provides solidity, which in turn
provides the basis for tangibility.
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and earth are not merely linked or combined with these intermediary terms, they are made
as uniform as possible. 108 Timaeus likens the terms of the bond to the ratio between a
number (for example, 2), its square (4), and its cube (8). 109 When these terms are set into
proportion with one another (2:4::4:8), the beauty of proportion’s bond is demonstrated by
the interchangeability of its components. For instance, taking 2, 4, and 8 in proportion, the
middle term—four—allows for the interchangeability of the terms. Four is both a half (of
eight) and a double (of two). In this kind of analogy, Timaeus says that by necessity all
terms will turn out to be the same as one another, forming a unity (ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ αὐτὰ
εἶναι συμβήσεται, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ γενόμενα ἀλλήλοις ἕν πάντα ἔσται, 32a5-6).

108

The degree to which the elements are made interchangeable by the most beautiful bond is called into
question in the demiurge’s treatment of the Earth. The elements are conceived of as components of a whole
here, in their nature geared toward structure, but not in the atomistic way in which we are used to thinking of
elements as parts of a whole. Instead of being the constituent building blocks out of which more complex
bodies are built, they are operating here more like regional categories that both spatially and intelligibly
inform different forms of embodiment in the cosmos. Later in Timaeus’ speech, the elements re-appear as
the regions in and according to which different kinds of animal bodies are constructed. There are heavenly
bodies to occupy the fiery region of the cosmos, winged and air-travelling bodies to traverse the airy region,
water-dwelling bodies in the watery region, and footed bodies to live on the earth (39e10-40a2). Here in the
dialogue each element corresponds with a different kind (γένος). Earth, however, occupies a special and
distinctive place in the cosmos. While the other elements are impersonal regions of the cosmos, Earth is given
a personal character and identity. Earth has a special priority in her place in the cosmos, with Timaeus placing
her at the center of the cosmos, wrapped around the axis that runs through the middle (40b). Timaeus says
that she is the first and oldest of the gods to come into being (πρώτην καὶ πρεσβυτάτην θεῶν ὅσοι ἐντὸς
οὐρανοῦ γεγόνασιν, 40c). Earth is distinctive also in that she is the only heavenly body that is not made up
of fire. Further, while the demiurge is called the father of the cosmos, there is no mention of a mother. Instead,
the Earth is the figure closest to a mother in the first discourse, being characterized as feminine and a nurse
(τροφόν, 40b) to humans. The account of the body of the cosmos created by the most beautiful bond stipulates
that the elements are all interchangeable and virtually identical with one another, but this characterization of
Earth seems to stand in tension with that account. While the elements are theoretically the same according to
geometric proportion, this is not the case practically. In its particular embodiment and position in the cosmos,
Earth is distinct from the other elements.
109 The example is expandable to four terms, representing the four elements, by adding the fourth power of
the original term (e.g., 2:4::4:8::8:16). There is no difference in the insights gained from the proportion
between three terms vs. four terms, mathematically speaking. Cosmologically speaking, there is a significant
difference between a bond between three and four terms; in order for the body of the cosmos to have depth
(στερεοειδῆ, 32b1), four components are required, rather than three (see 32a7-b3).
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With this proportionate bond, the demiurge makes fire, air, water, and earth not
only commensurable, but in a significant sense the same as one another. In doing so, he
also makes the visible and tangible intelligible as components of a structured whole (i.e.,
the cosmic body). This—structured visibility and tangibility—seems to define what it
means to be a body on the model of the first discourse. The composition of the body of the
cosmos constitutes the demiurge’s taking over of the visible. As a result of the demiurge’s
craft, being composed into interchangeable and therefore unified parts, the body of the
cosmos is unified and unchanging in a likely sense. That is to say, it is not truly unified or
unchanging, but it approximates these properties in the medium of Becoming. The cosmic
body is complex, but its complexity approximates simplicity in that it is structured. In other
words, geometric structure serves as a way to approximate simplicity and unity in the all
through a certain kind of decidedly complex structure called body.
In addition to the unity and intelligibility provided by the geometric structure of the
most beautiful bond, this body approximates Being by being unique and comprehensive
with respect to what is bodily. It is unique in that it takes up the entire quantity of each of
the elements, leaving nothing outside itself. Timaeus says that it is one insofar as nothing
is left out (33a1). Further, the body of the all approximates the unchanging nature of Being
in the behavior allowed by its uniqueness. With nothing outside the cosmic body, it is not
subject to external pressures like heat or cold, and it is therefore free of old age and disease
(33a3-6). For the same reason, it neither subsumes external nutrients nor expels waste—
instead, it uses its own waste for nutrition (33d). In this sense, the body of the cosmos
approximates unchangingness. It does not increase or decrease in mass, and the quality of
its body remains unchanging insofar as it neither ages nor gets sick. Finally, the cosmic
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body approximates the way the eternal model embraces all figures within itself by being
formed into the shape of a sphere, the shape which contains all other shapes (33b).
While the demiurge preserves some of the aspects of the disordered all in his
ordering—like visibility and tangibility—he actively suppresses some of its most
characteristic features, such as generativity, incompleteness, and dependency. It seems that
these properties are necessary to body insofar as it is something that has come to be, but
the demiurge occludes them as he orders the all. Timaeus indicates in the first discourse
that the main features that the demiurge seeks to occlude as he crafts a body for the cosmos
are multiplicity, change (i.e., growth and decay), and incompleteness (i.e., dependency).
However, as I will argue below in section 2.4, these aspects of Becoming are not able to
be fully occluded. Their resistance to the terms of the eternal model is expressed in certain
key moments throughout the first discourse where the demiurge’s craftsmanship cannot
totally eliminate certain kinds of necessary incommensurability in the cosmos.
The demiurge seeks to make the body of the cosmos as simple as possible,
subordinating its multiplicity to the terms of unity through structure. Approximating the
eternal model, the cosmos is one rather than many or indefinite in number (πότερον οὖν
ὀρθῶς ἕνα οὐρανὸν προσειρήκαμεν, ἢ πολλοὺς καὶ ἀπείρους λέγειν ἦν ὀρθότερον; ἕνα,
εἲπερ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα δεδημιουργημένος ἔσται, 31a2-4). There are multiple senses in
which it is one. As I have already mentioned, it is unique, with nothing existing outside of
it. Further, body is conceptually complex, but its structure resembles an intelligible unity.
As we saw in the discussion of the most beautiful bond, the parts that constitute the body
of the cosmos—fire air water and earth—are combined in such a way that they become
interchangeable with one another, becoming a unity (ἓν πάντα ἔσται, 32a6-7).
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Paradoxically, body’s complexity is crucial for its likeness to simplicity. Body
approximates the simplicity of Being through the intelligibility of its complex structure.
Body is undeniably complex and manifold, but the demiurge’s craft orders its complexity
toward oneness. Therefore, as a body, the cosmic body is one because its complexity is
structured.
The demiurge seeks also to impart the body of the cosmos with self-sameness, and
does so by occluding transformation, growth, and decay. Generation and destruction—
along with other transformative processes—are not presented as being essentially bodily.
We should note that although having body (σῶμα ἔχων, 28b8) is one of the traits that allows
Timaeus to identify the cosmos as a thing that has come into being, this is only insofar as
body is sensible. In other words, while body is indicative of becoming, the all in its preordered state is visible but does not consist of bodies. Body comes about as the result of
the demiurge’s craft, giving order and structure to the visible and tangible. Since body is
something made by the demiurge, generation and destruction do not naturally belong to
body qua structured product. Bodies are generative qua members of the class of Becoming,
but it is not in this sense that we understand them as bodies. The demiurge makes the
cosmic body as unchanging as possible and does so rather comprehensively. The spherical
cosmic body is made the same as itself from every angle (33b) and does not change its
shape over time. It is free from old age and disease (33a5-7), and therefore is not dissolved
in an untimely way (ἀκαίρως λύει, 33a5). The cosmic body is crafted as a fully formed
body. Once the demiurge sets its parts in proportion, it does not need to mature, grow, or
change in order to become what it is.
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The demiurge seeks to make the body complete and does so by suppressing any
sense in which it is dependent or relational. Timaeus says that nothing that is like the
incomplete would be beautiful (ἀτελεῖ γὰρ ἐοικὸς οὐδέν ποτ᾽ ἂν γένοιτο καλόν, 30c5).
Consequently, the demiurge makes the cosmic body as complete as possible. One way this
is accomplished is quantitative completeness. As I have mentioned already, the demiurge
uses up all of each of the elements, and nothing is left out (32c5-8). Completeness in the
cosmic body is also construed as self-sufficiency, or not relying on anything other than
itself. The demiurge thought it better that the cosmos be self-sufficient (αὔταρκες, 33d2)
rather than relying on another (μᾶλλον ἢ προσδεὲς ἄλλων, 33d3). Consequently, the cosmic
body does not require external nourishment, but recycles its own waste as nourishment
(33c8) and experiences everything in itself, by itself (πάντα ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ
πάσχον, 33c8-d1).
2.2.3.3 Mortal Bodies
The formation of mortal bodies presents another angle on what it means to be a body on
the productive model. There are three kinds of mortal bodies, made to correspond with the
airy, watery, and earthy parts of the cosmos (39e-40a). 110 The bodies that are generated
within the cosmic body demonstrate what it means to be a body in a sense other than the
virtually unique cosmic body. These internal bodies allow expression to otherwise
occluded features of the cosmos. Since mortal bodies are made with a kind of craftsmanship
that is less commanding than the demiurge’s, they are rife with the aspects of Becoming
that are minimized in the cosmic body. In fact, the evidence of the inferiority of mortal
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The bodies that populate the fiery parts of the cosmos are immortal (i.e., the heavenly bodies). As I will
discuss below, there is one exception or oddity to this rule: the Earth, the oldest and most authoritative of the
gods, is immortal, but not composed by fire.
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bodies lies in the pronounced presence of these traits that are occluded in the cosmic body.
The perfection and simplicity of the cosmic body stands in contrast with the dependency
and complexity of mortal bodies, and, in particular, the human body (the kind of mortal
body that receives the most extensive treatment). While the cosmic body is one, there are
many human bodies. 111 While the cosmic body is perfectly bound, simple, and selfsufficient, the human body is the opposite in every respect. As the craftwork of the lesser
gods, the human body is bound by dissoluble bonds, fastened together with rivets (43a)
rather than beautiful geometric proportion. Humans are constantly changing and dissimilar
with themselves; they grow old, suffer diseases, and subsume and expel external material.
They are temporary by design; Timaeus says that the lesser gods compose them borrowing
portions of the elements, intending to return them again. 112 Further, the shape and motions
of the human body are not self-same or all-encompassing to the same degree as the
spherical cosmic body. Humans have arms and legs and participate in all kinds of motions.
All of these qualities make the human body inferior to the cosmic body as a structural
likeness of being.
In addition to providing a new avenue into understanding the nature of body, mortal
bodies demonstrate something about the limits of the demiurge’s craft. After the demiurge
creates the planets time as a moving likeness of eternity, Timaeus reveals that the cosmos
is still incomplete and therefore dissimilar to the intelligible animal. Unlike the intelligible
animal, the cosmos does not at this point contain all kinds of animals within it. To be as
similar as possible to the intelligible animal, the cosmos must contain all kinds of animals,
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least as many as there are stars, as 41d8 suggests.
42e-43a.

112 Timaeus
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including mortal animals, of which there are three kinds. This incompleteness is called a
remainder—a κατάλοιπον (39e6)—in the cosmos. In order to fulfill the remaining task, the
demiurge delegates the task of imperfect creation to the young gods he himself has created,
who do not face the same limitations that he does. Since the lesser gods are looking to a
generated model in their craft, their productivity is different from—and inferior to—the
work that the demiurge does. The lesser gods imitate the demiurge’s work, and their
imitation yields a product that is dissoluble, i.e., mortal bodies.
Although mortal bodies are inferior kinds of bodies, they still approximate the
qualities of the eternal model to whatever limited degree the lesser gods are able to do so.
For instance, human bodies are, by nature, not able to be as self-sufficient as the cosmic
body. The cosmic body has nothing outside it, and therefore is not subject to external forces
of heat and cold or treacherous terrain to navigate. The human body, on the other hand,
exists within a greater environment, and is consequently not as self-sufficient. The human
body starts out as just the head, a roughly spherical body imitating the shape of the cosmic
body. However, in order to make the human body more self-sufficient, the lesser gods give
it arms and legs so that it is able to traverse its surroundings. There is a trade-off between
self-sufficiency and self-sameness at play. The self-sameness allowed by the spherical
shape of the head is sacrificed in favor of greater self-sufficiency allowed by having arms
and legs.
2.2.3.4 Summary of Body in the First Discourse

Timaeus does not give a straightforward account or definition of body in his first discourse.
However, by looking to these various senses of body in the first discourse, we can discern
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some things about the way Timaeus is conceiving of body. He associates it strongly with
the visible and tangible, to begin with. Additionally, he sees the elements as a more
structured order that the demiurge imparts visibility and tangibility with. Through the most
beautiful bond, visibility and tangibility are made commensurable with one another in
geometric proportion and are made into the cosmic body. Finally, bodies are also conceived
as the individuals that populate the various elemental regions of the cosmos. These bodies
are understood as operating within a certain context, naturally navigating a particular
environment (e.g., bodies in the airy part have wings, while humans have arms and legs to
move around the earth).
The demiurge crafts the body of the cosmos in the likeness of the eternal model by
making it adhere as much as possible to a certain set of characteristics. In particular, he
works to make the cosmic body as intelligible, unique, self-same, unchanging, selfsufficient, intelligible, ordered, structured, and simple as it can be. He does this by
minimizing the aspects of Becoming that are opposed to these properties, namely, the
aspects that are generative, incomplete, dependent on something beyond themselves,
multiplicitous, changing, and indefinite. While this is especially clear as a goal of the
demiurge as he crafts the cosmic body, it is also a goal of the lesser gods as they construct
mortal bodies, although they are not able to approximate these traits as fully as the
demiurge can.
2.2.4

The Androcentrism of the Craft Paradigm

In this section, I aim to reveal the role of sexual difference in the craft paradigm. I am going
to look at the commitments of the draft paradigm that guides the explanation of cosmic
order in the first discourse and argue the various ways that it is androcentric. Further, I will
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argue that, in its androcentrism, the demiurge’s craft seeks to occlude any feminine
principles from its explanation of what is essentially bodily. To make my argument, I will
first look to the overtly masculine characterization of the demiurge. This characterization
shows the way that Timaeus relies on categories of sexual difference in his first speech
while ignoring an entire sex; the demiurge is characterized as masculine as opposed to
feminine, but no account of femininity is given. After examining the masculinity of the
demiurge, I will analyze the way that the various aspects the demiurge and lesser gods seek
to occlude in the formation of bodies amounts to an occlusion of what is essentially
feminine, as the second discourse (and much of Greek literature) reveals.
2.2.4.1 The Masculinity of the Demiurge
Timaeus introduces the demiurge almost in passing; as soon as he claims that what comes
to be must come to be by some cause, he is also talking about the craftsman of the
cosmos. 113 The demiurge is a masculine figure as soon as he is introduced. Other than his
craftsmanship, his masculinity is the first aspect Timaeus attributes to him. His title,
δημιουργός, is masculine, and Timaeus immediately refers to him with masculine
pronouns. 114 Masculinity is one of few traits that can be said about the demiurge at all. At
28c, Timaeus says this:
Now to discover this poet and father (ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα) of this all is quite a task,
and even if we discovered him, to speak of him to all men (πάντας) is impossible.
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“Everything that comes to be necessarily comes to be by some cause; for apart from a cause, it’s
impossible for anything to have a coming to be. Now so long as the craftsman keeps looking to what’s in a
self-same condition…” (Timaeus 28a).
114 I.e., “αὐτοῦ” at 28a.
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Discovering who the demiurge is difficult, but two things are apparently equally selfevident: he is a maker, and he is a father. His masculinity is essentially tied up with his
identity as a craftworker.
The way in which the demiurge is centrally masculine is surprising for two reasons.
To begin with, the demiurge, being an entity who is causally prior to the cosmos and the
various animal bodies that come to occupy it, should also be causally prior to the concept
of sexual difference. Nevertheless, Timaeus characterizes him as essentially masculine and
a father; this concept of the cause of the cosmos relies on a concept of sexual difference of
which it is the cause. The second reason this characterization is surprising is that the
demiurge is the sole parent of the cosmos. The poet image aligns with the single parentage
of the cosmos; a poet does not require a collaborator to create. The father, by contrast,
requires a mother to reproduce, and it is precisely production or reproduction that is at issue
with this analogy. If the demiurge is the father of the all, he is a parthenogenic father who
reproduces without a mother. 115 This is a crucial sense in which the first discourse is
androcentric: by calling the demiurge father, Timaeus implies the concept of the mother,
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Given the demiurge’s status as parthenogenic father and sole ruler of the all, combined with Timaeus’
extensive use of religious language throughout the first discourse, it is difficult not to compare the role of the
Demiurge with Zeus in Hesiod’s Theogony as he gives birth to Athena. Like Zeus in the Theogony, the
Demiurge finds a way to act as a father without need for a mother in reproduction. The cosmic family exalts
the father as the sole parent, and likewise masculine traits are privileged as the standard for beauty in the
cosmos. The Earth is the figure closest to a mother in Timaeus’ description, being characterized as feminine
and a nurse (τροφόν, 40b) to us. There is also an indication that the Earth has some kind of distinctive priority
in her place in the cosmos, with Timaeus placing her at the center of the cosmos (40b), making her the only
heavenly body that is not made up of fire, and stating that she is the first and oldest of the gods to come into
being (πρώτην καὶ πρεσβθτάτην θεῶν ὅσοι ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ γεγόνασιν, 40c). However, there is no indication
that Earth is a mother to the cosmos in the same sense that the demiurge is the father. Although the Earth is
given a distinctive place in the first discourse and associated with motherly characteristics, she is still an
entity that has come into being, crafted by the demiurge, and as an inhabitant of the cosmos does not have
the same priority to the cosmos that the demiurge does.
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but never introduces one. Rather, he subsumes the meaning of father under what it means
to be a maker in general.
The productivity of the demiurge is, in many ways, unfatherly. Biologically
speaking, the father’s reproductive role is usually limited, collaborative, and spontaneous.
The demiurge, on the other hand, is the cause of the cosmos in a way that is comprehensive,
deliberative, and more or less exclusive. This is a salient distinction between the productive
model of the first discourse and the genetic model of the second discourse. While sexual
reproduction (i.e., childbearing, embryology, growth)—the metaphor for the structure of
bodies employed in the second discourse—is spontaneous and passive, craftworking is an
activity that is guided by an intelligible model. The nature of the making that the demiurge
does is on the whole analogous with the kind of making that a human crafter of artifice
does, such as a carpenter, potter, sculptor, or weaver.
At the same time, the demiurge’s craftworking demonstrates a familial, but nonbiological sense in which he is a father by revealing his participation in certain patriarchal
power structures. As I discussed briefly above, we should understand the demiurge taking
on (παραλαβῶν) the visible as a participation in a kind of patriarchal structure, as in taking
on the responsibility and obligations associated with a wife or a child. As father, the
demiurge is in a position of power. He is responsible for and presides over the ordering of
the visible. In addition to his participation in patriarchal structure, the demiurge appears
establish and oversee a hierarchy of responsibility. The way he establishes power structures
is especially clear in the case of his address to the lesser gods. The role of the mother is
attributed to imperfect or anomalous actors in the framework of the first discourse,
particularly the lesser gods and the Earth. In the demiurge’s address to the lesser gods, he
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directly states that these gods will be responsible for furnishing mortal bodies with the
powers of growth and decay (41d). The lesser gods’ ability to impart these qualities into
bodies depends on their limitations with respect to structure. Their craftwork is not perfect
like the demiurge’s, which is why he requires them in order to complete the cosmos with
the creation of mortal bodies. In other words, the qualities of growth and decay in bodies
depends on the imperfection of the lesser gods’ craft. The lesser gods function as a class of
laborers, responsible for fashioning mortal bodies, and their relationship to the demiurge
resembles one between apprentices and the master sculptor. In the same way that the master
sculptor charges his apprentices with artistic tasks that are reduplicative and imitative, the
demiurge delegates the tasks to the lesser gods, instructing them to imitate his art in giving
them birth. The lesser gods receive the material out of which to fashion human bodies just
as the demiurge receives the visible and tangible for fashioning the cosmic body. Thus, he
establishes and perpetuates a kind of hierarchical order in the task of divine craftworking.
Like a father, the demiurge is an external cause responsible for begetting a new,
separate entity. 116 As we have seen, the all is naturally in a state of constant flux and
transformation insofar as it belongs to the class of things that have come into being.
However, this characterizes its pre-ordered state before it has been taken over by the
demiurge. What the demiurge produces, i.e., what he is the father of, is not the growing,
changing aspect of the offspring. Because the demiurge seeks to liken the all to the eternal
model, his ordering suppresses the constant change natural to Becoming in favor of selfsameness and intelligibility. He cannot be responsible for the transformative or changing
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Roughly similar to an efficient cause, in Aristotelian terms. For more on the Demiurge as an efficient
cause, see Johansen (2014) p. 308.
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nature of the all, since these things are naturally present in it before he takes it over. Rather,
he imparts it with beauty, which is not natural to things that have come to be.
This is a construal of fatherhood that tacitly acknowledges that the father is not
solely responsible for the existence of the offspring. At the same time, it makes no room
for a mother, hence no mother is named or described. There is nothing for the mother to
produce on this model. The father is responsible for the coming-to-be of the cosmos as an
ordered version of the all. The part of the cosmos for which the father cannot be responsible
(i.e., the pre-ordered all) cannot be the domain of the mother, because no one is or can be
responsible for the pre-ordered all. Therefore, it is not merely the case that the mother goes
unmentioned in the first discourse but may have been given voice had Timaeus chosen to
do so. On the contrary, Timaeus’s commitment to the foundational principles of Being,
Becoming, and demiurge as cause excludes any role of a mother by design. The demiurge
is a father in that he is not solely responsible for the production of his offspring, but, at the
same time, Timaeus’s account does not allow for a mother to play any role.
2.2.4.2 The Occlusion of Femininity in the Demiurge’s Craftworking
As we have seen, the first discourse describes body as the visible and tangible organized
into an intelligible structure through the craft of the demiurge. On this model, what is
essentially bodily is the structure that the demiurge imparts rather than the traits associated
with visibility and tangibility (or generative Becoming as a whole). In fact, as I have tried
to demonstrate, Timaeus portrays the essential features of Becoming as unbodily.
According to the craft paradigm, a body is a better body when it can more comprehensively
suppress the features of its becoming, as we see when we compare the cosmic body—the
most ideal body—with the human body, an inferior kind of body. The ordered body in the
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first discourse is a way of understanding Becoming in terms of structure rather than on its
own terms. In my view, of the demiurge’s productive task of ordering the all into a body
should be understood as the process of subordinating the various senses of femininity in
the all to an expressly masculine order.
Everything that the demiurge seeks to minimize as he perfects the look of the
cosmos—for instance, disorderliness (ἀτάξις, 30a5), unintelligibility (ἀνόητος, 30b2),
incompleteness (ἀτελεῖ, 30c5), multiplicity (πόλυς, 31a2), and boundlessness (ἄπειρος,
31a3)—are overwhelmingly feminine traits, according to both the Greek literary and
medical traditions, and to the framework of the Timaeus itself. 117 We can think of the
various qualities that the Demiurge seeks to minimize in the cosmos as different iterations
of femininity, representing different categories for women and female bodies in Greek
culture, literature, religion, and medical theory. There are different names for different
categories of women, each distinguished by their varying relationships to men, and, in
particular, sexual partners. Some of these different categories of women are (i) the virgin,
ἡ παρθένος (i.e., the woman who does not yet have a husband; femininity as what is
incomplete or dependent on another), (ii) the wife, ἡ γυνή (the woman with a husband;
femininity as yielding, being second in hierarchy, and supportive), and (iii) the archetypal
Pandora (the original woman, conceived in Hesiod as a problem for men; femininity that
precipitates destruction, disorder, decay, and chance). Each of these categories captures a
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Additionally, if we are meant to understand Timaeus as a member of the Pythagorean tradition, we have
even more reason to think of these traits as feminine. Given Aristotle’s account of the Pythagorean table of
opposites, which divides the all into two categories along the same general lines as Timaeus’ bifurcatory
division of the all in the prologue and first discourse (discussed further below), we should think of goodness,
oneness, and finitude as characteristically male, and badness, multiplicity, and boundlessness as
characteristically feminine.
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different aspect of what the demiurge is forced to encounter but seeks to subordinate or
cover over as he crafts the cosmos.
Just as body serves as a way to understand Becoming in terms of structure, it
construes what is essentially feminine in terms of masculinity. The main qualities or
behaviors that I’m referring to here as being subsumed under unfitting terms are the
transformability of Becoming, and the dependent, relational qualities of bodies. The first
discourse treats all things as adult versions of themselves; it is concerned with what is fully
formed and unchanging. Despite the fact that the crafts of Intellect have some version of a
birth insofar as they are brought into being, they are all born as adult versions of
themselves, ready to participate in their naturally habitual activities. For instance, when the
demiurge creates the stars, they immediately move regularly according to their planned
orbits. When he creates human souls, they need only to be shown the basics of things and
they immediately know what to do and how to live:
He told them the laws of destiny: how the first birth ordered for all would be one, in
order that no one might be slighted by him; and how, once he had sown them, each
in his own appropriate organ of time, they would have to sprout into the most godfearing of animals; and how, human nature being twofold, the superior part would be
a kind which at a later point would be called man (ἀνήρ). 118
Once human souls are shown the laws of destiny, the demiurge no longer has any obligation
to care for them, their fate is in their own hands. Nothing that the demiurge gives life to
has the need for external nourishment or rearing in order to actualize its natural state. This
is especially true of the cosmos as a whole. Timaeus notes that it is specifically designed
not to need nourishment from an outside source, instead relying on its own waste as food
(33d). Further, as has already been made clear, the crafts of the demiurge are naturally

118 Timaeus, 41e-42a.
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incapable of decay. Whatever comes into being through the demiurge’s hand can only be
dissolved according to his will, and since his will is good, he never dissolves his creations.
As a result of his natural propensity for order, the demiurge populates the cosmos entirely
with adults, leaving a place neither for things that are growing and maturing, nor for what
is past its natural ripeness and falling into decay. As I have suggested above, these
processes—growth and decay, broadly construed—are present as errant states of being and
are appropriately accounted for by means other than the demiurge himself.
The first discourse’s subsumption of growth and decay—i.e., states of being that
diverge from the norm—under structural terms is closely related to the omission of
femininity as mother from this part of the text. Given the association between generative
processes and femininity, it is unsurprising that the mother is omitted from the parentage
of the cosmos in the first discourse. Mothers are responsible for a child’s growth in both
the embryological and cultural sense. These extra-structural behaviors or characteristics of
things—which will be attributed to Necessity in the second discourse—are addressed in
the terms of structure rather than their own appropriate terms. Because whatever is other
than structure is being subsumed under the terms of mathematical structure in the first
discourse, it (i.e., extra-normativity) is conceived as errancy or a mathematical remainder.
In addition to the mother’s role in growth and development, there is a close association
between women and degeneration insofar as women are characterized in the Timaeus and
elsewhere as erring from the male standard as part of their natures (c.f., 42a, 76d, 90e). The
χώρα, with its distinctly feminine characterization, is the source of growth and decay in the
second discourse. The χώρα is described as a nurturer and mother, and the formation of
bodies from elemental triangles (called a birth, 53c, 54d) is described with the same
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language as embryology in pregnant women/female animals later in the dialogue (c.f. 91d).
Further, the shaking of the χώρα, which leads to the interchanging of elemental bodies, is
determined to be the cause of decay and bodily dissolution in the cosmos.

2.3

The Genetic Paradigm: Timaeus’s Second Discourse

After his discussion of sense perception at the end of the first discourse, Timaeus
acknowledges that something has been left out of his account so far:
Now what’s gone by so far in what we’ve said, except for a bit, has shown the things
that have been crafted through intellect; but we must also set down beside this the
account of what has come to be through necessity. 119
Timaeus sets his second discourse up as the process of bringing to light what was omitted
from his first discourse. As he starts out, the things that come to be through necessity are
placed alongside the works of intellect. Early on in his second speech, Timaeus revises his
initial distinction between Being and Becoming and adds a third kind alongside them. He
introduces the third kind by placing it alongside his earlier division of the two kinds.
However, following this initial division, he gives more context and clarity to the third kind,
and the relationship between the three kinds changes. By his final re-division of the three
kinds, Timaeus has taken up a new paradigm for the origin and structure of the cosmos.
This new paradigm compares the origin of the cosmos to an act of sexual reproduction
rather than the productivity of a craftworker. Thus, I will argue, the craft paradigm is
abandoned in favor of a genetic model of the cosmos.

119 Timaeus,

47e-48a.
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In this section, like the previous section, I will start by analyze the commitments of
the second discourse. In particular, I am going to focus on the way that the first discourse’s
foundational division between Being and Becoming is revised and re-revised in order to
bring to light the third kind. In analyzing each of these divisions, I will be highlighting the
way that femininity is increasingly foregrounded in Timaeus’s cosmological account. I will
use this analysis to argue the incompatibility of the paradigms that guide the first and
second discourse in the next section.
2.3.1 The Division of the Three Kinds
The second discourse starts out with a revision of Timaeus’s divisions from the prologue:
Now let this new beginning concerning the all have more divisions than the one we
made before. For then we distinguished two forms, but now we must make plain
another, third kind. Two kinds were sufficient for what we said before: one set down
as the form of a model—intelligible and always in the self-same condition—and the
second, an imitation of a model, having birth and visible. A third kind we didn’t
distinguish at that time, since we considered the two would be sufficient; but now
the account seems to make it necessary that we try to bring to light in speech a form
difficult and obscure. 120
Here Timaeus is referring back to the distinction between Being and Becoming that he
made in advance of the first discourse. In addition to these two, which he has already
introduced, Timaeus describes a third kind:
What power, then, and what nature should we suppose [the third kind] to have? This
especially: That it’s a receptacle for all becoming, a sort of wet nurse (τιθήνην). 121
After his initial framing of the three kinds, Timaeus re-frames his new tripartite division of
the all three additional times. 122 He spends a significant portion of his second speech
making this division, offering orienting remarks to clarify the division (and in particular

120 Timaeus

48e-49a.
49a.
122 At Timaeus 50c-d, 52a-b, and 52d-e.
121 Timaeus,
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the third kind), and returning to the division. This stands in contrast with the first discourse.
Timaeus divides and re-divides the all into three kinds from 48e-53c in the second
discourse, but his initial division between Being and Becoming takes only a few lines at
28a and is never revised over the course of the first discourse.
Timaeus labors to speak about this third kind he introduces in the second discourse.
The strangeness of the third kind—the kind that Timaeus eventually calls “χώρα” at 52b—
presents a problem for thinking and speaking about it. All thinking about the χώρα is
improper insofar as it is indirect and mediated by intellect and sensible things. Being what
makes room for all sensible things, the χώρα is implicitly present in all thinking about
sensible things. Trying to talk about the χώρα itself draws what is the background of all
things, so to speak, into the foreground. Methodologically, we are trying to speak
determinately about the thing that is completely indeterminate. As a result, it is intuitive to
frame a conversation about space in terms of the things it makes room for, but this is
misguided because it speaks about the χώρα as if it has determinate attributes.
To account for this problem, Timaeus reveals something about the χώρα by talking
about what it does rather than what it is. He reveals certain things about the way the χώρα
acts on the basis of various incompatible images. He calls it a nurse (49a), gold being
constantly re-modeled (50a-c), a mother (50d), the odorless base for perfumes (50e), and a
winnowing basket (53a). Each of these images represents the χώρα in a different aspect.
Among its other representations in Timaeus’ speech, the χώρα nourishes as a wet nurse
does, remains a constant underlying change in the cosmos as moldable gold does, makes
room for the birth of the second kind as a mother does, is completely receptive to the
qualities of everything it makes room for as the odorless base of perfume is, and shakes
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and purifies its contents with shaking and disequilibrium as a winnowing basket does. I am
now going to unpack each of these ways of speaking about the χώρα to get a fuller picture
of the ways Timaeus revises his explanation of the cosmos in the second discourse.
2.3.1.1 The First Division: The Wet Nurse of Becoming
When Timaeus first divides the three kinds, he sets the third kind down as an addition to
the kinds previously distinguished:
Now let this new beginning concerning the all have more distinctions than the one
we made before. For then we distinguished two forms, but now we must make plain
another, third kind. 123
Timaeus sets us up to expect his second discourse to be an addition to and continuation of
the first. As was the case with the introduction of the demiurge, Timaeus claims that it
would be difficult to proclaim the nature of the third kind:
Now the account seems to make it necessary that we try to bring to light in speech a
form difficult and obscure. 124
Although the third kind is difficult to make clear, Timaeus spends a great deal of effort
trying to bring it to light. Also like his introduction of the demiurge, Timaeus is able to
reveal one aspect of the third kind with ease. Where he was at first unable to say anything
about the demiurge except that he was a father, Timaeus is unable to say anything about
the third kind at first apart from her femininity. Once again, sexual difference is the first
orienting detail we receive about the third kind:
What power, then, and what nature should one suppose [the third kind] to have? This
especially: that it’s a receptacle for all becoming, a sort of wet nurse. 125
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Here, by classifying one of his divisions of the all as a nurse, Timaeus for the first time
names femininity as an essential feature of the cosmos. However, this feminine principle
seems to have less responsibility than the masculine principle (i.e., the demiurge, or first
kind). While the demiurge is called father, Timaeus introduces the third kind as nurse
rather than mother, emphasizing a continuity with the model according to which only
the male parent is responsible as a cause of the things that come to be. By using the
image of nurse rather than mother, Timaeus represents femininity in the model of the
origin of cosmos with a kind of secondary generative capacity—the nurse’s role is to
care for the already begotten offspring, in contrast with the mother’s role of bearing the
offspring. However, Timaeus quickly revises this characterization after offering some
images and suggestions about how to think of the third kind.
After Timaeus divides out the three kinds for the first time, he further explains the nature
of the third kind by giving a new account of the elements. The elements, he explains, are
not things in themselves, but rather are sorts of occasions of the third kind. The χώρα is
that in which the elements appear. 126 Sensible things are the third kind molded in different
ways. Put another way, the third kind is like a nurse in that she provides an occasion for
the elements (and, consequently, for everything that comes to be). Next, before re-division,
Timaeus offers an image for thinking of the third kind. He compares it to a gold molding
stuff 127 (ἐκμαγεῖον, 50c2):
But we must make an effort to speak about this once more and with still more clarity.
If someone, having molded all figures out of gold, should in no way stop remolding
126

Timaeus, 49c-50e.
(2006) offers an alternative translation and understanding of ἐκμαγεῖον: “The primary meaning
of ekmageion, or at least the first given by Liddell and Scott is, by contrast, that of a napkin or wiping cloth:
something that instead of creating marks rather removes them. Plato uses it precisely in this sense when
describing the function of the spleen as that which cleans the liver and absorbs its impurities, ‘as a wiper
[ekmageion] that is laid beside a mirror always prepared and ready to hand’” (p. 91).
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each figure into all the others, then if someone pointed out one of them and asked
“whatever is it?”—by far the safest thing to say in point of truth is “Gold.” … The
same account applies to the nature that receives all bodies. … It’s laid down by nature
as a molding stuff for everything, being both moved and thoroughly configured by
whatever things come into it; and because of these, it appears different at different
times. 128
When Timaeus calls the third kind, he highlights the sense in which the χώρα remains the
same, underlying the changing, various bodies (σώματα, 50b) that it receives. 129 Like the
pre-ordered all in the first discourse, the third kind as ἐκμαγεῖον is the necessary material
out of which things come into being, but is itself not responsible for the actual structural
quality of anything that comes to be in it.
2.3.1.2 The Second Division: Mother, Father, and Offspring
After characterizing the third kind as ἐκμαγεῖον, Timaeus re-frames his division of the three
kinds. While he placed the third kind alongside the previous division between Being and
Becoming at first, Timaeus casts each of the kinds in a new light at 50c-d and presents a
new kind of relationship between them:
In any case, at present we should keep in mind three kinds: that which comes to be,
that in which it comes to be, and that from which what comes to be sprouts as
something copied. And what’s more, it’s fitting to liken the receiver to a mother, the
“from which” to a father, and the nature between these to an offspring, and to notice
that if the imprints are going to be sufficiently various with every variety to be seen,
then that in which the imprint are fixed wouldn’t be prepared well unless it’s
shapeless with respect to all those looks that it might be going to receive from
elsewhere. 130

128 Timaeus,

50a-b.

129 The gold image appears to be something like a provisional account of what Aristotle calls δύναμις, which

he develops an extensive account of especially in Book Θ of the Metaphysics. Aristotle describes matter as
that which underlies all changes to a thing (Metaphysics 1042a33-1042b5), and further says that, as the
underlying substance, matter is “that which exists potentially,” (1042b10, trans. Ross). In Aristotle’s thought,
δύναμις is determined by and directed toward actuality (c.f., Θ.6). This marks an important difference
between Aristotle’s account of potency and the image of the chо̄ra as gold.
130 Timaeus, 50c-e.
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As Timaeus expands his explanation of the third kind, we see the second discourse’s model
begin to diverge from the first discourse’s craft paradigm. At the same time, there is still a
great deal in common between the two accounts. On the one hand, Timaeus is naming a
mother of the cosmos and shifting the entire paradigm for its generation: the cosmos is now
like a begotten offspring rather than a crafted artifact, the result of two parents rather than
a single craftsperson. The feminine principle is more fully integrated in this framing. Rather
than being added in addition to the kinds Being and Becoming which can be understood
without the addition of the third kind, the relationship between the three is understood in a
new way here. On the new reproductive paradigm, the role of the father and offspring
cannot be understood without the mother. In contrast with the first characterization of the
third kind as a wet nurse, Timaeus now calls her mother, attributing to the third kind a
similar kind of causal responsibility for the offspring that he did not initially present.
On the other hand, this model still shares significant features with the craft
paradigm. The mother—i.e., the third kind—is not yet sufficiently differentiated from the
all which the demiurge takes over in the first discourse. Like the model in the first
discourse, here Timaeus characterizes the third kind as something fully passive and
receptive. As an ἐκμαγεῖον, she is necessary for what comes to be in her, but she does not
determine anything about what comes to be. While Timaeus further centralizes the
feminine principle of his cosmic account by calling the third kind ‘mother’, it remains to
be seen the ways in which she is responsible for what comes to be in her.
The mother’s total receptivity is underscored by the perfume image Timaeus presents:
For if [the third kind] were similar to any of the things that come on the scene, on
receiving what was contrary to itself or of an altogether different nature, whenever
these things arrive, it would copy them badly by projecting its own visage alongside
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the thing copied. For this reason, that which is to take up all the kinds within itself
should be free of all forms, just as with all those fragrant oils, whose makers first
artfully contrive this very condition: they first make the liquids that are to receive the
scents as odorless as possible. 131
In the image of the odorless base for perfume (50e), Timaeus describes the third kind as
what makes room for the sensible. Like the perfume base, the third kind makes room for
shaped things by being itself totally free from form or shape. This shapelessness is the
necessary condition for shaped things to come into being. This characterization informs
Timaeus’ return to discussing the elements. Here, he says that the third kind is neither any
of the elements nor anything that comes to be from them, but rather is what underlies these.
The elements are different configurations of the third kind, the result of her “partaking
somehow of the intelligible in a most perplexing way and most hard-to-capture.” 132 Fire,
for instance, can be called the part of the third kind that has been ignited. 133
2.3.1.3 The Third and Fourth Divisions: Bastard Reasoning and the Winnowing Basket
Timaeus divides the three kinds for a third time at 52a:
One kind is the form, which is in a self-same condition—unbegotten and
imperishable, neither receiving into itself anything else from anywhere else … that
which is intellection’s (νόησις) lot to look upon; and there is a second kind, which
has the same name as the form and is similar to it—sensed, begotten, always swept
along … graspable by opinion with the aid of sense (δόξῃ μετ᾽ αἰσθήσεως); and
moreover, a third kind—that of Space (χώρα)—which always is, not admitting of
destruction and providing a seat for all that has birth, itself graspable by some bastard
reasoning with the aid of insensibility (ἁπτὸν λογισμῷ τινι νόθῳ), hardly to be
trusted, the very thing we look to when we dream and affirm that it’s somehow
necessary for everything that is to be in some region and occupy some space, and
that what is neither on earth nor somewhere in heaven is nothing. 134

131 Timaeus,

50e.
Timaeus 51a-b.
133 Timaeus 51b: “Someone would speak most correctly if he said that the part of it that’s been ignited appears
each time as fire; the part that’s been liquified, as water; and both earth and air appear to the extent that it
receives imitations of these.”
134 Timaeus, 52a-c.
132
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Timaeus further centralizes the third kind in his account by emphasizing the way that it,
like the first kind, always is and does not admit of generation or destruction. The third kind
is as timeless and as foundational for becoming as the first kind. Here, Timaeus is
associating the three kinds with the different intellectual capacities used to grasp them. For
intellect and the things that come into being, this framework roughly corresponds with
Timaeus’ remarks in the beginning of the dialogue:
Now the one [i.e., Being] is grasped by intellection (νοήσει) accompanied by a
rational account, since it’s always in the same condition; but the other in its turn is
opined by opinion accompanied by irrational sensation (δόξῃ μετ᾽ αἰσθήσεως), since
it comes to be and perishes and never genuinely is. 135
This characterization of the three kinds seems to align with the first discourse more closely
than the previous two. Once again, the third kind seems to be something merely added in
addition to that initial distinction. However, immediately on the heels of the third division,
Timaeus re-frames the three kinds a final time before giving his account of the construction
of the elemental bodies. He calls this account a summary (ἐν κεφαλαίῳ, 52d2), but this reframing differs greatly from the previous characterizations of the three kinds:
So then, in summary, let this account be given, proceeding from my vote and
reasoned out as follows: Being and Space and Becoming (ὄν τε καὶ χώραν καὶ
γένεσιν εἶναι), three in a threefold way, are before the birth of heaven; and that wet
nurse of becoming … appears to our sight in all sorts of ways. And because she’s
filled with powers neither similar nor equally balanced, in no part of her is she
equally balanced, but rather, as she sways irregularly in every direction, she herself
is shaken by those kinds and, being moved, in turn shakes them back; and the kinds,
in being moved, are always swept along this way and that and are dispersed—just
like the particles shaken and winnowed out by sieves and other instruments used for
purifying grain: the dense and heavy are swept to one site and settle, the porous and
light to another. 136
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Timaeus, 28a.
Timaeus 52d-53a.
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In this final division, Timaeus introduces another image that further centralizes the role of
the χώρα in his account and adds a new dimension to his conception of the feminine
capacities of the third kind. Timaeus likens space to a winnowing basket that purifies grain.
Previously, the χώρα has been characterized only as wholly passive in receiving
impressions of intellect and providing an occasion and making room for the sensible to
come into being. Here, in addition to these properties, Timaeus offers an image that
demonstrates the role of the third kind in the cosmos. While she is not responsible for the
identity, structure, or properties of anything that comes into being—since those are the
domain of intellect—she does affect the sensible in her own way.
Timaeus says that the χώρα is unbalanced, and as a result she shakes and is shaken.
This indeterminate shaking results in a kind of sorting or purification in which everything,
being shaken, is sorted by likeness, the way that shaking a winnowing basket sifts grain.
As we will discuss in the next section, Timaeus says that the disequilibrium and shaking
of the χώρα divides the four kinds (53a), separating the dissimilar kinds, and pushing
similar kinds together. The swaying, unbalanced nature of the χώρα picks up on the nature
of the “wandering cause” (τὸ τῆς πλανωμένης εἶδος αἰτίας, 48a6-7) that Timaeus referred
to as part of his justification for taking up a new beginning in the second discourse:
So if anyone is to declare how the all was in this way genuinely born, he must also
mix in the form of the wandering cause and say how it is its nature to sweep things
around. 137
The χώρα is entirely receptive, but her total receptivity fills her with uneven and
unbalanced powers which, in turn, cause her to shake, sweep along, and disrupt the cosmos.
The χώρα, not intellect, is responsible for disorder in the cosmos. Further, this aspect of
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the χώρα is not merely taken over and molded as the demiurge takes over the all. Intellect
struggles with the χώρα’s disruption, and that disruption plays a key role in the sorting of
the elements and the coming to be of bodies.
2.3.2

The Genetic Paradigm in Summary

Through these various characterizations of the division between Being, Becoming, and
χώρα, Timaeus brings to light a conception of the origin and structure that uses sexual
reproduction as its guiding paradigm. In contrast with the craft paradigm, according to
which there was a single, male creator of the cosmos, the genetic paradigm posits a mother
and father of the cosmos who are mutually responsible for what comes to be in distinctive
ways. The father (i.e., intellect), has essentially the same domain as the first discourse’s
demiurge. He provides order and structure in what comes to be, and everything that comes
to be is in some sense a likeness of him. The things that come to be in the cosmos are the
offspring on this model. Like the class of Becoming in the first discourse, the offspring is
everything that comes to be, which is sensible and grasped by opinion.
Special attention has been given to uncovering the mother of the cosmos according
to this model. The mother (i.e., the third kind, the χώρα) has a role that is more obscure
and difficult to discern. Timaeus relies on various incompatible images to infer things about
the mother of the cosmos. In his initial characterization of the mother, she appears similar
to the pre-ordered all of the first discourse; she is wholly receptive, lacks any structure or
intelligibility in herself, and is taken over and shaped by intellect. Timaeus emphasizes the
total receptivity of the χώρα by comparing her to a molding stuff that can take on various
forms (i.e., the ἐκμαγείον), as well as the odorless base of a perfume that receives scents
but does not itself shape what comes to be in it in any way. Timaeus’s divisions of the three
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kinds culminate in his characterization of the mother as a winnowing basket. In this image,
Timaeus highlights a new set of generative properties of the mother of the cosmos. In her
total receptivity, she takes on various unbalanced powers, and these in turn cause her to be
shaken and to shake what comes to be in her. These properties in particular will be of
special interest in the following section as I consider this genetic paradigm in contrast with
the craft paradigm.

2.4

The Incompatibility of the Craft Model and Genetic Model

Now that I have laid out the various commitments of Timaeus’ cosmologies in the first and
second discourses, I am going to argue that the genetic paradigm is not a continuation of
the craft paradigm. I find that, in its incompatibility, the genetic paradigm offers a
significant revision of the craft paradigm. Further, it is not merely the case that the craft
paradigm is incomplete because it omits what comes to be through necessity. Instead, I
find that the craft paradigm is shown to be insufficient due to its inability to account for or
accommodate the things that come to be through necessity on its model.
As a matter of clarity, I am not arguing that there is necessarily a rift between or a
replacement of the causal personnel between the first and second discourses. In other
words, I think there is good reason to agree with those who say that intellect in the second
discourse is a continuation of the first discourse’s demiurge. It does not matter much to my
argument whether intellect replaces the demiurge. My argument relies on the relationship
between the causal principles of the cosmos, rather than they themselves. It isn’t the figures
themselves that make the genetic paradigm significantly different from the craft paradigm,
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it is the relationship between the parents of the cosmos, and the way Timaeus construes the
relationship between principles of sexual difference in the cosmos.
I’m going to make my argument from two angles. First, I will look at the ways that
the second discourse makes disorder an essential feature of the cosmos in a way that the
first discourse does not allow. Second, I will argue that the first discourse presents a model
of forcible suppression of feminine features by the masculine demiurge, while the second
discourse represents a collaborative relationship between the masculine and feminine,
having intellect accomplish his goals by means of persuasion rather than force. While
reason still seeks to minimize the effects of necessity as the demiurge does disorder, the
relationship between reason and necessity in the second discourse involves a basic respect
for or acknowledgement of the feminine that is not allowed by the framework of the first
discourse.
2.4.1

Disorder as an Essential Feature of Timaeus’s Cosmology

In centralizing the χώρα, and, in turn, centralizing the χώρα’s capacity to shake and disrupt
the cosmos, Timaeus makes disorder, decay, and disruption an essential feature of the
cosmos on this account. While these properties were treated only as obstacles for the
demiurge to overcome in the first discourse, here they play a crucial role in making the
cosmos what it is. This is the most significant way that the second discourse’s genetic
paradigm differs from the first discourse’s craft paradigm. The first discourse does not just
omit disorder from its account of what is an essential feature of the bodies of the sensible
things that populate the cosmos, it has the demiurge forcibly suppress those features in
bodies. He seeks to minimize disorderliness (ἀταξία, 30a5), unintelligibility (ἀνόητος,
30b2), incompleteness (ἀτελεῖ, 30c5), multiplicity (πόλυς, 31a2), and boundlessness
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(ἄπειρος, 31a3)—all of which are demonstrated in the second discourse to be essential
features of the cosmos insofar as they are behaviors brought about by χώρα. Further, these
are all shown to be essentially feminine features, partially constituting the χώρα’s role in
the cosmos as its mother and nurse. On the craft paradigm, the essential features of bodies
are those that are similar to the eternal model. On the genetic model, by contrast, Timaeus
highlights both order and disorder as essential features of the cosmos, making intellect and
χώρα both causal explanations of the cosmos.
Like the first discourse, the second discourse conceives of body as that which is
constituted by the four kinds—fire, air, water, and earth. In the first discourse, the elements
are brought about by the demiurge bringing visibility and tangibility into proportion with
themselves in the fairest bond. 138 The god is also responsible for bringing about the
elements 139 in the second discourse. 140 However, according to the genetic paradigm, the
χώρα plays a role in the formation of the elements:
So too, when the four kinds are shaken by the recipient, who, being herself moved,
is like an instrument that produces shaking, she separates farthest from each other
the kinds that are most dissimilar, while pushing together as close as possible those
that are most similar—which is exactly why these different kinds also held a different
place even before the all was arrayed and came to be out of them. 141
The χώρα’s shaking separates out the pre-elemental traces—picking up on ἴχνη at 53b2—
of fire, air, earth and water prior to the involvement of the god. Her shaking has a lasting
effect on the way the cosmos is composed. Even once the god has intervened and ordered

138 Timaeus

31b-32c.
Using the term ‘elements’ here and throughout this section as shorthand for what the four kinds really
are. As Timaeus demonstrates, these are not truly elements (or even syllables, as in 48c).
140 See Timaeus 53b.
141 Timaeus 53a.
139
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the elemental bodies, Timaeus says that the χώρα’s motion is responsible for the division
of the bulk of the elements in the cosmos into separate regions:
They [the elements] all exchange their places; for while the bulks of each kind stand
apart in their own private region through the motion of the receiver, yet those that
from time to time become dissimilar to themselves and similar to others are carried,
because of the shaking, toward the region of those to which they’ve been made
similar. 142
In bringing the χώρα to light and attributing disorderly motion (i.e., shaking rather than
directed motion, like the orbits of planets set out by the demiurge) to her, Timaeus makes
room for disorderly or indeterminate motion in his account of body and the conditions of
embodiment. On this model, disorderly motion is crucial to what it means to be a body. All
things are subject to the χώρα’s shaking, and, in return, the shaking of the χώρα plays a
certain role in sorting out the traces of what the god will order into the elemental bodies
that compose all things. The role that the motion of the χώρα plays in developing the
elements cannot be accounted for on the model of the first discourse, where the demiurge
designs bodies not to suffer from disorder.
The way the shaking of the χώρα is taken up as a guiding feature of human health
at the end of the dialogue represents another way in which disorderly motion becomes an
essential feature of body in the Timaeus following the switch to the genetic model. At the
end of Timaeus’s third speech, he refers back to the motion of the χώρα as he characterizes
health for the human body:
If someone imitates what we have called the nurturer and wet nurse of the all, and
for the most part never allows the body to be at peace but keeps it in motion and, by
always inducing certain shakings in it … he will have set friend next to friend so as
to produce health. 143
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The shaking of the χώρα is not only accommodated on the third discourse’s account of the
human body but guides the principle of health. The healthy or good body in the first
discourse is the one that most resembles the demiurge. We find this in the body of the
cosmos—it is spherical, self-same, and as unmoving as possible. However, in the account
of the human body in the end of the dialogue, a body that is unmoving will become
unhealthy. In certain respects, the human body must imitate the χώρα rather than the
demiurge in order to be healthy.
Consider this together with the first discourse’s discussion of human bodies. Here,
Timaeus talks about bodiless human heads rolling around and getting stuck in ditches (44de). The humor of this section underscores the difference between the human body and the
cosmic body, and in particular the inability of the craft paradigm to account for the human
body. Like the cosmic body, the human head is spherical. However, although it is like the
cosmic body in shape, the human head taken by itself appears absurd. This absurdity
reveals the degree to which the human body is dependent compared to the independence
of the cosmic body. While sphericity represents total independence for the cosmic body, it
renders the human body helpless. Without arms and legs to help the head navigate its
terrain, we are left with the absurd picture of a head which, although equipped with the
power of thought and sensation, cannot move itself. This demonstrates the dependency that
is entailed by existence within an environment. The cosmos is able to be self-sufficient
because nothing exists outside it. As soon as there is an outside, sphericity is no longer a
virtue of body, but an obstacle to basic operation. The very property that contributes to the
self-sameness of the cosmic body gives expression to incompleteness in this different
context. It is for this very reason that the human body has to imitate the motions of the
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χώρα to achieve health. By keeping the body in motion, the human sets up a defense against
external motions.
We have seen some ways that the properties associated with the shaking of the
χώρα are made to be essential features of body in the second and third discourse. The craft
paradigm cannot accommodate the privileged place of disorder that we find on the genetic
paradigm. This is because the demiurge does not simply omit these properties in his craft,
but rather seeks to minimize all of the properties associated with χώρα in the first discourse.
Timaeus sets up the demiurge’s craft in such a way that stands at odds with the features of
body revealed later in the dialogue. As a result, I find that we must consider the model of
the second discourse a revision of the first discourse rather than a continuation of it.
2.4.2

Force and Persuasion

In addition to the way the genetic paradigm adopts properties of the χώρα as essential
features of embodiment, the genetic paradigm differs irreconcilably from the craft
paradigm in the way it construes the relationship between masculinity and femininity, and
the ways in which the masculine acts upon the feminine. In particular, the first discourse
emphasizes the way the demiurge acts by force, while, in the second discourse, intellect
acts through persuasion. In Timaeus’s introduction to the second discourse, his discussion
of the relationship between reason and necessity appears similar to the role of the demiurge
on the craft paradigm. According to this account of the birth of the cosmos, as in the first
discourse, the male parent of the cosmos’s origin works to minimize the role of the
feminine parent:
For mixed indeed was the birth of this cosmos here, and begotten from a standingtogether of necessity and intellect; and as intellect was ruling over necessity by
persuading her to lead most of what comes to be toward what’s best, in this way
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accordingly was this all constructed at the beginning: through necessity yielding to
thoughtful persuasion. So if anyone is to declare how the all was in this way
genuinely born, he must also mix in the form of the wandering cause and say how it
is its nature to sweep things around. 144
While the relationship between reason and necessity emphasizes the minimization of
feminine properties in a way similar to the demiurge’s ordering of the all, there is a
difference that sets the cases apart in the way that minimization is achieved. Namely, this
minimization or marginalization occurs according to persuasion rather than force. Reason
rules over (ἄρχοντος, 48a2) and necessity, but he relates to her through persuasion. In other
words, necessity is persuaded by, and therefore to some extent agrees to the aims of reason:
she yields to (ἡττωμένης, 48a4) reason. By contrast, when the demiurge encounters
resistance to his craft in the first discourse, he suppresses disorder by force. For instance,
when he is crafting the soul of the cosmos by combining elements of Being (οὐσία), Same
(ταὐτά), and Other (ἕτερος), he encounters a difficulty. Timaeus says that the nature of
Other is difficult to work with (τὴν θατέρου φύσιν δύσμεικτον οὖσαν, 35a7-8) and the
demiurge orders it using force (βίᾳ, 35a8).
As I discuss above, this forceful minimization of feminine features is a crucial
component of the craft paradigm. Timaeus is explicit about the features of Becoming that
the demiurge is suppressing as he orders the cosmos. Consider, for instance, 33a-d, where
Timaeus describes the uniqueness, self-similarity, and self-sufficiency of the cosmos. He
mentions the suppressed opposites of these categories (i.e., multiplicity, dissimilarity, and
dependency), in order to explain why the cosmos is the way that it is rather than another
way (e.g., the cosmos is spherical so that it will not be dissimilar to itself). In cases like

144 Timaeus 48a-b.
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these, Timaeus signals to us clearly the features that the demiurge aims to suppress for the
sake of order in the cosmos. The craft paradigm does not make room for collaboration
with—or even the yielding of—disorderliness. Insofar as the craft paradigm involves the
demiurge fashioning the cosmos as a likeness of the eternal model, it entails that he
emphasize certain elements of his medium (i.e., the pre-ordered all) while minimizing
others. Essentially, the agreement or resistance of the all to the demiurge’s craft is not an
issue of concern for the craft paradigm in the way it is for the genetic paradigm.
I find that the particular way in which the demiurge uses force in his craft is
irreconcilable with the way reason persuades necessity in the second discourse. Whether
the all is persuaded or coerced is irrelevant to the first discourse’s account of the demiurge’s
craft. In crafting the all as a likeness, all that matters is whether the demiurge achieves the
end of producing a cosmos that resembles the eternal model. Whether he achieves that end
by force or persuasion does not matter on the model of the first discourse the way it does
in the second discourse. By requiring that intellect persuade necessity, the model of the
second discourse gives necessity a greater sense of power and something closer to equality,
even as—or perhaps precisely when—she yields to intellect.
2.4.3

The Unity of the First and Second Discourse

The first and second discourse do not agree about everything in their cosmological
accounts, and this is most of all true with respect to the treatment of the role of feminine
features in the origin and structure of the cosmos. In this article, I have highlighted the
ways that sexual difference sheds light on fundamental differences between the paradigms
that guide the cosmology of the first and second discourse of the Timaeus. While I have
argued that there are irreconcilable differences between the craft paradigm of the first
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discourse and the genetic paradigm of the second discourse, the two discourses contribute
to a unified speech in the Timaeus. As I have mentioned elsewhere, Timaeus foreshadows
from the beginning of his speech the incongruity of his speeches, warning us that his
speeches will not always agree with one another about everything. 145 Timaeus refers back
to the internal unity of the three speeches at the outset of his final discourse, when he
suggests that the final speech adds a head to the account. 146 Given Timaeus’ remarks about
the unity of his speech despite inconsistencies between the accounts, what are we to make
of the differences between the discourses? How can we see them as parts of a unified
account?
Admittedly, a full account of the unity of these discourses despite their differences
is an issue that would require another article to address fully. Nevertheless, I will gesture
toward a possible solution to the glaring differences. One way we might look at the
frameworks of the first two discourses is as complementary models which emphasize
different aspects of generativity. Just as there are different myths in Plato’s dialogues which
explore different elements of similar phenomena, we might see the first two discourses as
accounts of a similar subject (i.e., the origin of the cosmos) that take up different methods
of explanation. 147 This would explain the way each paradigm seems to be taken up at
certain points in the third discourse in Timaeus’ account of the human body. On the one
hand, the craft paradigm is at play as the lesser gods construct the human body in imitation
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See Timaeus 29c-d.
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147 For instance, consider the differences in the model of ἔρος in the Symposium’s various myths, or the
differences in Socrates’ account of the ascent up the ladder of love in Symposium and his myth of the
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of the demiurge’s craft. On the other hand, the genetic paradigm expresses itself in the third
discourse in the elevated role of feminine properties in human anatomy and physiology,
and in Timaeus’ tendency to assign for each bodily function an organ that serves the male
function and one that serves a female function.

2.5

Conclusion

To sum up, the craft paradigm that guides the first discourse relies on the subordination
and occlusion of feminine principles insofar as it has the demiurge make the all in the
likeness of the eternal model. To be made a likeness requires that a thing’s own standards
or characters are left behind in favor of the norms of the thing of which it is a likeness. In
other words, to be made a likeness is to be subordinated to the terms of the model to which
a thing is likened. I have shown that, in many cases, Timaeus is explicit about this
subordination. Especially in his description of the formation of the body of the cosmos, he
asserts and repeats the norms that the demiurge seeks to impart in the visible, and, further,
the aspects of the all that he is required to occlude in order to replicate those norms. In
particular, these suppressed aspects of the all are unintelligibility, disorder, complexity,
multiplicity, dissimilarity, incompleteness, dependency, and wandering. The second
discourse, in contrast, offers a new model that makes essential the very features suppressed
by the demiurge in the first discourse. The genetic paradigm does this by bringing the
feminine principle of the cosmos to light and giving it voice alongside the masculine
principle as the χώρα.
I have argued that the second discourse’s genetic paradigm is not an extension of
the first discourse’s craft paradigm. I have observed two basic incompatibilities between
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the models. First, the first discourse does not leave room for the features that the second
discourse deems essential. This is crucially different from the view that the things that
come to be through necessity are merely left out of the account in the first discourse. Rather,
Timaeus addresses these properties in the first discourse and has the demiurge actively
suppress them. When Timaeus says that we must explain the things that come to be through
necessity (i.e., 47e), I take him to mean that a new model is required that can account for
the things that come to be through necessity, rather than exclude them from the model. The
second incompatibility I observe is the demiurge’s use of force on the craft paradigm
compared to intellect’s use of persuasion on the genetic paradigm. Intellect and necessity
share a mutually collaborative relationship in the production of the cosmos. While
necessity yields to intellect, they are each responsible for different aspects of the coming
to be of the cosmos, and must, to some degree, acknowledge or pay respect to one another.
This expresses itself in the form of intellect’s use of persuasion rather than force, as well
as necessity’s agreement to be persuaded in yielding to intellect. The craft paradigm does
not allow for such a mutual respect. In addition to not naming a female counterpart to the
masculine demiurge, the means by which the demiurge shapes the all (i.e., whether by force
or persuasion) is not shown to be a concern for his ultimate aim, which is to fashion the
cosmos in the likeness of the eternal model. I have tried to argue that each of these
incompatibilities suggests that the second discourse is in some ways a revision of the first,
rather than a pure continuation of it. At the very least, the second discourse invites us to
reconsider the role of the feminine principles that were overlooked in the first.
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CHAPTER 3. WOMEN’S BODIES AND HEALTH IN PLATO’S TIMAEUS AND THE
HIPPOCRATICS

3.1

Introduction

Alongside the Hippocratic texts, Plato’s Timaeus is often cited as a locus classicus for
hysteria with its account of the wandering womb in the myth of the origin of women. 148
In that passage, Timaeus describes the womb as an unruly animal that wanders around the
woman’s body wreaking havoc by causing suffocation and “all manner of other diseases”
(νόσους παντοδαπάς, 91c6) in order to satisfy its desire for childbearing. The woman’s
suffering is relieved only when she has sex with a man and conceives a child. 149 The myth
portrays women’s bodies as categorically dependent on men’s bodies. Because of the
womb’s ability to move throughout the body, women are predisposed to disease and require
intervention from men in the form of sexual intercourse to achieve health.
This infamous passage from Plato’s Timaeus builds on the Hippocratic conception
of the natural insufficiency of women’s bodies. 150 Throughout the Hippocratic

148

I.e., Timaeus 91c. For the connection between this passage and historical conceptions of hysteria (and
misogyny more generally), see Mercer, “The Philosophical Roots of Misogyny” (p. 188), Ng “Hysteria: a
cross cultural comparison of its origins and history” (p. 288), and especially Bianchi, “The Errant Feminine
in Plato’s Timaeus,” (c.f., p. 89: “This is the same errancy, straying, or wandering (planomenon) that Plato
attributes to the womb at the very end of the dialogue, in a passage that (alongside Hippocrates) is a locus
classicus for the malady of hysteria”).
149 “Whenever [the womb] comes to be fruitless long beyond its due season, it grows difficult and irritable;
and wandering everywhere throughout the body it blocks up the breathing-passages, and by not allowing
breathing throws one into the most extreme frustrations and brings on all sorts of other diseases, until the
desire of the one and the love of the other bring the sexes together,” Timaeus 91c-d (translated by Peter
Kalkavage).
150 As a matter of chronology, the Hippocratic gynecological texts are some of the oldest extant Greek prose.
Grensemann (1975, p. 195-202) has argued that the Nature of Women was written in the first half of the fifth

103

gynecological texts, the author (or authors 151) describes female anatomy as prone to disease
and in need of male intervention to achieve health. 152 Sexual intercourse is prescribed
frequently as a cure for all kinds of feminine diseases. 153 Sex is also prescribed as a kind
of preventative measure women should take to ensure their health. The author of On Girls
suggests that women should begin having sex as soon as they reach menarche, otherwise
they will inevitably begin to suffer from some kind of disease. 154 Likewise, the author of
On Generation begins the treatise by correlating women’s health with sex: “the following
point is also true for women: if they have intercourse with men they are more likely to be
healthy, if not, then less so.” 155 According to the Hippocratic tradition, men and women
differ vastly in their basic anatomical principles; beyond having different reproductive
equipment, women’s bodies are viewed as fundamentally porous, while men’s bodies are
viewed as comparatively dense and smooth. Additionally, men and women have entirely
different standards of health, and require different treatment regimens. The author of
Diseases of Women I says that disease is “hard to recognize” (χαλεπὰ συνιέναι) in women

century based on the text’s humoral theory and the author’s use of asyndeton, particles, and vocabulary (see
also Dean-Jones (1994) p. 10).
151 The Corpus of Hippocratic texts consists of about sixty treatises, which scholars today generally agree to
be the work of multiple authors (although this has historically been a contentious issue in scholarship; see
Dean-Jones “Women’s Bodies in Classical Greek Science,” p. 6 note 15). At the same time, many (if not all
ten) of the gynecological texts are considered to be the source of a single author due to the strong unity in
doctrine and intertextual references (e.g., On Generation 4: “why [women] become prone to disease, I will
explain in Diseases of Women,” and Diseases of Women I 2-3, which takes up this topic). Dean-Jones argues
(p. 12) that, regardless of authorship, the unity in the ideas expressed in the Hippocratic gynecology allow it
to be treated as a perspective with unity (p. 12).
152 Especially in Nature of Women, On Girls, Diseases of Women, On Generation, and Barrenness.
153 E.g., uterine edema (Nature of Women ii 314, Diseases of Women I lix), displaced uterus (Nature of
Women iii-v, viii, Diseases of Women II xviii-xix), postpartum complications (Nature of Women xvi-xviii),
excessive phlegm (Diseases of Women I lviii), and uterine carcinoma (Diseases of Women II xlviii), to name
a few examples among many more.
154 On Girls 470. See also Diseases of Women I ii: “if the woman does not have intercourse with her husband
… her uterus turns aside. For it has no moistness of its own, since the woman is not having intercourse, and
… it is drier and lighter than it should be” (translated by Paul Potter).
155 On Generation 4.476 (translated by Potter).

104

and emphasizes the importance of approaching care for men and women differently,
writing, “Physicians too may err in not inquiring carefully about a disease’s cause [in
women], and in treating them like diseases in men: indeed, I have seen many women perish
in such cases. … For there is a great difference in the treatment of women’s diseases and
those of men.” 156
It is unsurprising that there has historically been a strong association between the
Timaeus and Hippocratic thought. Plato’s work is often in conversation with medicine.
Elsewhere in his work, Plato’s characters discuss medicine and even Hippocrates
specifically. In the Phaedrus, for instance, Socrates and Phaedrus look to Hippocrates as a
model for a philosophical method of division. 157 It is especially fitting for the Timaeus to
take up Hippocratic ideas; in many ways, versions of the Hippocratic project resemble
Timaeus’ project. In addition to their practical concern of identifying and curing human
disease, the Hippocratics are concerned with sorting out the ways that the human body
must be understood in light of the equilibrium of the cosmos. 158 Likewise, the Timaeus
explains the different ways that the human body resembles the cosmos as a whole and is
designed to navigate and comprehend it.
Although the Timaeus undoubtedly draws on ideas from the Hippocratics about
sexual difference, the texts differ in their respective approaches to the nature of femininity

156 Diseases

of Women I lxii (translated by Potter).
Plato, Phaedrus 270b-e. This section is understood to refer to the views expressed in the Hippocratic
treatise on Ancient Medicine. Hippocrates of Cos is also mentioned by name in the Protagoras at 311b, and
is alluded to in the Charmides at 156e.
158 For instance, on the relationship between medicine and meteorology, the author of Airs, Waters, Places
writes, “If it be thought that all this belongs to meteorology, he will find out, on second thoughts, that the
contribution of astronomy to medicine is not a very small one but a very great one indeed. For with the
seasons men's diseases, like their digestive organs, suffer change” (Airs, Waters, Places ii. 20-26, translated
by W. H. S. Jones).
157
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and dependency. In this project, I will consider the ways that the Timaeus takes up and
revises ideas from Hippocratic gynecology rather than simply adopting them. I will explore
different senses of dependency that Timaeus portrays in the dialogue, focusing on his
account of human anatomy and health and disease in the human body (i.e., Timaeus’ third
discourse from 69a-90d). In my analysis, I will argue that the Timaeus differs from the
Hippocratics in its approach to the relationship between health and femininity in two
crucial ways. First, in Timaeus’ account of human anatomy and physiology (69d-81e),
several of the body’s organs, processes, and desires with traits that are characteristically
masculine in Hippocratic accounts (e.g., the heart, the liver, desire for food and drink, and
bones) depend on the assistance of organs with characteristically feminine traits (e.g., the
lungs, spleen, lower belly, and flesh). Second, in his account of diseases and health (81e90d), Timaeus makes femininity a normative standard for health when he advises that one
should imitate the χώρα in order to maintain a healthy body and soul. Here, Timaeus
portrays features that the Hippocratics consider to be characteristically feminine (e.g.,
porosity, multiplicity, dependency, disequilibrium, and flux) as necessary for human
health. While the Hippocratics use these principles to characterize the female body as an
inferior kind of body, Plato’s Timaeus takes the very same concepts and makes them central
to the dialogue’s notion of health and the demiurge’s design of human anatomy.
I will begin with remarks on the Hippocratic notion of sexual difference. Here, I
will focus on their conception of the unstable standard of health for women’s bodies and
their account of menstruation, which postulates that women depend on sexual intercourse
to maintain health. Following the overview of Hippocratic gynecology, I will offer an
analysis of the way these ideas are taken up and changed in the accounts of anatomy, health,
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and disease in the third discourse of the Timaeus. This analysis has two parts, each focusing
on one of the two sections of the third discourse (i.e., the account of human anatomy at
69d-81e and the account of health and disease at 81e-90d). In the first part, I will consider
the way Timaeus associates dependency with masculine properties rather than feminine
ones in his account of anatomy, and ultimately presents a mutual dependency between
masculine and feminine features. In the second part of my analysis, I will argue that
Timaeus characterizes health in his speech by appealing to the same qualities that the
Hippocratics use to explain the inferiority of the female body.

3.2

Women’s Bodies in the Hippocratic Corpus

The Hippocratics construe sexual difference as a matter not limited to reproductive organs.
Beyond reproduction, sexual difference is constituted by differences in physiological
processes and capacities of all varieties. On the whole, the Hippocratics consider men to
have solider and denser flesh than women, which in turn allows their bodies to maintain
equilibrium. Women, on the other hand, have flesh that is comparatively loose and porous.
Although the malleability these qualities provide is seen as advantageous and even
necessary for women in some circumstances—for instance, in pregnancy a woman’s body
must be able to stretch and change to make room for a growing child—it is an obstacle to
health in other cases. Since female flesh has more room and requires more substance to fill
it up compared to a man’s compact flesh, women tend to retain excessive blood that must
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be released periodically through menstruation. If it is not released, the excessive blood
causes pain and disease for the woman. 159
Although women’s bodies are generally marked off from men’s according to these
principles in the Hippocratic tradition, there is a great deal of variance between different
women’s bodies based on factors like environment or sexual maturity. For instance,
according to the author of Nature of Women, “cold places promote fluxes, while hot ones
are drying and constipating.” 160 Women’s bodies differ from men’s the most in their
childbearing years and resemble men’s bodies more prior to menarche or post-menopause,
with barren women also sometimes possessing traits that more resemble men. 161
The traits that constitute the sexually mature and fertile woman would be markers
of disease for men. The author of Nature of Man asserts that health for the human being is
a matter of proportionality between its parts:
The body of man has in itself blood, phlegm, yellow bile and black bile; these make
up the nature of his body, and through these he feels pain or enjoys health. Now he
enjoys the most perfect health when these elements are duly proportioned to one
another in respect of compounding, power and bulk, and when they are perfectly
mingled. Pain is felt when one of these elements is in defect or excess, or is isolated
in the body without being compounded with all the others. For when an element is
isolated and stands by itself, not only must the place which it left become diseased,
but the place where it stands in a flood must, because of the excess, cause pain and

159 Although

the Hippocratics are the first to give this medical-scientific account of the porosity of female,
the vice of women’s overindulgence is a well-worn narrative in Greek thought. Consider, for instance,
Hesiod’s accounts of the origin of women in both the Theogony and the Works and Days, each of which
postulates overindulgence as a crucial feature of femininity. In the Theogony, Hesiod calls woman a
“beautiful evil” (καλὸν κακόν, 585), and says that they are “a great woe for mortals, dwelling with men, no
companions of baneful poverty but only of luxury. As when bees in vaulted beehives nourish the drones,
partners in evil works—all day long until the sun goes down, every day, the bees hasten and set up the white
honeycombs, while the drones remain inside among the vaulted beehives and gather into their own stomachs
the labor of others—in just the same way high-thundering Zeus set up women as an evil for mortal men, as
partners in distressful works” (592-603, translated by Glenn Most).
160 Nature of Women 1 (L VII 312), translated by Potter.
161 See Dean-Jones (p. 109).
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distress. In fact when more of an element flows out of the body than is necessary to
get rid of superfluity, the emptying causes pain. 162
The healthy person has a balance between their humors. Women, who are by nature
disposed to an imbalance in humors due to their tendency to produce and retain excessive
blood, are therefore never healthy in the same way that men can be. The healthy male body
is self-sufficient and maintains an equilibrium with its itself.
Gynecology is a special and difficult subject for the Hippocratics. Because of women’s
tendency toward disproportion and disease, the Hippocratics must treat women according
to a different standard than men, hence gynecology becomes its own special branch of
medicine. However, the Hippocratics do not consider women to have a standard of health
in the same way that men do. While proportion between humors—the male standard of
health—cannot apply to women in the same way, there is no standard that takes the place
of proportion for evaluating women’s bodies. The author of On Barrenness remarks on the
difficulty with treating women:
Try to treat in accordance with nature, with an eye to each women’s condition and
strength, since in these matters there is no common measure, but you should try to
estimate from the various factors how to employ cleanings of the whole body and of
the head, purgative medications, fomentations of the uterus, and suppositories. 163
Without a standard other than the woman’s general comfort and survival, the Hippocratics
find it especially difficult to assess how or when they are diseased, and to what standard
the physician aims to return them through treatment.
For the rest of this section I will go through the basic description and rationale for
women’s anatomy and physiology in the Hippocratic texts, focusing on their account of

162 Nature
163 On

of Man iv (translated by Jones).
Barrenness 230 (translated by Potter).
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menstruation, and the way menstruation serves as a reason that women depend on men for
healthy menstruation.
3.2.1

Porosity and Menstruation

The Hippocratics distinguish men from women in part by their respective capacities for
holding and processing nourishment and blood. The author of Diseases of Women I
compares the difference between men’s and women’s bodies to the difference between a
woven carpet and flocks of wool:
If someone sets both some clean flocks of wool and a clean densely woven carpet of
exactly the same weight as the flocks over water or a moist location for two days and
two nights, on removing them he will discover, on weighing them, that the flocks
have become much heavier than the carpet. This happens because (sc. moisture)
always moves up away from water present in a wide-necked vessel, and flocks, being
porous and soft, take up a greater quantity of what is moving away, while a carpet,
being compact and densely woven, becomes saturated without accepting much of
what is moving toward it. In the same way, a woman, being more porous, will draw
into her body more of what is being exhaled from her cavity, and more quickly, than
a man does. 164
The woman’s natural porosity causes her to absorb and retain more of what she takes in
than a man would. 165 The porosity of female flesh may also be owed to the openness of her
poroi. In the Regimen, the author describes a vast and winding network of channels that
run through the flesh and play a role in shaping a person’s characteristics. 166 In a mature
and healthy woman, these poroi are open and loose, with constriction being a sign of
disease. This difference in anatomical structure (i.e., men’s flesh being dense and women’s
porous) is the root of several differences in the way each sex experiences different
physiological processes. Perhaps the most significant of these is the connection between
164 Diseases

of Women I (i 12), translated by Potter.
Elsewhere, the Hippocratics mark off glands as a special kind of flesh that is spongy, rarefied, and fatty,
and say that “to the touch it is like wool” (Glands 1, translated by Potter). Female flesh in the Diseases of
Women is described as flesh that is like a gland.
166 For more on these poroi, see Regimen 1. 36.
165
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female porosity and menstruation. The author of Diseases of Women I goes on to explain
the connection between a woman’s porous flesh and the necessity for menstruation:
Also, because a woman’s flesh is softer, when her body fills up with blood, unless
the blood is then discharged from her body, the filling and warming of her tissues
that ensue will provoke pain: for a woman has hotter blood, and for this reason she
herself is hotter than a man; if, however, most of the blood that was added is
subsequently discharged, no pain will arise from it. A man, having solider flesh than
a woman, will never overfill with so much blood that, unless some of it is discharged
each month, he feels pain, and besides he takes in only as much (sc. blood) as is
necessary for the nourishment of his body, and his body—lacking softness as it
does—is never overstretched or heated by fullness as a woman’s is. A great amount
of this is also due in a man to his exerting himself physically more than a woman,
which consumes a part of the exhalation (sc. rising from his food). 167
When the stomach converts food into blood, the part that is not useful to the body is meant
to be exhaled. 168 The female flesh, however, absorbs excessive blood and retains it due to
its porosity. As a result, women must periodically expel the excessive blood, which occurs
through menstruation. The Hippocratics see menstruation as a necessary cleansing of the
body of this excessive blood. For that reason, the authors often call menstruation ἡ
κάθαρσις: “the cleansing,” or, even “the purification.” 169 Men do not need to menstruate
because their dense flesh does not retain excessive blood. Their flesh allows the body to
retain the amount of blood it needs, and nothing more. The capacity of the man’s flesh to
hold blood aligns with what is best for his body; in other words, he can hold only as much
as he should hold. Women’s flesh retains as much as it can, and its capacity exceeds what

167

Diseases of Women I (i 13), translated by Potter.
Timaeus refers to the interconnected relationship between digestion, blood, and the breath as the
“irrigation system” and gives a full account of it at 78a-81d. This system will be an object of analysis below.
169 See, for instance, Diseases of Women I 6.
168
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is good for the body. She can hold more than she should, and menstruation is considered
evidence of this disparity. 170
Although menstruation is evidence of the female body’s inferiority with respect to
achieving equilibrium with itself, it is even worse for a woman not to menstruate. The
author of Diseases of Women I says that “if a woman is healthy, her menstrual blood will
pass like that of a sacrificial animal.” 171 When a woman stops menstruating all together,
the Hippocratics do not in any case find that this is evidence of health or that the woman’s
body only holds the amount of blood it needs. Instead, they postulate that a woman who
fails to menstruate retains her menses within her body. 172 The Hippocratics consider
retained menses—a version of which is called the “virgin’s disease,” the topic of the
treatise On Girls, as well as many of the other gynecological treatises—a disease that is
fatal when not treated promptly. The Hippocratics often prescribe sexual intercourse with
a man to cure and prevent retained menses in women.
3.2.2

Feminine Dependency and Men’s Role in Women’s Health

According to the Hippocratic understanding of both the female reproductive system and
menstruation, the uterus does not, precisely speaking, perform menstruation as its natural
function, and menstruation may take alternative forms. 173 The womb’s purpose as an organ
is for childbearing, but its role in menstruation is comparatively accidental. The womb

170 Dean-Jones observes the way that this demonstrates the androcentric norm of the Hippocratic conception

of health: “underlying the Hippocratic characterization of male and female flesh is a value judgement: firm
and compact = good; loose and spongy = bad” (p. 58).
171 Diseases of Women I 6.
172 C.f., Diseases of Women I 3: “When the menses cease to appear, pain occupies the lower belly, and a
heaviness seems to be lying there; the woman suffers terribly in her loins and flanks. … after two or three
months sometimes her menses break out in a mass through the vagina” (translated by Potter).
173 For instance, in extreme circumstances, the womb may fall down into the thigh, form a sore on the thigh,
and “menstruate” from there.

112

becomes the mechanism for releasing excessive blood from the body due to its hollowness
and its need for moisture. The womb needs moisture but must receive that moisture from
somewhere else. 174 When a woman is menstruating regularly, the Hippocratics postulate
that her excess blood flows 175 into her uterus, which in turn periodically releases the
menses through the vagina. When the excessive blood from the woman’s flesh does not
flow into the uterus, it seeks out moisture elsewhere in the body by attaching itself to
various organs and taking moisture from them. 176
Unlike other organs, the Hippocratics see the womb as able to move itself
throughout the woman’s body in search of moisture. They describe the womb’s movements
less dramatically than the Timaeus. While the womb “wanders” (πλανώμενον, 91c) in the
Timaeus, the Hippocratics describe it as “turning” to one side or another (e.g., στρέφω or
τρέπω, as seen in Diseases of Women I 2, 7). 177 In order to keep the womb reliably attached
to the cervix and menstruation regular, a woman must be sexually active with a male
partner. 178 Sexual intercourse has two functions for women’s health. First, the semen the
uterus receives in intercourse encourages it to remain attached to the cervix. It does so by
providing the womb with extra moisture so that it will not stray off to other parts of the
body to receive moisture elsewhere. Second, sexual intercourse encourages the regular and

174 See

On Generation 4, Diseases of Women I ii.
most frequent verb used for the flowing of the menses is χωρείν (c.f. Diseases of Women I 6), which
can also mean “makes room” or “withdraws.”
176 E.g., the heart or the liver. See Diseases of Women I vii for an account of the womb attaching itself to the
liver out of excessive dryness. The womb’s attachment to one of the body’s other organs can be fatal. Timaeus
describes a similar phenomenon in his myth of the wandering womb, which has the womb block up the
breathing passages.
177 Hanson (1991) suggests that the womb’s movements owe to the fact that, since men do not have wombs,
there is no natural place for the womb in the female body (p. 82).
178 This regimen is recommended by the author(s) of On Girls, Diseases of Women I and II, On Generation,
Barrenness, and especially frequently in the Nature of Women.
175 The
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easy flow of the menses by heating the blood with semen. 179 Intercourse also manually
opens the passageway through which the menses pass, which is otherwise in danger of
constricting. 180
Men play a significant role in women’s health by ensuring the regularity and curing
the irregularity of menstruation. This is not a mutual relationship; men have no need of
women for their health. 181 Men carry out a kind of paternalistic care over women. That is,
they are not women’s assistants; they are their caretakers. The dynamic of dependency
between men and women is unbalanced, there is no mutual need.
3.2.3

The Hippocratic Woman in Summary

Hippocratic gynecology asserts that women’s bodies are incapable of reliably maintaining
an equilibrium on their own. Menstruation—called an “evil” by the author of On Girls—
is the primary evidence for the inferiority of women’s bodies. The Hippocratics conceive
of menstruation as the body forcing out what it cannot deal with rather than a purposeful
physiological process. On this account of menstruation, the porosity of a woman’s flesh
causes her to retain more blood than is useful to her body. The body must in turn be
cleansed by releasing its excessive blood in menstruation. The woman, however, requires
assistance in this release; her body does not naturally or always release its excessive blood

179 The author of On Generation says “[the woman’s] uterus becomes moist during intercourse, rather than
being in a dry state, and in a dry state it contracts more strongly than it should, and in contracting provokes
a serious trouble in the body. Second, intercourse makes the menses pass more easily by warming and
moistening the blood, whereas if the menses do not pass, women’s bodies become prone to disease” (4,
translated by Potter).
180 See On Girls 468.
181 That isn’t to say that men have no need of women at all; women, especially in their childbearing (i.e.,
menstruating) years are valuable to men. At the same time, women are no use to men as far as men’s health
is concerned.

114

regularly, painlessly, or in the correct amount. 182 To ensure that the menses leave the body
through the vagina and in the appropriate amount, the uterus must be stimulated by male
seed through sexual intercourse.
This Hippocratic account of menstruation develops a scheme on which women
physiologically depend on men for their health. This need is not reciprocal; women do not
play any role in producing health for the man. Further, this scheme of feminine dependency
relies on a fundamental distinction between denseness and porosity. It is the denseness of
the man’s flesh that allows his body to maintain equilibrium with itself and exhale his
excessive blood. For the same reason, the porosity of the woman’s flesh necessitates
menstruation and causes her to rely on male intervention in the form of sexual intercourse.

3.3

Women’s Bodies in Plato’s Timaeus

Timaeus’ speech is, first and foremost, an account of how the cosmos has come to be
through the god (i.e., the demiurge, intellect) imposing order and proportion on the preordered all. 183 Throughout the speech, Timaeus is analyzing and explaining the world—
from the shape of the cosmos as a whole down to the individual bodies that reside within
it—as exegetes (ἐξηγηταί, 29b5) of the god’s craftwork.
Humans occupy a special place in Timaeus’ account. Part of us—the divine kind of soul
within us—is crafted by the demiurge with the same materials he used to craft the soul of
the cosmos. 184 When the demiurge crafts the immortal souls, he also instructs them about

182 According

to the author of Diseases of Women I, the correct amount of menstrual blood that should be
released each cycle is two Attic cotyles.
183 C.f. Timaeus 30a, 53b, 69b.
184 Timaeus 41d.
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the “laws of destiny” (νόμους τε τοὺς εἱμαρμένους, 41e2-3), “in order that he might be
blameless of the future evil from each of them.” 185 As he is instructing the souls, he
introduces sexual difference as a normative bifurcation of humanity: “He told them the
laws of destiny: … how, human nature being twofold, the superior part would be a kind
which at a later point would be called man.” 186
By contrast with the kind of soul that the demiurge crafts for us, the human body and
the other kinds of soul within the human are by nature mortal. Since the demiurge does not
produce mortal crafts (i.e., crafts that will naturally dissolve over time), he assigns the task
of crafting human beings to the lesser gods whom he has already crafted:
“Gods of gods, you works of whom I am craftsman and father, whatever is born
through me is not dissoluble except by my will. … Three mortal kinds are still left
unbegotten; but if these are not born, heaven will be imperfect, for it will not have
all the kinds of animals within itself—but have them it must, if it’s to be sufficiently
perfect. … So in order that mortal kinds may be and this all be genuinely all, turn
yourselves, in accordance with nature, to the crafting of animals, imitating my power
in giving you birth. And as many of them for whom it’s suitable to have the same
name, ‘immortal,’ … that part I’ll hand down to you after I’ve sown it and made a
beginning. But as for what remains, you are to go about fashioning and begetting
animals by interweaving mortal with immortal; and make them grow by giving them
nourishment, and, when they’ve withered away, receive them back again.” 187
The lesser gods initially form the human body as the head only, a spherical body that
contains all of the divine circuits. 188 However, the head turns out to be helpless on its own,
unable to navigate the world, so the gods give the head a body:
In order that it not go rolling on the earth, which has all sorts of heights and depths,
and be at an impasse when it came to climbing over the one and climbing out of the
other, they gave [the head] the body as a chariot for easy travel. 189
185

Timaeus, 42d.
Timaeus 41e-42a, translated by Kalkavage. Remarkably, the division between men and women comes
before the human body is introduced.
187 Plato, Timaeus 41b-d (translated by Kalkavage).
188 I.e., the sense faculties. Timaeus 43c-45d.
189 Timaeus 42d, translated by Kalkavage.
186

116

This initial account of the human body posits two basic parts: on the one hand there is the
head, which is the most perfect shape a mortal body can be (spherical) and possesses the
divine part of the human. On the other hand, there is the rest of the body, which by nature
serves the head and provides it with mobility. 190 After these brief remarks about the
structure of the human body, Timaeus spends the final part of his first discourse focusing
on the nature of sense perception, characterizing the senses as “the assistant causes
(συναιτίων, 46c7) that god uses as his servants in perfecting as far as possible the look of
the best.” 191
In this initial sketch of the human being, Timaeus frames our thinking about the
human being with a few versions of a similar kind of twofold division. The various
divisions that Timaeus makes in this early account of the human being in the dialogue
prepare us to think of the human being in terms of normative divisions. First, humans are
immortal and mortal, the product of two kinds of craftworking. The demiurge is responsible
for the immortal part of the human, while the lesser gods, imitating the work of the
demiurge, are responsible for the mortal part of the human. Additionally, Timaeus has the
demiurge say that human nature is twofold, with the superior part being called man. These
distinctions reflect the initial division in the structure of the human body: the head
resembles the immortal, being spherical and is containing the divine circuits, while the
body is set apart as its servant and carries it around the world. Finally, sense perception
serves as an assistant to reason in teaching humans the nature of concepts like number,
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Precisely speaking, Timaeus only highlights the limbs when he describes the rest of the body; there is no
mention of the thorax (i.e., chest and abdomen) yet. A full account of the thorax does not come until the third
discourse.
191 46c, translated by Kalkavage.
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proportion, same, and other. By the time Timaeus returns to give a more detailed account
of the human body near the end of his speech, he has prepared us to think of the human
being in terms of these normative pairs.
3.3.1

Timaeus 69d-81e: Human Anatomy

In his third discourse, Timaeus narrows his focus. Rather than going through the nature
and origin of the whole cosmos, like he does in the first and second discourse, Timaeus
focuses almost exclusively on the way that the human body is ordered. 192 In his account,
Timaeus first discusses human anatomy and physiology (69d-81e), followed by an account
of the nature and causes of diseases and health (81e-90d). In the discussion of anatomy,
Timaeus frames the human being by focusing on different organs and physiological
processes that serve different purposes by the design of the lesser gods who compose the
body in imitation of the demiurge’s craft. 193 Timaeus begins by addressing the parts of the
body that have to do with different kinds of soul in the human. He starts with the body’s
frame, which, like the earlier discussion of the human body at 42d, is divided into the head
and the body (69e). Next, he divides the body into the chest and the abdomen (69e).
Timaeus goes on to address the role that the heart and the liver play in communicating
between the immortal kind of soul and the mortal kinds of soul (70b-d and 70d-72d,
respectively). Next, he addresses the way the lower belly accommodates humans’
gluttonous appetite for food and drink (72e-73a). He discusses marrow and bones apart

192 Timaeus

does swiftly address the coming to be of the whole cosmos at the outset of the third discourse at
69b-c in which he summarizes the idea that the cosmos came to be through the god ordering the disordered
all: “So just as we said at the beginning, since things were in a condition of disorder, the god introduced
proportions in them, making each thing proportional both to itself and to the others … For at that time, things
partook of none of this, except insofar as it happened by chance” (translated by Kalkavage).
193 See 69c: “[the god] himself becomes the craftsman of things divine, but the birth of things mortal he
ordered his own offspring to craft. Imitating him, and having taken over the immortal principle of soul, they
next sculpted around it a mortal body and gave it the entire body as its chariot” (translated by Kalkavage).
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from flesh and sinew (73b-75d), the head, protected by skin and hair (75d-76d), and the
fingers and fingernails (76d-e) before finishing off his anatomical account with an
extensive discussion of the body’s irrigation system and breathing (78a-81b). 194
Timaeus first introduces the parts of the body (i.e., head, chest, and abdomen, 69e-70a)
as the houses of different forms of soul. After distinguishing the head from the rest of the
body, which is marked off by the neck, he distinguishes further between the chest and
abdomen within the body. In doing so, he uses sexual difference as a model:
Now within the chest region or so-called thorax they proceeded to bind the mortal
kind of the soul. And since one part of it is by nature better and another worse 195,
they build the cavity of the thorax in turn in sections, as though marking one dwelling
for women and a separate one for men, by putting the midriff between them as a
partition. 196
I find that Timaeus’ choice of image here is not accidental. Throughout the entire Timaeus,
sexual difference has been the paradigm that guides normative twofold divisions (i.e.,
reason and necessity, or intellect and the χώρα). Following that same framework, Timaeus
uses this image to forecast the various ways he will draw on the concept of sexual
difference, as he has been throughout his entire speech, as he makes various bifurcatory
divisions in his account of the body’s organs and their assistants in accomplishing their
purposes. Each time Timaeus explains a new part of the body and the purpose of an organ,
he also introduces a second organ that assists it. In other words, for each of the body’s
needs, there is an organ to accomplish that need, and another organ on which it depends
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There is also a brief discussion of the bodies and souls of plants at 76e-77d, which, although rich and
fascinating, is beyond the scope of this project in its current form.
195 This association between a twofold division into a better and worse part recalls Timaeus 42a: “human
nature being twofold, the superior part would be a kind which at a later point would be called man,”
(translated by Kalkavage).
196 Plato, Timaeus 69e-70a, translated by Kalkavage.
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for assistance. Each of those sets of pairs is characterized in the terms that the Hippocratics
uses to characterize sexual difference.
In this section, I will be analyzing Timaeus’ account of human anatomy by looking
to the ways he takes up Hippocratic explanations of sexual difference each time he makes
a twofold division in the human body. In each case, Timaeus describes the assistant organ
in the terms that the Hippocratics use to explain feminine dependency, but casts
characteristically feminine features in a new light. In contrast with the Hippocratic theory
of women’s bodies, Timaeus portrays dense and solid substances as those which depend
on the porous and malleable ones. At the same time, while the feminine organs do not
depend on the masculine ones, they are posited as entirely secondary. The masculine organs
depend on the feminine ones, but the feminine organs function entirely as assistants rather
than paternalistic caretakers.
3.3.1.1 Reason, Spirit, and Appetite: the Heart, Lungs, Liver, and Spleen
Timaeus opens his account of anatomy by describing the body as it relates to the various
kinds of soul(s) in the body. Following his earlier account, Timaeus sets the head up as the
seat of the divine kind of soul, which is separated from the rest of the body by the neck. 197
In turn, the two kinds of mortal soul that reside in the body—the spirited kind and the
appetitive kind—are divided into the upper and lower regions of the thorax. The spirited
kind resides in the chest, which the midriff separates from the appetitive kind of soul,
residing in the lower abdomen. 198 The upper and lower region of the thorax each possess
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69d-e.
“The part of the soul, therefore, that partakes of courage and spirit … they settled closer to the head,
between the midriff and neck” (70a), and “as for the part of the soul that’s desirous of food and drink and all
those things it needs because of the nature of the body, they settled it in between the midriff and the boundary
in the navel area (70d-e, translated by Kalkavage).
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organs whose purpose it is to exhort the mortal kinds of soul to obey the immortal kind of
soul. The heart is responsible for communicating to the spirited kind of mortal soul, while
the liver communicates to the appetitive kind of mortal soul.
Timaeus conceives of the heart as the junction (or girdle, ἅμμα, 70b1) of the veins
and source (πηγήν, 70b1) of the blood, whose purpose is to exhort the body to listen to
reason rather than spirit by means of pumping blood through the body’s narrow vessels to
each of the sense faculties. 199 The heart monitors and adjusts the spirited kind of soul:
Now the heart … they positioned in the guardhouse (τὴν δορυφορικὴν οἴκησιν, 70b2)
in order that, whenever the ferocity of spirit might boil up, as soon as reason sends
word that some unjust action is arising that involves these limbs, either from outside
or even some action from the desires within, then, by way of all the narrow vessels,
every sense-faculty in the body might grow acutely sensible of both the exhortations
and threats and in all ways give heed to them, thus allowing the best part among them
all to be leader. 200
The heart is the guard and overseer of the body’s vast network of blood vessels. It acts on
the body swiftly and keenly (ὀξέως, 70b5) by means of these vessels. 201 Although Timaeus
characterizes the heart as a guard and overseer, it is not entirely self-sufficient in its
authority. The heart strains and suffers (πονοῦσα, 70d5) as it heats the body. In order that
it might suffer less, the gods contrived assistance (ἐπικουρίαν, 70c4) for the heart in the
lungs. Timaeus describes the lungs as being soft (μαλακήν, 70c5) and bloodless (ἄναιμον,
70c6), as well as being porous like a sponge (oἶον σπόγγου, 70c6), having perforations and
caverns to absorb liquid. By receiving liquid in its soft and spongy caverns, the lungs cool
the heart. When the heart is especially active and leaping (πηδῶσα, 70d4) around, the lungs
199 See

Timaeus 70b-c.
70b-c.
201 In this respect, the heart’s role is similar to Zeus’ role in Hesiod’s Theogony. When injustice is committed
in that text, Hesiod often makes mention of Zeus’ ability to keenly notice and quickly act. For instance,
Theogony 838: “On that very day an intractable deed would have been accomplished … if the father of men
and of gods had not taken sharp notice (ὀξὺ νόησε)” (translated by Most).
200 Timaeus,
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yield (ὑπεῖκον, 70d4) to it, cool it, and thereby relieve and comfort (ἀναπνοὴν καὶ
ῥᾳστώνην, 70d1) it.
The lungs share the same characteristics as women’s flesh on the Hippocratic
model. They are soft and porous, ready to receive and absorb whatever comes into them.
Timaeus, however, construes the softness and porosity of the lungs differently than the
Hippocratics do female flesh. Porosity is not a marker of vulnerability for the lungs. While
the porosity of a woman’s flesh renders her vulnerable and in need of assistance, it is
precisely the same quality that allows the lungs to help the heart. At the same time, this is
not a pure elevation of feminine aspects of embodiment. The lungs are conceived of as
entirely secondary to the heart. The lesser gods fashion each aspect of the lungs in order
that it would be an assistant to the heart. The gods contrive the lungs as an assistant
(ἐπικουρίαν αὐτῇ μηχανώμενοι, 70c4), and they design for the sake for the heart. It is
spongy in order that (ἵνα, 70c7) it might have a cooling effect, and it is for this reason (διὸ
δή, 70d2) that the gods place the lungs around the heart. The heart depends on the lungs to
be cooled, but the lungs are contrived as an organ secondary to the heart.
Like the heart, the liver’s purpose is to communicate to the mortal kind of soul (in
this case, the appetitive kind) on behalf of the immortal kind of soul to ensure the rule of
the immortal kind. The gods, knowing that the appetitive kind of soul would not understand
reason, constructed the liver as a way of communicating to it by means of images and
phantasms (εἰδώλων καὶ φαντασμάτων, 71a5-6). The liver displays images on its surface,
which Timaeus describes as dense (πυκνόν, 71b2), smooth (λεῖον, 71b2), and brilliant
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(λαμπρόν, 71b2). 202 Just as they construct the lungs for the sake of the heart and place them
near it, the gods construct the spleen for the sake of the liver and place it nearby:
And again, 203 the structure of the organ that neighbors the liver, and its seat on the
left, has come about for the liver’s sake: to keep it always brilliant and pure, like a
napkin (ἐκμαγεῖον, 72c5) laid next to a mirror, always prepared and ready to hand.
And for this very reason, whenever certain impurities arise around the liver through
diseases of the body, the loose texture of the spleen purifies them all and receives
them, insofar as the spleen has been woven hollow and bloodless. 204
The parallels between Timaeus’ account of the liver and spleen and the Hippocratic account
of male and female flesh are even more apparent. Here, once again, a dense and smooth
substance is contrasted with a loose and porous one, with a dynamic of dependency
between them. As was the case with the heart and lungs, Timaeus reverses the Hippocratic
theory of the vulnerability of porous flesh. Instead, the liver, in its denseness and
smoothness, needs something porous to help keep it healthy. The liver does not rid itself
of impurities; rather, the spleen absorbs impurities from the liver’s surface and takes them
into itself.
Timaeus underscores the spleen’s femininity when he likens it to a napkin and a
receiver. Here, Timaeus is characterizing the spleen in the same terms he used to describe
the χώρα—the mother and wetnurse of the cosmos—in his second discourse. The
relationship between the liver and spleen is quite like the relationship between intellect and
the χώρα as Timaeus describes it at 50b-c:
The same account applies to the nature that receives all bodies. … it’s laid down by
nature as an ἐκμαγεῖον for everything, being both moved and thoroughly configured
by whatever things come into it; and because of these, it appears different at different
times; and the figures that come into it and go out are always imitations of the things
202 He

also describes it as sweet—γλυκύ—and bitter—πικρότητα (71b2).
72c1. Timaeus acknowledges the pattern of pairs of organs. Like the heart and lungs, the liver and
spleen consist of an organ set out to accomplish a task, and a secondary organ designed to assist the first.
204 Timaeus 72c.
203 Aὖ,
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that are, having been imprinted from them [by intellect] in some manner hard to tell
of and wondrous.
In addition to the spleen’s reception of the images and impurities of the liver, its
characterization should be considered feminine for the way it serves as a purifier of the
liver. Like the womb, the spleen absorbs impurities and, in turn, both performs a κάθαρσις
and must be purified itself. Just as the Hippocratics postulate the womb fills with all of the
excessive blood from the woman’s body and expels it, purifying the body, the spleen takes
in the impurities of the liver, purifying it (καθαίρουσα, 72c6). At the same time, the spleen
must empty itself of the impurities that come into it: “when it’s filled up with the impurities
that have come off the liver, it swells to a great size and becomes festered, and … whenever
the body has been purified, the spleen shrinks and settles back down to the same size.” 205
However, as was the case with the heart and the lungs, this account is not an
elevation of feminine principles. Although Timaeus has the liver depend on the feminine
porosity and receptivity of the spleen, the spleen is categorically secondary to the liver.
That is to say, the lesser gods create the spleen for the sake of the liver, as an assistant to
it. Timaeus construes the lungs and the spleen as at once both essential and secondary in
their roles. They are indispensable to the heart and liver, but not in the same way that men
are indispensable to women’s health in the Hippocratics. While men are paternalistic
caretakers of women’s bodies on the Hippocratic model, the organs with feminine features
are assistants of and servants to their masculine counterparts. At the same time, unlike the
Hippocratic scheme according to which women are exclusively dependent on men, there
is a reciprocal dependency on Timaeus’ model. Each requires the other in a different
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72c-d, translated by Kalkavage. This description of the diseased spleen resembles the accounts
of uterine edema in the Hippocratic texts (c.f., Diseases of Women I 7).

124

respect: the liver requires the spleen to maintain its health and ability to carry out its role
in the body, while the spleen depends on the liver for its purpose and functions.
This finishes off Timaeus’ account of the body as it relates to the different kinds of
soul. Timaeus constructs “the remainder of the body” (τὸ τοῦ σώματος ἐπίλοιπον, 72e2)
according to the same principles as the heart, lungs, liver and spleen. In what follows, he
introduces a need of the body, the organ, process, or function that accomplishes that need,
an imperfection in the carrying out of the function, and a secondary or assisting organ with
feminine qualities like porosity or receptivity. I will review each of these cases.
3.3.1.2 Appetite and the Lower Belly
Humans require food and drink for nourishment. At the same time, human appetite is not
temperate or mindful of health, and requires mediation. Timaeus says that the gods who
crafted humans recognized that they would have an intemperate and gluttonous desire for
food and drink. In order that humans do not immediately destroy themselves through
overindulgence, the gods design a receptacle for excessive food and drink in the lower
belly:
Foreseeing [excessive appetite], they put in place the lower belly as it is named as a
receptacle (ὑποδοχήν) for the holding of superfluous food and drink and round about
they coiled the growth of the intestines, so that the nourishment might not pass
through swiftly and swiftly again compel the body to need other nourishment, and,
by producing insatiableness through gut-gluttony, fashion the entire kind
unphilosophical and uncultured—disobedient to the most divine of things within
us. 206
Once again, Timaeus compares part of the body with an assistant function to the χώρα. He
says that the gods set up the lower belly as a receptacle—ὑποδοχήν, the same way he

206 Timaeus

72e-73a, translated by Kalkavage.
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describes the receptacle of becoming at 49a. 207 As a part of the body that receives excessive
nourishment, the lower belly functions like the Hippocratic womb. However, unlike the
lungs and spleen that have come before, Timaeus describes the lower belly as doing more
than merely assisting a higher function or clearing impurities. Rather than any specific
organ, the lower belly is an assistant to appetite for food and drink, which is gluttonous by
nature. The belly assists the appetite by mediating it, which produces not merely a healthy
body, but encourages virtue in the human being. 208 Without the gut as a receptacle of food
and drink, Timaeus says that humans would be unphilosophical (ἀφιλόσοφον, 73a6) as a
whole. In order to be not just healthy, but also philosophical, the human relies on the
assistance of the belly and intestines.
3.3.1.3 Bones and Flesh
Timaeus’ discussion of bones and flesh is another example of porosity and softness aiding
a hard substance rather than depending on it. This example in particular demonstrates
hardness as a vulnerable quality. Bones—and the head—are fragile. In other words, they
turn out to be fragile in their hardness, requiring flesh as a cushion.
The account of bones and flesh begins with a description of marrow, since marrow
is the origin (ἀρχή, 73b2) of bones and flesh and all things of that nature. Marrow is a
universal seed (πανσπερμίαν, 73c1) formed from the most perfectly smooth and un-warped
triangles and implanted with the various kinds of souls. The brain is the marrow with the
immortal kind of soul, and the marrow with mortal kinds of souls are elongated. Bones are

207 I.e.: “πάσης εἶναι γενέσεως ὑποδοχὴν αὐτήν,” 49a5-6.
208 The relationship between physical health and moral psychology is treated more precisely later in the
dialogue at 87d, which is a subject of analysis below.
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created as hard shelters for marrow, and bones themselves are constructed from marrow
dipped in water and fired several times. 209 The skull is crafted as a spherical bony shelter
for the brain, and the rest of the body’s bones are constructed as shelters for the oblong
formed marrow.
Timaeus describes bones as being exceptionally vulnerable. Upon crafting the
bones, the god 210 notices that they are more brittle and inflexible than necessary (τοῦ
δέοντος κραυροτέραν εἶναι καὶ ἀκαμπτοτέραν, 74b1) and easily susceptible to destruction
through temperature fluctuation. In contrast with the Hippocratic scheme according to
which porosity is correlated with vulnerability, Timaeus correlates rigidness with
vulnerability. The bones more than any part of the body are described as fragile and
vulnerable, and they are also the hardest parts of the body. Further, insofar as masculinity
is associated with intellect throughout the dialogue, Timaeus is also framing this
exceptionally vulnerable part of the body as a masculine one. The skull—the seat of reason,
immortal soul, and the divine circuits in the human, itself crafted from immortal soul, and
compared to the “men’s living quarters” at 70a—is the most fragile part of the body, later
described as weak. 211 Because the bones need a cushion to protect them, the gods create
flesh.
Flesh stands in contrast with bones. Where bones are rigid, flesh is capable of
stretching and bending. The gods construct it as a barrier against heat and cold, and a
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account of the construction of bones occurs at 73d-74a. The bones are their money, so to speak.
Timaeus reverts back to using 3rd person singular verbs, it seems that this must still refer to the
lesser gods, since, as Timaeus mentions twice (i.e., 41c and 69c) that the demiurge must delegate the
construction of mortal kinds to the lesser gods.
211 I.e., 75d.
210 Although
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cushion to protect bones in the case of falls. Just as the Hippocratics do, Timaeus compares
it to wool:
Flesh he contrived as both a block against burning heat and a barrier against the
winter cold, and furthermore, in the case of falls, so that it might gently and easily
give way to bodies, just like the woolen goods we wear. 212
The capacity to retain moisture is viewed as an advantage of flesh: “since it has a warm
moisture within itself … it might provide a congenial coolness over the entire body.” 213
The gods compose flesh moist and soft (ἔγχυμον καὶ μαλακήν, 74d1). Timaeus sets up a
norm for flesh that differs from Hippocratic thinking. Where men’s flesh—i.e., flesh that
is comparatively dry, compact, and hard—is the standard and norm for flesh on the
Hippocratic model, with women’s flesh being viewed as straying from that norm, here the
norm for flesh more closely resembles the Hippocratic idea of women’s flesh—i.e., flesh
that is soft, loose, moist, cushiony, and malleable. At the same time, as is the case with the
prior examples, flesh is constructed for the sake of the bones as their protector.
There is a tradeoff between flesh and bones, especially in the case of the head. The
parts of the body covered with less flesh have better sensation, while the parts where bone
is covered with thick flesh are less apt to sensation. For the first time in Timaeus’ account
of organs and their assistants, there is an upper limit to the degree to which the assisting
organ can be helpful. Too little flesh creates a body that is exceedingly fragile, but too
much flesh creates a body that is exceedingly insensible. The god must confront this
problem when constructing the head: is it better for humans to have a head that is better
protected, or one that is more sensitive? Although Timaeus says that a fleshier head would
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give humans a life that would be longer, healthier, and freer from pain, he says that this
kind of life is worse (χεῖρον, 75c1). Although it produces a shorter and more painful life,
the gods judge that the more sensitive head produces a better (βέλτιον, 75c1) life.
Timaeus describes fingernails as a special combination of bones, sinews, and flesh:
Where sinew and skin and bone were woven together around the fingers there was a
mixed combination of the three, which, upon drying, came to be one hard skin
compounded of them all—crafted by these accompanying causes (συναιτίοις, 76d6),
but fashioned by the superlative cause (αἰτιωτάτῃ, 76d7), purposeful intelligence, for
the sake of those who were to come afterwards. For they who were constructing us
knew that out of men (ἐξ ἄνδρων, 76d8) some day women and the rest of the wild
animals would be born; and they saw, in particular, that many of these nurslings
would, for many reasons, require the use of nails; whence they sketched out the origin
of the nails in human beings right from their birth. 214
Fingernails, while seemingly useless to men, are included on the male body because
women and non-human will later require them. 215 Although women are conceived of as a
category that is secondary to the human male (i.e., they come to be after and out of the
human male), 216 this aspect of the gods’ design of mortal bodies is still for their sake. In
the previous examples, we have noticed the ways that an organ is construed as secondary
when it is constructed for the sake of something else. Like the characterization of flesh,
fingernails present a challenge to the androcentric design of the human being. Fingernails,
although useful to women rather than to men, are still included in men’s bodies.
3.3.1.4 The Irrigation System: Nourishment and Breathing
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76d-e, translated by Kalkavage.
The karmic myth at the end of the dialogue (90e-92c) describes the mechanism through which women
and the rest of the wild animals come to be from human men.
216 Reading the account of the origin of sexual difference at the end of the dialogue, some scholars (e.g.,
Strauss, Kalkavage, Miller) have asserted that the initial humans are unsexed, and that sexed men and women
arrive on the scene at the same time. This passage—particularly the claim that women come to be from men,
ἐξ ἄνδρων—presents a challenge for that view to address.
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Timaeus’ anatomical account culminates in his discussion of the irrigation system, which
in turn sets up his discussion of the nature and cause of diseases. The irrigation system (τὴν
ὑδραγωγίαν, 77e7) consists of the interconnected processes of digestion and breathing that
nourishes the body and regulates its temperature. On the one hand, the body generates heat
by taking in nutrition, converting it into hot blood, and returning that hot blood into the
veins:
The fire cuts up the food and sways this way and that inside us as it follows the
breath; and in this swaying to and fro it fills up the veins from the belly by pumping
into them from there the cut-up bits of food … We call it ‘blood’, which feeds the
flesh and the entire body, from which source the various parts of the body are
irrigated so as to fill up the base of what’s been left void. 217
On the other hand, the body cools itself through breathing:
Now all this work and process [i.e., breathing] has come about for the sake of our
body, so that by being refreshed and cooled, it might be nourished and live; for
whenever the inner fire, which is attached to the breathing that goes in and out, should
follow this breathing, and, in its perpetual swaying back and forth, should enter in
through the belly and lay hold of food and drink, it melts them and, by dividing them
up into small pieces, drives them through the outgoing channels from a spring, and
it makes the currents of the veins flow through the body as though through a pipe. 218
For the Hippocratics, it is the interaction between the irrigation system and the flesh that
explains women’s need for menstruation. According to the Hippocratics, the porosity of
women’s flesh allows it to be overfilled with blood from the stomach, which must be
expelled through menstruation. Timaeus has, however, described the flesh as being
naturally loose and moist rather than dense and dry, as the Hippocratics describe men’s
flesh. Further, Timaeus’ account of the irrigation system depends on the fundamental
porosity of the human body. 219
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Given the way Timaeus frames the human body in a more feminine light, one would
hope that Timaeus would offer a solution to, or at least an account of, the problems that
women face in the Hippocratic texts due to the porosity of their flesh. He does not,
however, seem to see the porosity of flesh as an obstacle in the same way that the
Hippocratics do for women. Additionally, Timaeus does not address menstruation in his
account of the irrigation system as such. He does, however, give special attention to what
happens when the body retains excess material. This serves as the explanation for why
disease arises in the human body. Where the Hippocratics view menstruation as a
particularly female process of expelling excessive material, Timaeus views the physical
phenomenon of excessive retention as a general principle of disease in the body.
3.3.2

Timaeus 81e-90d: Health and Disease

After his account of the irrigation system, Timaeus moves into a discussion of the nature
of health and disease. He starts with disease (81e-87b), which in turn is broken into two
sections: body-related diseases and soul-related diseases. In each case, Timaeus conceives
of disease as a kind of disproportion within the body. Following his account of disease,
Timaeus discusses health for the human being (87b-90d). He describes health as a matter
of proportionate care for the soul and body (87c-d). Care for the soul and body, in turn,
consists of making them imitate the mother and wetnurse of the universe, the χώρα, to the
greatest extent possible. 220
In this section, I am going to analyze the way Timaeus positions femininity in his
accounts of health and disease. Like the first part of his third discourse, Timaeus draws on
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Hippocratic ideas about sexual difference—and in particular Hippocratic ideas about
feminine pathology—in his account of health and disease. For the most part, Timaeus
centralizes femininity in his account of health. The χώρα, the paradigm of femininity in the
Timaeus, serves as the model for human health on his account, and he even frames certain
masculine features (i.e., denseness of the flesh) as pathological. At the same time, Timaeus
also uses Hippocratic accounts of female disease as a model when he describes diseases of
the soul. In this account, people with soul-related disease experience something like the
virgin’s disease described in the treatise On Girls and in the final myth of the Timaeus.
While it is undeniable that Timaeus centralizes femininity in his account of health in a way
that the Hippocratics do not, his generalization of the model of female disease must also
be accounted for.
3.3.2.1 Disease
In his account of disease, Timaeus distinguishes between body-related diseases (“τὰ περὶ
τὸ σῶμα νοσήματα” (86b1), discussed at 81e-86a) and soul-related ones that arise through
the body (“τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν διὰ σώματος” (86b2), discussed at 86b-87b). This leaves open
the possibility of diseases of the soul that come to be through means other than the body
(i.e., through the soul itself), which Timaeus does not discuss. Consequently, the body is
the site of explanation for all of the kinds of diseases that Timaeus discusses. Like the
Hippocratics, Timaeus’ explains disease as a kind of disproportion within the body:
Where the structure of diseases comes from is, I take it, plain to everyone. For since
there are four kinds of which the body is compacted (earth, fire, water and air), when,
contrary to nature, either an excess or a deficiency of these kinds arises; or else when
there’s a shift from their familiar place to one that’s alien; or again, since the kinds
of fire and the rest happen to be more than one, when a particular bodily part rakes
in an additional something that’s not suited to it—when all such things happen, they
provide factions and diseases. … whatever is unmusical and steps outside of [right
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proportion] upon leaving or arriving will produce alterations of any and every variety
and indefinitely many diseases and corruptions. 221
Although diseases of all kinds arise through some kind of bodily disproportion, Timaeus
divides them into kinds based on the organs or systems that are affected by the
disproportion. He discusses diseases that result from the decomposition of flesh and the
organs (82c-84b), diseases of the marrow (84b-c), and diseases that come to be from air,
phlegm, and bile (84c-86a). In these accounts, Timaeus centralizes feminine anatomical
principles as indicators of health, while pathologizing excessively masculine features. In
the first kind of diseases, Timaeus says that the body falls into disarray when the parts of
the body become hostile (πολέμια, 83a5) toward their χώραν—their rightful place:
For when all these have become reversed and thereby corrupted, they first destroy
the blood itself; and providing no further nourishment for the body, they course
through the veins in every direction, no longer abiding by the order of their natural
circuits, becoming hateful to themselves, because they have no enjoyment of
themselves, and hostile to whatever in the body stands together 222 and stays in its
assigned place (χώραν), thus destroying and wasting everything. 223
Next, in the second kind of disease, the one having to do with the marrow, Timaeus
attributes disease in bones to their denseness:
But dangerous as these body-related ailments are, still more serious are those that are
more primary. These arise whenever bone, through density of flesh, doesn’t get
sufficient air and, getting all heated up by mold, gangrenes, fails to receive its
nourishment, and crumbles. 224
In his initial account of flesh, as we have already observed, Timaeus emphasizes porosity
rather than denseness, in contrast with the Hippocratic norm for healthy flesh. Here,
Timaeus takes his divergence from the Hippocratics a step further—not only is the kind of
221

Timaeus 81e-82b, translated by Kalkavage.
The word here is συνεστῶτι, from συνίστημι. Compare this to the similar willful standing together of
intellect and necessity at 48a: “mixed indeed was the birth of this cosmos here, and begotten from a standing
together (συστάσεως) of necessity and intellect” (translated by Kalkavage).
223 Timaeus 82e-83a (translated by Kalkavage).
224 Timaeus 84b-c (translated by Kalkavage).
222
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flesh the Hippocratics consider to be feminine the normative standard of flesh for Timaeus,
but characteristically masculine flesh is pathological. Density of the flesh prevents the
bones and marrow from receiving their due nourishment and causes them to be consumed
by mold. The flesh must be porous in order for the body’s marrow to remain healthy.
While Timaeus’ account of body-related diseases foregrounds feminine features
that have been pathologized by the Hippocratics, his account of soul-related diseases uses
Hippocratic accounts of female disease as a template for disease in general. Timaeus
introduces soul-related diseases that come to be through the body by claiming that “it must
be granted that folly (ἄνοιαν, 86b3) is a disease of the soul.” 225 He divides folly into two
categories of disease: madness (μανίαν, 86b4) and stupidity (ἀμαθίαν, 86b4), and sets them
down alongside excessive pleasures and pains. As an example of soul-disease related to
folly and excessive pleasures and pains, Timaeus discusses male sexual incontinence:
When the seed from a man’s marrow-area frows copious and free-flowing, just like
a tree whose nature makes it fruitful beyond measure, he brings on himself again and
again many intense pains and many pleasures amid his desires and their offspring;
and he comes to be raving mad for the greater part of his life through those greatest
pleasures and pains; … the truth is that sexual incontinence has come about as a
disease of the soul, due for the most part to the condition of a single kind, which,
because of the porosity of the bones, flows freely in the body and irrigates it. 226
Timaeus characterized the excessive density of the bones as a pathology earlier, and here,
in turn, he shows the danger of bones that are excessively porous. This is true at least in
men—there is no indication of whether for women porous bones would produce the same
kind of disease. There is no discussion of female sexual incontinence. While we could view
this as Timaeus pathologizing the feminine trait of porosity in the bones, perhaps this

225 Timaeus
226 Timaeus

86b (translated by Kalkavage).
86c-d (translated by Kalkavage).
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suggests instead that the male body is more easily prone to certain diseases in a way that
the female body would not be.
This male disease follows a similar pattern to Hippocratic descriptions of diseases
that are exclusively female. The madness of the sexually incontinent man, overfull with
marrow, resembles the madness of the girl with virgin’s disease, who is overfull with her
menses. In On Girls, virgin’s disease results when the mouth of the uterus is closed and, as
a result, the menses are retained: 227
But when the mouth at its end is not opened up, even more blood flows in from food
and the body’s growth. Then, having no means of flowing out, the blood springs up
in its multitude, into the heart and the midriff. 228
Like the man who becomes raving mad due to his body’s overfullness, the girl with virgin’s
disease displays a terrifying madness due to her retained blood:
As a result, when this is the way things are going, the woman rages because of her
acute inflammation, and in her rottenness she becomes murderous. She is afraid of
darkness and dreads it. Because of the compression around the heart, they want to
strangle themselves, and the bad state of the blood drags her spirit into evil, being
agitated and in great anguish. She names deviant and fearful things, and they urge
her to leap and fall into wells or to hang herself, as if being better and altogether
necessary. When she is without these dreams, there is some pleasure through which
she yearns for death as if it were some kind of a good. 229
Timaeus seems to be taking this Hippocratic account of a sexually specific disease (i.e., a
disease that only women suffer) and adapting it for a uniquely male ailment. Timaeus’
sexually incontinent man suffers from something similar to the girl with virgin’s disease,
and for a similar cause. Both experience an overfullness of a substance that needs to be
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This disease is not exclusive to the treatise On Girls. It appears frequently throughout the Hippocratic
gynecology, especially in the earliest gynecological treatise, Nature of Women. I have chosen to look to the
treatise On Girls in particular because it offers an account of virgin’s disease that is the most focused and
detailed of anywhere in the Hippocratic Corpus, and its details remain consistent with the other accounts of
the same disease.
228 On Girls, my translation.
229 On Girls, my translation.
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released from the body. The undue retention of the substance results in a madness and
terrible pains and pleasures. For women, the disease is cured when she has sex with a
man. 230 Timaeus does not give an account of the man’s release from sexual incontinence
due to excessive marrow, but presumably it must also come from emission of the excessive
substance.
Following the account of sexual incontinence, Timaeus outlines another kind of
pain the body creates for the soul, producing soul-related diseases like melancholy, bad
temper, recklessness, and cowardice, forgetfulness, and slowness in learning. This account
resembles even more closely Hippocratic accounts of the wandering womb, as well as
Timaeus’ own account which comes a few pages later:
Whenever the humors from acidic and briny phlegms and those that are bitter and
bilious, wandering (πλανηθέντες, 86e7) throughout the body, have no vent to the
outside but remain huddled up inside, and mingle the vapor that comes from them
with the coursing of the soul and get thoroughly blended by it, they introduce all
manner of soul-diseases (παντοδαπὰ νοσήματα ψυχῆς, 87a2), some more intense and
widespread than others; and once they’ve penetrated to the three regions of the soul,
in whatever region each of these attacks, they mottle (προσπίπτῃ, 87a5) her with
diverse forms of bad temper and melancholy as well as of recklessness and
cowardice, and also forgetfulness and slowness in learning. 231
The vocabulary of Timaeus’ wandering womb myth is a repetition of this section. In that
myth, the womb acts on the woman in the same way that the acidic and briny phlegms treat
the soul here. Timaeus describes the womb as wandering (πλανώμενον, 91c4) all
throughout the body and causing all manner of diseases (νόσους παντοδαπάς, 91c6) for the
woman by suffocating her (τὰς τοῦ πνεύματος διεξόδους ἀποφράττον, 91c5). Once again,
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“Release from these things comes whenever nothing prevents her blood from flowing out. Therefore, I
really urge young girls, whenever they suffer from this kind of thing, to get together with a man as quickly
as possible.” (On Girls, my translation).
231 Timaeus 86e-87a (translated by Kalkavage).
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in his account of soul-related diseases Timaeus de-territorializes female pathology and
instead makes it a model of disease that is common to both sexes.
3.3.2.2 Health and the Χώρα
Timaeus introduces health in terms of proportion:
And it’s likely and fitting that we deliver in turn the counterpart that answers to all
this, which concerns the treatment of our bodies and thought processes, as well as
the causes by which these are preserved, for it’s more just that good things have their
account rather than bad. Now all the good is beautiful, and the beautiful is not
disproportionate; so one must posit that an animal, too, if it’s to be beautiful, must
have due proportion. And while we thoroughly perceive and reason out the minor
proportions, concerning those that are most critical and greatest, we are unreasoning.
For with respect to health and diseases and virtue and vices, there isn’t a single
proportion or lack of proportion greater than that of soul herself in relation to body
itself. 232
Health and virtue are both constituted by a kind of proportion between the body and the
soul. Body and soul are, however, different kinds of substance (if soul can be called
substance at all) and therefore cannot be brought directly into proportion with one another.
In order to maintain one’s health, the proportion one must attend to is the one between care
for the soul and the body. The healthy and virtuous person is the one who exercises the
soul and the body in equal amount:
The one safeguard against both these conditions [i.e., a soul stronger than the body
or a body stronger than the soul, both of which produce disease and vice] is this:
never to set the soul in motion without the body nor body without soul, so that both
of them, by defending themselves, may become equally balanced and thereby
healthy. 233
He goes on to give examples; the student of math must take care also to practice
gymnastics, and the body-builder must also attend to philosophy. Although the soul and
body are different and require different care, the basic principle of care for each of them is
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the same: they need to be set in motion. Care for the soul and body is synonymous with
setting them into motion in this passage.
Timaeus describes this care for soul and body as setting each into motion in terms
of the χώρα, the mother and wetnurse of the cosmos who is also the principle of motion,
shaking, change, and disorder in the cosmos. 234 In advising how the body should be put
into motion, Timaeus says that one should imitate the motion of the χώρα:
The various bodily parts must also be treated in the same way, in imitation of the
form of the all. For since the body is burned up and chilled within by what enters it,
and again dried up and moistened by what comes from the outside 235 … it happens
that whenever anyone surrenders his body, which has been in a state of peace, to
these motions, the body is overpowered and utterly destroyed. But if someone
imitates what we have called the nurturer and wetnurse of the all, 236 and for the most
part never allows the body to be at peace but keeps it in motion and, by always
introducing certain shakings in it, provides a constant natural defense against the
inner and outer motions and, by temperate shaking, arrays the affections and particles
that wander around the body and puts them in order with one another according to
various kinships, as in the previous account we gave concerning the all, then he won’t
allow foe to be set next to foe to breed wars in the body and diseases as well, but
rather he will have friend set next to friend so as to produce health. 237
The χώρα is the paradigm of femininity in the Timaeus. She stands in contrast with
masculine intellect; Timaeus uses a detailed image of sexual difference to characterize the
two in relation to one another. In the initial discussion of the χώρα, she is viewed like the
traditional Greek woman: a necessary evil. The cosmos cannot come to be except through
her therefore intellect must persuade her toward what is best. 238 Here, however, she is cast
in a new light. Rather than the irascible and indiscernible enigma Timaeus first presents
her as, she is the model for human health and virtue.

234 Timaeus

discusses at length in his second discourse. For the account of the χώρα, see Timaeus 47e-53a.
Timaeus 52d-53a.
236 At 49a, 50d, and 52d.
237 Timaeus 88c-89a.
238 See Timaeus 48a.
235 C.f.
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Previously in Timaeus, humans, along with the rest of the cosmos, are products that
have been crafted solely in the likeness of the god and eternal model. This does not
contradict or disagree with that account, but it does reveal a new aspect of embodiment.
While the lesser gods craft human beings in imitation of the kinds of products their father,
the demiurge, makes, the human being who imitates the demiurge in her actions will be
neither healthy nor virtuous. When the human acts in some of the ways the demiurge acts
(i.e., in ways that are motionless or purely reinforcing of self-sameness), she is destroyed
by vice and disease. Timaeus finishes off his third discourse by reminding us that god has
given us our own share of divinity (i.e., intellect), and that to become as immortal or godlike
as a human can be, one must, above all, honor her divinity. As it turns out, honoring one’s
divinity and becoming godlike—through pursuing health, virtue, and the philosophical life
that those allow—is a practice of imitating the feminine χώρα.

3.4

Conclusions

In my first analysis of the third discourse, I examined the ways that Timaeus reconsiders
the Hippocratic notion of feminine dependency. In my analysis of the first part of Timaeus’
first discourse, I argued that Timaeus casts the features that the Hippocratics consider
characteristic of male bodies (i.e., dense, hard, and smooth flesh) in a position of
dependency. Each of the organs that embody those traits—like the liver—requires another,
feminine (i.e., porous, loose, soft, spongy, hollow, yielding, malleable) organ to maintain
it and care for it. While in the Hippocratics women’s bodies are dependent on men due to
their porosity, Timaeus portrays the human body as one in which denseness and hardness
must be maintained by what is porous. At the same time, the soft and porous organs (i.e.,
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the lungs, lower belly, spleen) are secondary to their counterparts in function. Each of these
organs is crafted for the sake of caring for another organ in the body, rather than
accomplishing some purpose for the body. The liver is constructed in order to communicate
between intellect and the appetite, while the spleen is constructed for the care of the liver.
Thus, there is a kind of mutual but incommensurate dependency between masculine
and feminine properties throughout the Timaeus. In the third discourse, the soft organs
depend on the hard ones for their functions, while the hard organs depend on the soft ones
for their ability to function. They are mutually dependent in different ways. In the account
of the origin of the cosmos in the second discourse, the χώρα depends on intellect for any
form, intelligibility, or determinacy, while the cosmos coming into ordered being depends
on intellect persuading necessity to be shaped in such a way. This mutual dependency
stands in contrast with the Hippocratic notion of feminine dependency, which postulates
women’s unreciprocated dependency on male bodies. On the Hippocratic model, women
require sexual intercourse to maintain an equilibrium, but men do not. Men do not require
anything from women for their health; they are the caretakers of women, receiving nothing
in return. Timaeus works in the terms that the Hippocratics use, discussing dependency in
terms of sexual difference and physiological traits. However, while the Hippocratics frame
dependency as a marker of inferiority and pathology, associated exclusively with
femininity, Timaeus makes dependency an essential part of existence for everything that
comes to be in the cosmos, especially human beings. Dependency is in its own way a
feature of both masculinity and femininity.
In addition to revising the Hippocratic notion of feminine dependency, Timaeus is
de-territorializing the Hippocratic idea of female diseases. In the Hippocratic texts, there
140

are certain diseases that are exclusive to women, such as virgin’s disease and other forms
of the retention of the menses. 239 Timaeus takes these female diseases and instead makes
them a model of disease in general. He uses provocatively similar vocabulary to describe
the origin of soul diseases as he does the pathology of the wandering womb. In the case of
soul-diseases, humors wander throughout the body and strangle the soul, bringing on all
manner of diseases for her. In another example, Timaeus takes his de-territorialization of
the Hippocratic notion of female diseases a step further by using the model of female
anatomy (i.e., porosity) and disease (i.e., retained menses) in order to present an account
of male sexual incontinence. On that account, Timaeus uses the terms of female disease to
describe an exclusively male disease. In his account of diseases, Timaeus is, as he is
elsewhere, speaking in Hippocratic medical-scientific terms, but changing the meaning of
those terms in a way that makes room for and better appreciates the feminine properties of
embodiment.
Finally, Timaeus’ most significant divergence from the Hippocratic norms of
sexual difference and human health comes in his account of health. Timaeus foregrounds
femininity in his account of health by making the χώρα the model of health for the soul
and body in the human being. Where the Hippocratics set men’s bodies as the standard of
health for the human being, Timaeus establishes a feminine standard of health in the way
he prioritizes the χώρα. This has to be one of the most significant instances in ancient Greek
thinking of femininity being foregrounded and used as a standard of health for the human
being. In making room for the feminine aspects of embodiment and foregrounding the

239 There are other exclusively female diseases in the Hippocratic Corpus, especially outlined in the Diseases

of Women I and II and in the Nature of Women. I have focused primarily on diseases having to do with a
displaced uterus and retained menses for the purposes of my project.
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account of health in the human being, Timaeus acknowledges the sense in which humans
are bodies as well as souls, and does justice to body as a component of the cosmos in its
own right.
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